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Abstract 
This thesis examines the processes that underlie how individuals seek hospital 
care and purchase private health insurance in a mixed public and private hospital 
system such as that of Australia. To achieve this objective, a theoretical model 
with explicit functional forms is first developed to analyse the determinants of 
the intensity of hospital care use, the choice to seek public or private hospital 
care and the decision to purchase insurance. The key areas of interest are how 
direct and indirect 'prices' for hospital care, viz-a-viz waiting times and private 
health insurance, influence the decisions to seek either public or private care and 
the intensity of care. A key result from the analysis is that individuals with more 
severe medical conditions are expected to have a higher probability of seeking 
treatment from the public sector because the duration of wait for public care is 
shorter due to priority setting in the public sector. In addition, the availability 
of private hospital insurance reduces the effective price of private hospital care 
and increases both the probability that individuals seek private treatment and 
the intensity at which private hospital care is utilised. 
A simultaneous equation econometric model that is based on the structure of 
the theoretical framework is developed. The econometric model accommodates 
count and binary outcomes variables as well as endogenous binary regressors. 
The model is estimated using data from the 2004-05 National Health Survey to 
conduct two empirical analyses. The first analysis examines the determinants of 
the intensity of hospital admissions and the decision to purchase private health 
insurance. A key result is that having private hospital insurance increases the 
expected number of hospital admissions each year by 19 percentage points. In 
addition to insurance status, the intensity of hospital admission is also influenced 
by age, gender, employment status, health status and locality. 
The second empirical analysis examines the determinants of the intensity of 
hospital care use and the decisions to seek public or private hospital care and 
purchase private health insurance using a simultaneous framework. The results 
indicate that individuals with private hospital insurance are 81 percentage points 
more likely to seek hospital care as a private patient. Age, household income, 
private sector employment and the presence of dependent children are factors that 
increase the probability that individuals obtain private care. On length of stay, 
the results show that the expected length of hospital stay by private patients 
is on average 1.11 nights shorter than that of public patients which suggests 
that systematic differences exist in the types of medical conditions for which 
individuals seek public or private treatment. Contrary to existing evidence, this 
study does not find any significant moral hazard effect amongst patients who 
sought hospital care as a private patient. 
Prom a policy perspective, the results suggest that the effectiveness of gov-
ernment initiatives in Australia to encourage the purchase of private hospital 
insurance is likely to be limited to reducing public hospital waiting lists and 
lowering waiting times for public treatment. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Health care is one of the key policy concerns among governments in many devel-
oped countries. The rapid growth in public expenditure on health and long-term 
care from the late 1990s has placed tremendous fiscal pressures on government 
budgets. Average public expenditure on health and long-term care in developed 
countries from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) is projected to roughly double from 6.7% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in 2005 to 10-13% by 2050 (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2006). For Australia, this is projected to rise from 5.6% in 2005 to 
between 9.9%-12.6% in 2050. Population aging and longevity, technological ad-
vancement and increasing relative prices of health services have been identified as 
the key drivers of the growth in health care spending. As fiscal pressures mount, 
governments have sought to identify and implement alternative mechanisms to 
finance the health care demands of their populace. Policy makers in countries 
where the public sector plays a significant role in paying for health care have 
looked to private health insurance markets as an additional source of funding to 
complement public financing. Private health insurance also perform the role as a 
policy instrument to help governments achieve their health policy goals such as 
reducing pressures on the public health care system, promoting individual choice 
and improving efficiency (Colombo and Tapay 2004). 
Australia adopts a mixed public and private approach in the financing and 
provision of hospital care. The country's tax financed national health insurance 
program, Medicare, ensures free and universal access for public patients in pub-
lic hospitals. Patients may elect to seek private care in both public and private 
hospitals where they are given the freedom to choose their treating doctor, ac-
cess to private rooms and avoid significant waiting times for elective treatment 
in public hospitals. The charges associated with private treatment are either 
borne by individuals as out-of-pocket expenditures or by other insurers (e.g. pri-
vate health funds, Department of Veterans' Affairs). In Australia, private health 
insurance provides duplicate insurance coverage for hospital services that are in-
cluded under the public insurance scheme Medicare. Individuals are allowed to 
utilise the public system and obtain free hospital care regardless of their private 
health insurance status. 
Against the background of steadily declining private health insurance mem-
bership after the Australia's national health insurance program Medicare was in-
troduced in 1984, the Australian government introduced a series of policy changes 
between 1997 to 2000 aimed at encouraging the purchase of private health insur-
ance. These policies included a combination of tax subsidies, tax penalties and 
a modification of the community rating regulations. The then prevailing policy 
stance clearly supported a balanced public and private involvement in the deliv-
ery of health care to ensure both universal access and choice and the declining 
private health insurance membership was regarded as threatening the financial 
viability of the private hospital sector, which could eventually lead to greater 
burden on the public hospital system (Commonwealth Department of Health and 
Aged Care 1999). The implementation of the policies resulted in a dramatic in-
crease in private health insurance coverage, from a low of 30.1% in December 
1999 to 45.7% in September 2000 (Butler 2002).1 
Whilst it is clear that the series of policy changes have been effective in re-
versing the declining trend in health insurance coverage, the effectiveness of these 
policies in relieving the burden on the public hospital system is less conclusive. 
The available evidence in the literature suggest that while utilisation of private 
hospital care increased following the expansion of private health insurance cov-
erage in 2000, a significant fraction of this increase was attributed to admissions 
for elective surgical and medical procedures (Sundararajan et al. 2004). Further-
more, patients suffering from severe medical conditions are more likely to seek 
public as opposed to private hospital care, which leads to the public hospital sys-
tem being increasingly burdened by patients with complicated, and potentially 
expensive medical needs (Hopkins and Freeh 2001). Evidence on the effect of 
1 Although coverage began to drift downwards again after September 2000, by mid 2004 it 
had stabilised at 43%. Since then, coverage has begun to increase slightly with 44.7% of the 
population having hospital coverage at 31 December 2009 (PHIAC 2010). 
the increase in private hospital activity on public hospital waiting lists has also 
been inconclusive. Hanning (2002) observed that the length of waiting lists in 
Victorian public hospitals shortened following the dramatic increase in the pro-
portion of Victorian population with private health insurance although a major 
contributor was the decrease in additions to waiting lists rather than the increase 
in the number of admissions from lists. Duckett (2005) on the other hand found 
that waiting times in Australia were negatively associated with the proportion 
of public hospital separations and argues that financing the provision of elec-
tive surgery directly through the public system is likely to be more effective in 
decreasing public hospital waiting times. 
A precursor to any investigation on the feasibility and effectiveness of private 
health insurance as a policy tool requires first a thorough understanding of the 
processes that underlie how individuals seek hospital care and purchase private 
health insurance in a mixed public and private hospital system such as that of 
Australia. And the latter is the main motivation of this thesis. This thesis con-
tributes to the body of literature on the demand for hospital care and private 
health insurance in a mixed public and private health care system. Following a 
review of the existing literature in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 examines the relation-
ship between the intensity in the utilisation of hospital care, the decision to seek 
public or private hospital care and the choice to purchase private health insurance 
through a theoretical model with explicit functional forms. The data that is em-
ployed for the empirical analysis is described in Chapter 4. A novel simultaneous 
equation econometric model that accommodates count and binary outcomes as 
well as endogenous binary regressors is discussed in Chapter 5. The framework 
for the econometric model is based on the theoretical model presented in Chapter 
3. In Chapter 6, the econometric model is estimated empirically to examine the 
determinants of the demand for hospital admissions and private health insurance. 
In Chapter 7, the determinants on the demand for hospital stay, the decision to 
seek public or private care and the choice to purchase private health insurance 
are investigated. Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the main findings in 
this thesis. 
Chapter 2 
Institutional Setting & Literature 
Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the institutional setting of hospital care financing in Aus-
tralia and reviews the literature on the relationship between private health in-
surance and the demand for hospital care in a mixed public and private health 
care system. The chapter is organised in four sections. The discussion begins 
with a description on how hospital care is financed in Australia in Section 2.2. In 
Section 2.3, the literature on the determinants of demand for public and private 
health care is discussed. Section 2.4 reviews the literature on the relationship be-
tween medical care use and insurance and Section 2.5 discusses the determinants 
of demand for private health insurance. 
2.2 Institutional Setting in Australia 
In Australia, individuals can choose to be admitted as public or Medicare patients 
in public hospitals and receive free treatment from doctors and health practition-
ers nominated by hospitals as well as free hospital accommodations and meals. 
Public hospital care is financed through Medicare, a compulsory tax-funded uni-
versal health insurance scheme which subsidies both outpatient and inpatient 
medical services and technologies according to a schedule of fees referred to as 
the Medicare Benefit Schedule (MBS). An alternative to choosing hospital care 
as a publicly funded patient is private care, which can be obtained in either pri-
vate or public hospitals. Individuals who choose private care are entitled to their 
choice of treatment doctor, better amenities such as private hospital rooms, and 
faster access to treatment (for elective surgeries). Private patients are charged 
fees for the professional services rendered by doctors, although they can claim a 
portion amounting to 75% of the MBS fees from Medicare. Private patients are 
also billed by hospitals for accommodations, theatres fees, diagnostic tests and 
medical supplies (such as medications, dressings and other consumables). The 
private hospital charges, as well as the portion of the difference between the fees 
that doctors charge and the Medicare subsidy (known as a 'gap fee'), is afforded 
either by private health insurance or as out-of-pocket expenditures. 
There are two types of private health insurance cover in Australia and these 
types can be defined by its role in relation to the public insurance program Medi-
care. The first type is private hospital coverage which provides duplicate coverage 
for hospital services already included under Medicare as well as complementary 
coverage towards the gap fees or copayments on private hospital expenditures. It 
is important to highlight that individuals are not allowed to opt out of Medicare 
hence private health insurance neither exempts nor excludes individuals from 
contributing or utilising the public system. The second type is ancillary or extra 
coverage (also referred to as general treatment policies) which performs a sup-
plementary role in covering expenditures on services such as dental care, allied 
health and items such as eye glasses which are not covered under Medicare. Indi-
viduals can choose either hospital, ancillary or combined cover. The health plans 
within each type of cover can vary in the amount of annual excess or deductibles, 
copayment rates, as well as the comprehensiveness in terms of the menu of ser-
vices covered.1 Policies may cover solely individuals (e.g. singles) or as a family 
unit (e.g. couple, single parent family, family). Children under the 21 years of 
age and full-time students below 25 years may be covered under their parents' 
policy without additional cost. 
A key feature of the regulatory structure on the private health insurance 
market in Australia is the community rating requirement on premiums, which 
stipulates that insurers must charge the same price for a particular insurance 
plan regardless of individuals' age, gender, health status, utilisation and claims 
history. Premiums are allowed to vary by states and may be different across 
lrThe information on the details of individuals' private health insurance plans are not avail-
able in the data used for the empirical analysis in this paper. 
policies and insurers. The requirement on community rated premiums was widely 
believed to have contributed to the dramatic decline in the proportion of the 
Australian population with private health insurance, which fell from roughly 50% 
when Medicare was introduced in 1984, to 32% in 1997 (Industry Comission 1997; 
Hall et al. 1999; Barrett and Conlon 2003). The contraction in private health 
insurance membership invoked active public debate on the appropriate role of 
public and private health insurance and the declining membership was regarded 
as threatening to the financial viability of the private hospital sector, which could 
eventually lead to greater burden on the public hospital system (Commonwealth 
Department of Health and Aged Care 1999). Between 1997 and 2000, three policy 
changes were implemented in the private health insurance market in Australia. 
These changes followed The first of three policies was the Private Health Insurance 
Incentive Scheme (PHIIS) introduced in July 1997. The scheme involved using 
tax subsidies to encourage the purchase of private health insurance amongst lower 
income individuals and tax penalties for individuals without insurance. On the 
latter, single individuals and families whose annual household income is above 
$50,000 or $100,000 respectively, and are without private health insurance cover, 
are liable for a tax penalty amounting to 1% of their annual income. In early 
1998, the subsidy component of the PHIIS was replaced a non means-tested 
30% rebate on health insurance premiums, with the tax penalty on high income 
earners remained in place. The third policy introduced in July 2000 is the Lifetime 
Community Rating (LCR) which involved a modification of the community rating 
regulations. Individuals above 30 years of age when joining an insurance fund 
are required to pay a higher premium over the remainder of their lifetime. The 
premium increase is calculated at 2% per year for each year of age above 30 
years at the time of entry. The implementation of the policies resulted in a 
dramatic increase in private health insurance coverage, from a low of 30.1% in 
December 1999 to 45.7% in September 2000 (Butler 2002). Coverage began to 
drift downwards again after September 2000 but have since stabilised. At the end 
of 2005, roughly 43% of the population have private hospital insurance coverage 
2.3 The Demand for Public and Private Health 
Care 
In countries where the public sector plays a dominant role in the financing of 
medical services and where services are provided free at the point of use, waiting 
lists feature predominantly as allocation mechanisms to control the access to 
publicly financed health care. Often, a private market coexists alongside the 
public sector which delivers private medical care financed either through direct 
payments by consumers or private health insurance. The following sections review 
the literature on the demand for health care in a health care system where health 
care is delivered at zero monetary cost through the public sector but rationed 
through the use of waiting lists. Individuals can choose to avoid waiting on 
public sector waiting lists by seeking private treatment that is provided at a 
positive price. The review begins with a discussion in Section 2.3.1 on how 
waiting on waiting lists performs a rationing role for public care where explicit 
monetary prices are absent. Section 2.3.2 reviews a selection of studies that have 
empirically estimated the cost of waiting on waiting lists. The literature on the 
demand for public and private health care is reviewed in Section 2.3.3. The main 
interest here is empirical studies that have examined how 'prices' for public and 
private medical care, viz-a-viz waiting times and private insurance, influence the 
demand for public and private care. 
2.3.1 Waiting as Rationing 
In health care markets where monetary prices are either minimal or absent, queues 
and waiting lists play a central, albeit different, role as allocation mechanisms to 
control access to and distribution of health care resources. Queueing, through 
the act of waiting in person, imposes a waiting cost on individuals undertaking 
the wait. The cost of waiting emerges in the form of the opportunity cost of time 
individuals spent physically waiting which can be channeled to labour market 
or leisure activities (Barzel 1974).2 Individuals join the queue if the benefits of 
obtaining the good exceeds the cost of waiting plus the price of the good. For 
2There are a variety of situations where queues have been noted to emerge. In the goods 
market, queues may arise as a result of uncertainty in demand and supply and where prices do 
not instantaneously adjust to clear the market (Arthur 1976). In a non-random environment, 
queues may occur if prices do not adjust the disequilibrium in demand or supply (See Culyer 
and Cullis (1976), p. 240). This discussion will focus on the latter. 
the marginal queuers, the cost of waiting is equal to the benefit of the good if the 
price of the good is zero. 
Waiting on waiting lists to access health care differs from physical queuing in 
that individuals on waiting lists are able to pursue labour or leisure activities in 
the duration of the wait. Hence, the opportunity cost of time that is associated 
with physical queuing does not fully apply. The absence of an opportunity cost 
of time however does not imply that waiting on waiting lists imposes no cost on 
individuals. Individuals waiting on waiting lists may be perceived as paying a 
price through the pain, suffering, inconvenience and uncertainty in waiting (Cu-
lyer and Cullis 1976).3 Waiting can be a source of disutility given that individuals 
on waiting lists are in poorer health than they would otherwise and because wait-
ing may be associated with anxiety arising from the uncertainty surrounding the 
length of time individuals have to wait as well as the eventual outcomes of medical 
treatments (Propper 1995). 
Rather than directly inflicting a cost on individuals, Lindsay and Feigenbaum 
(1984) argue that waiting on waiting lists performs a rationing role because the 
value of medical care diminishes when care delivered with a delay. The benefits 
from medical care depends on both the expected duration individuals are required 
to wait as well as the rate at which the value of care diminishes.4 The latter is 
referred to as the decay rate which is influenced by the characteristics of medical 
conditions that individuals suffer from. For instance, illness conditions that are 
self-correcting in nature if left untreated, and for which alternative treatments 
are available have a higher decay rate than otherwise.5 According to the model, 
individuals join waiting lists if the expected present value of the benefits of treat-
ment exceeds the cost of joining, where the latter includes all costs associated 
3 A necessary condition for the validity of the proposition that individuals pay a time-price 
in the form of the non-pecuniary cost associated with waiting is that these costs may be avoided 
if individuals choose not to join the waiting lists. In this regard, the authors remarked that 
their proposition is theoretically weak given that the non-monetary cost of pain, suffering and 
uncertainty incurred while waiting cannot be avoided if individuals choose not to join the 
waiting list. 
4Formally, the present value of medical care may be denoted by V • e~gt, where V denotes 
the value of medical care, g a decay rate and t the expected duration of wait. 
5In Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), the decay rate g is a combination of two effects. The 
first component in g is the intertemporal discount rate. The second component is a decay factor 
that is dependent on characteristics of medical conditions. Variations in g across individuals 
arise from differences in the decay rates as opposed to the discount rate as the magnitude of the 
former is expected to be considerably larger relative to the latter. This is because waiting times 
in practice are seldom long enough for the effect of intertemporal discounting to be significant 
(Lindsay and Feigenbaum 1984, p.407). 
with qualifying to be placed on the waiting list such as expenditure on medical 
examinations, consultations and referrals, and non medical related expenditures 
such as transportation costs and market information. 
An implicit result of the studies discussed above is that all else being equal, a 
shorter duration of wait will always be preferred to a lengthier one. Johannesson 
et al. (1998) argue the contrary and showed that individuals can actually be worse 
off when the waiting time for medical care is reduced. This is because there are 
both positive and negative discounting effects that arise which may increase or 
decrease individuals' expected present value utility from health and consumption 
when medical treatment is brought forward. Hence, it is not necessarily the 
case that individuals' willingness to pay for a shorter wait is always non-negative 
(p.643). The positive estimates of the willingness to pay for a one month reduction 
in waiting times obtained by the authors suggest that one would expect that 
individuals are on average better off from a short duration of wait than otherwise.6 
2.3.2 Empirical Estimates on the Cost of Waiting 
Studies have sought to estimate the cost of waiting on hospital waiting lists. The 
available literature on this subject differs in terms of the perspective or view-
point (patients, caregivers and/or health systems) adopted in the analysis and 
the methodological approaches that were employed to calculate or elicit the esti-
mates of the cost of waiting. The discussion here focuses on a selection of studies 
that have attempted to estimate the cost of waiting from the perspective of pa-
tients who are the demanders of hospital care.7 Using the framework proposed 
by Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), Cullis and Jones (1986) argue that the cost 
of waiting may be approximated by the price of private medical care where avail-
able. Individuals can avoid waiting for public hospital care by paying a positive 
price for treatment in the private sector where the expected duration of wait is 
zero. Individuals are indifferent between waiting for public care and the private 
alternative if the net present value of public hospital care is equal to the net 
benefit of private treatment.8 Hence, the average price of private medical care 
6The empirical estimates obtained in this paper are discussed in Section 2.3.2 below. 
7See Centre for Spatial Economics (2008) who estimated the cost of waiting from a societal 
perspective for the case of Canada. 
8The net present value of benefits of public hospital care is V • e~gt - C, where C is the 
expenditure associated with medical examinations, diagnosis and referral by a general practi-
tioner and the remaining variables are defined above. The net benefit of private treatment is 
given by (V — C) - P where P is the price of private care. 
provides an upper bound estimate on the cost of waiting and the lower bound is 
zero. Based on this argument, the authors estimated that the total cost of wait-
ing in the United Kingdom (UK) National Health Survey (NHS) ranges between 
£1,205 million to £2,155 million (in 1984 dollars), or 9.1% to 16.2% of the total 
government expenditure on the NHS (Cullis and Jones 1986, p. 253). Based 
on these estimates, the cost of one month's wait ranges from £110 to £220.9 
Propper (1995) estimated the monetary values of the disutility of waiting on UK 
hospital waiting list using contingent valuation.10 The estimates of the value of 
waiting time were found to vary by income. For individuals whose income is 
below £350 per week, the value of time ranges from £26.7 to £30.1 per month 
of wait (1987 dollars). The value of time for individuals whose weekly income is 
above £350 is higher than the former, ranging from £37.7 to £39.5 per month 
of wait. Johannesson et al. (1998) derived estimates on the value of time on 
waiting lists by considering individuals' willingness-to-pay for private insurance 
to reduce the length of waiting time based on data collected through interviews 
with a sample of Swedes. The estimate of the willingness-to-pay for a reduction 
in one month's wait, factoring the exchange rate between the Swedish Kroner and 
the British pound, ranges between £95 to £110 in 1991 prices.11 As a first inter-
country study on the cost of waiting times, Bishai and Lang (2000) estimated the 
monetary value of willingness to pay for a one month reduction in waiting time 
for cataract surgery using data collected from patients who underwent surgery in 
Canada, Denmark and Spain. The authors estimated that the average willingness 
to pay to reduce waiting times ranges from $24 in Denmark, $33 in Canada and 
$107 in Spain (1992 dollars).12 These estimates suggest that the "hidden" cost 
of cataract surgery waiting time comprised 10%025% of the pecuniary cost of 
the surgical procedure. 
Although the estimates on the value of waiting times from the selected studies 
reviewed above are broadly comparable, it is not unexpected that the estimates 
9In 1985 dollars. See Propper (1995), p.695. 
10A separate objective of the paper was to investigate if the value of waiting time is influenced 
by uncertainty surrounding duration individuals are required to wait for care. In this regard, 
the author obtained estimates of the value of the uncertainty. 
11 This result is broadly consistent with that obtained in Propper (1995), where the total 
willingness-to-pay for a reduction in one month's wait is approximately £80 in 1991 dollars 
(Johannesson et al. 1998, p.641). 
12These results are consistent with the authors' hypothesis that the actual waiting times for 
surgery would be the shortest in the country with the highest willingness to pay to reduce the 
length of wait (Bishai and Lang 2000, p. 228) 
should differ given that considerable differences exist in the way the studies are 
designed in terms of the medical conditions of interest, the methodological ap-
proaches to elicit the willingness to pay measures as well as the country of focus.13 
2.3.3 Theoretical and Empirical Studies: Demand for Pub-
lic & Private Medical Care 
In countries where health services are provided free at the point of delivery, wait-
ing lists feature predominantly as resource allocation mechanisms to control the 
access to health care. Here, the cost of waiting on waiting lists performs the 
rationing role that market prices traditionally play and the expected duration of 
wait influences individuals' decisions to join waiting lists (Lindsay and Feigen-
baum 1984). When a private alternative to public care is available, individuals 
weigh the cost of waiting on waiting lists against the price of private treatment 
in formulating their choices (Cullis and Jones 1986). The utilisation decisions 
of individuals influence the aggregate demands of public and private health care 
which in turn affect the respective market prices. The public provision of pri-
vate goods, which include health care and education, can also play a role in the 
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor (Besley and Coate 1991). 
Within the framework briefly outlined above, individuals' decision making on 
the demand for public and private health care is succinctly described in Martin 
and Smith (1999). In their model, individuals face the choice of either receiving 
public or private treatment or alternatively choosing to forgo treatment alto-
gether. Private treatment that is undertaken immediately confers the maximum 
health benefit to individuals at a positive price. Free public treatment that is 
delivered after a duration of wait produces a smaller health gain as compared to 
private treatment. Individuals incur a fixed cost of seeking care regardless of the 
type of care which is avoided only if individuals forgo treatment. Individuals de-
cide between the three treatment strategies by choosing the option that produces 
the largest net benefits. 
The interaction between the public and private markets for hospital care is the 
13For example, the estimates of the cost of waiting are considerably higher in Cullis and Jones 
(1986) compared with those in Propper (1995) which may be attributable to methodological 
differences where the analysis in the former is based on medical conditions with varying decay 
rates g whereas the latter explicitly considers only conditions with zero decay rates (Propper 
1995, p.695). 
subject of interest in Goddard et al. (1995). The authors developed a theoreti-
cal general equilibrium demand and supply model of public and private hospital 
treatments that incorporates attributes of the demand side models in Lindsay and 
Feigenbaum (1984) and Cullis and Jones (1986).14 Waiting times in the public 
sector and the price of private treatment are endogenously determined and adjust 
to clear the public and private markets for hospital treatments. Prom Goddard 
et al.'s model, expectations of an increase in public sector waiting times decrease 
the demand for public care and increase the demand for private care. Corre-
spondingly, a decrease in the private treatment price increases the proportion 
of individuals seeking public treatment. An increase in the decay rate has two 
effects. Firstly, it reduces the demand for private care by inducing individuals to 
shift away from private into public care. Secondly, individuals shift away from 
using the public hospital sector and seek non-hospital alternatives. Consequently, 
the effect on an increase in g on the demand for public care is indeterminate as 
it depends on the relative magnitude of the two shifts (Goddard et al. 1995, p. 
44). 
Iversen (1997) analysed the effect on public hospital waiting times in the 
presence of a private sector emphasising the supply side institutional features 
of the public and private hospital care sectors. If waiting list admissions are 
not rationed, the effect of a private sector on public hospital waiting times is 
indeterminate unless the elasticity of public hospital care with regards to waiting 
times is sufficiently high, in which case the presence of a private sector will increase 
public sector waiting times (Iversen 1997, p.389). If admissions to waiting lists are 
rationed, and where hospital consultants work in both sectors, the introduction 
of a private sector increases the length of wait for public hospital treatments. 
The presence of a private sector does not affect public hospital waiting times if 
consultants do not dual practice and work in separate sectors (p. 391). 
A variety of studies have empirically investigated the relationship between 
utilisation, prices and costs to the users of public and private medical care. 
McAvinchey and Yannopoulos (1993) investigates the demand for public and 
14The interpretation of the decay rate in Goddard et al. (1995) differs from Lindsay and 
Feigenbaum's model in two aspects. Firstly, the authors make a distinction between the in-
tertemporal discount rate S and the decay rate g and both variables enter the utility function 
separately. Here, the discount rate is represented by the interest rate which affects the present 
value of income and consumption. Secondly, while the interpretations of g in Goddard et al. 
(1995) and Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) are similar insofar that they both represent the 
rate at which illness conditions improve or deteriorate over time, the increase in g in Goddard 
et al.'s model is motivated by improvements in the efficacy of non-hospital treatment. 
private acute care in the UK using an interrelated expenditure share model with 
aggregate data from 1955 to 1987. Expenditures on the following three com-
modities are considered: (1) NHS acute care obtained through waiting on NHS 
waiting lists, (2) private acute care with access through insurance and (3) general 
consumption. The price of NHS care is represented by a weighted average of the 
time spent waiting on NHS waiting lists for eight medical specialties.15 The aver-
age medical insurance premium across all insurance types16 is used as a proxy for 
the price of private medical care while the retail price index acts as the price for 
general consumption. The interrelated share model was specified as a translog 
cost function and the estimated coefficients were used to compute the short and 
long-run own-price, cross-price and income elasticities of the three commodities. 
The authors estimated that the price elasticity of public care with respect to 
waiting times ranges from between -0.30 to -0.68. Estimates for the price elastic-
ity of private acute care is relatively higher (-0.78 to -0.85) and is considerably 
less volatile across time than the elasticity estimates for public care. Cross-price 
elasticity estimates suggest that while the relationship between public and private 
care varies over time, public and private care are generally considered as substi-
tutes. This evidence suggests that the increase in NHS waiting times may be 
associated with relatively higher expenditures on private care, while a reduction 
in the price of private medical insurance leads to lower public expenditures. 
Martin and Smith (1999) examined the determinants of the demand and sup-
ply for elective surgery in the U.K. NHS using ward level data in 1991-92.17 The 
utilisation of public hospital services is measured by the ratio of the actual against 
the expected number of admissions to the NHS for elective surgery in a given 
ward.18 A standarised index of public hospital waiting times is constructed by 
calculating the ratio of the actual waiting times for the routine surgery specialty 
15The eight medical specialties considered in the study include General Surgery; Orthopaedic; 
Ear Nose and Throat; Ophthalmology; Urology; Oral Surgery and Oral Medicine; Surgical 
Paediatrics and Gynaecology. Waiting time for each specialty is computed as a ratio of the 
number of people on NHS waiting lists and the total deaths and discharges from hospital in 
any given year. 
16The three categories of insurance plans are individual, corporate and group. 
17The unit of observation in the study is the 'synthetic ward' which provides an indication 
of the area an individual resides. The average population size of a ward is roughly 10,000 with 
a total of 4,985 wards covering the whole of England (Martin and Smith (1999), p. 148) 
18The expected number of admissions in a given ward is calculated by first calculating the 
national NHS utilisation rates by age and sex groups. Thereafter, the utilisation rates are 
applied to age and sex profile of the population within a given ward. 
against a measure of expected waiting times.19 Further measures that influence 
the demand for public care include the number of family practitioners which acts 
as an alternative to hospital care and the accessibility of private inpatient treat-
ment, represented by the availability of private hospital beds. The supply model 
is based on managerial models of supply and is influenced by waiting times, and 
the number of public sector beds. Demand and supply are estimated separately 
using two-stage least squares to address the problem of endogeneity in waiting 
times to both demand and supply. The authors found that the demand elasticity 
of NHS elective surgery with respect to NHS waiting times is -0.21. The accessi-
bility to private care, measured by the availability of private hospital beds, does 
not have a significant impact on the demand for public elective care. Utilisation 
of NHS surgery is negatively associated with the available of family practitioner 
care (coefficient estimate is -0.08) which suggests that family practitioner care 
may perform as a weak substitute for public inpatient care. The degree of substi-
tutability between the family practitioner care for inpatient care is synonymous 
to the definition of the decay rate g in Goddard et al. (1995) and hence the 
negative relationship between family practitioner care and the demand for NHS 
care is consistent with Goddard et al.'s theoretical results. 
Using the 2004-05 Australian National Health Survey, Srivastava and Zhao 
(2008) examined the determinants of individuals' choice between public and pri-
vate hospital services. The key explanatory variable of interest is the role of 
private health insurance. The authors estimated a recursive trivariate probit 
system of equation model that accounts for partial observability given that in-
dividuals' choice between public and private care is only observed for those who 
have visited a hospital. The econometric model also allows for the endogeneity of 
the insurance binary variable in the public/private choice equation. In addition 
to covariates such as age, educational attainment, employment status and occu-
pation and household income, indicators of the quality of public health care were 
included (e.g. average waiting time and the proportion of individuals who waited 
more than a year for elective surgery, the public hospital bed-to-population den-
sity and the number of full time equivalent public hospital doctors). The results 
showed that the availability of private health insurance is the most important 
determinant of private heath care use. Individuals with private cover are 76 per-
centage points more likely to seek private hospital care relative to public care. 
19The expected waiting times are derived using national average waiting times by age and 
sex. 
The quality indicators of public hospital care are not significantly associated with 
both the choice to purchase private health insurance and to receive public or pri-
vate care. 
Propper (2000) examined the demand for public (NHS) and private health care 
for the case of the UK. The author exploited the individual level longitudinal data 
feature of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to account for individual 
heterogeneity on utilisation choices and to examine if past utilisation decisions 
can predict current choices of providers. The number of individuals waiting under 
and over 12 months on NHS waiting lists and an availability index for dental 
services are chosen as indicators of NHS quality. Individual occupations were used 
as proxies for employment linked private health insurance coverage given that 
information on private medical insurance is not captured in the survey. Contrary 
to previous studies, Propper found that individuals' decisions to seek private care 
are not significantly influenced by waiting times in the NHS. It was also observed 
that while movement between the public and private sectors occurred frequently 
and individuals do not obtain care only from a particular sector, individuals' 
choices tend to persist over time. The estimated probability that previous use 
of a given sector is followed by current use of the same sector (termed as the 
same sector effect) is higher than the probability that current use is of a different 
sector (cross sector effect). Socioeconomic characteristics such as income and 
employment are significantly associated with the choice to receive care from a 
particular sector. The author found that political attitudes significantly influence 
the choice of between public or private care in that more users of public care 
supported the principles of the NHS as compared to those who use private care. 
Gertler and Roland (1997) investigated how the demand for public and private 
medical care is affected by private medical insurance using survey data from 
Jamaica. For the case of preventive care, the authors found that the availability 
of insurance shifted individuals from public to private providers and increased the 
overall demand for preventive visits. More specifically, insurance is associated to 
a 28% reduction in the number of visits to public providers and a 114% increase 
in the visits to private providers. Overall, the number of public and private 
care visits increased by 48%. In the case of curative care, insurance reduces the 
number of visits to public providers by 45% and increases the private care visits 
by 37%. The overall number of curative care visits however does not increase 
significantly. 
2.4 Insurance, Moral Hazard and Medical Care 
Use 
In his seminal article, Arrow (1963) emphasised the presence of uncertainty and 
asymmetric information in the market for medical care that result in the ab-
sence of markets providing medical insurance coverage for certain types of health 
risks.20 The failure of the market for insurance was argued as a justification for 
governments to intervene and insure against risks for which insurance policies 
would fail to materialise if left to the markets (Arrow 1963, p.961). As Arrow 
points out, an important consideration here is the incentive effect of insurance 
known as the problem of moral hazard. There are two types of moral hazards 
that are associated with medical insurance. The first refers to ex ante moral haz-
ard which occurs prior to the onset of illness, where the availability of insurance 
increases the likelihood of illness and the expected expenditure on medical care 
(Ehrlich and Becker 1972). The second is ex post moral hazard which occurs after 
the incidence of illness. Here, insurance lowers the effective price of medical care 
to individuals, and hence increasing utilisation and medical expenditures (Pauly 
1986).21 
Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) describes the structure and design of health 
insurance and discusses the role of agency problems and moral hazard. Within 
the literature, there is substantial empirical evidence that individuals use more 
medical care when the generosity of insurance increases. Studies in the literature 
on this subject is divided into three types: randomised experiments of insurance, 
natural (or quasi) experiments and observational studies (Zweifel and Manning 
2000). Randomised experiments are specially designed studies where study par-
ticipants or 'subjects' are randomly assigned to receive different interventions or 
'treatments'. For random experiments involving insurance, the main objective 
would be to examine how the utilisation of medical care varies across individ-
uals randomly assigned to insurance plans with different levels of cost sharing. 
Random experiments avoid the self-selection problem and the estimates obtained 
from these studies can be regarded as reflecting the causal effects of insurance on 
medical care. The second type of empirical study is natural experiment which 
20See McGuire (2000) for a comprehensive review of the related literature. 
21The classical theory of moral hazard applies to the case of a single good. Goldman and 
Philipson (2007) shows that the classic moral hazard results may not apply for the case of 
multiple goods which are either complements or substitutes. 
typically relies on observational data. Natural experiments in insurance exploit 
changes in the regulatory and policy environment in insurance markets to anal-
yse how medical care utilisation patterns vary across individuals who were or 
were not affected by the changes. These studies are referred to as natural or 
quasi-experiments given that the policy changes are external to individuals and 
individuals can be thought of as being randomly assigned to different 'treatments' 
depending on whether or not they are affected. The third type of empirical study 
involves the use of observational data to compare how medical care utilisation 
behaviour of individuals varies with the generosity of insurance. In such studies, 
considerable attention is devoted to addressing the problem that the insurance 
explanatory variable is endogenous. 
The remainder of this section will be devoted to reviewing the literature on 
the relationship between insurance and the utilisation of medical care. The re-
view begins in Section 2.4.1 with a brief discussion of the key findings from the 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment which is often regarded as the 'gold stan-
dard' of studies on health insurance given the randomised feature of the study. 
Section 2.4.2 reviews the literature on empirical studies that have used observa-
tional data to examine the impact of insurance on medical care use. The main 
interest here is in empirical studies that have examined the effects of supplemen-
tary insurance on the demand for medical care within the context of a health 
care system where the public sector plays a dominant role in the provision and 
financing of health services and where individuals can purchase supplementary 
health insurance for services not covered under the public program. This insti-
tutional feature is consistent with the health care system in Australia. Studies 
using natural experiments, which is the second of the three types of empirical 
study, will not be discussed here and readers can refer to Zweifel and Manning 
(2000) for an excellent review.22 Finally, Section 2.4.3 concludes with a review 
of the methodological issues and complexities that frequently arise in using ob-
servational data for insurance studies and discusses the strategies that have been 
adopted to address them. 
2.4.1 Randomised Experiment in Insurance 
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) was a randomised trial of health 
insurance conducted in the United States between 1974 and 1977. The main 
22Section 5.2.1, pp. 429-433. 
objective of the HIE was to examine the impact of insurance cost sharing on the 
demand for health care, the financial risk from health expenditures and on health 
status (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group 1993). The random as-
signment of insurance plans is important to control for confounding effects that 
could substantially bias the estimates of the price elasticity of medical care. An 
example where this can happen is if individuals who are in poorer health and 
expect to use more medical care purchase insurance with more generous cover-
age. Failing to account for this adverse self-selection implies that the observed 
insurance effect on medical care use is likely be biased upwards. Adverse selec-
tion into insurance is likely to occur if insurance premiums are not risk-adjusted 
due to incomplete information on individuals' risk or constraints as a result of 
government regulations (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). 
In the HIE, study participants were randomly assigned to 14 different fee-
for-service insurance plans with different levels of costing sharing. 12 of the 14 
insurance plans differ according to four coinsurance rates (0, 25, 50 or 95 percent) 
and three stop-loss levels (5, 10, 15 percent of family income) on out-of-pocket 
expenses up to a limit of $1000. All expenses incurred beyond the stop-loss were 
fully reimbursed. Two remaining plans have different coinsurance rates for differ-
ent types of medical services.23 The results obtained from the HIE showed that 
the demand for medical care is responsive to insurance cost sharing for a broad 
range of medical services (Manning et al. 1987). For example, moving from an 
insurance plan with zero patient copayment to that with a 95 percent coinsurance 
reduces the average number of doctor visits from 4.55 to 2.73, hospital admis-
sions rates from 12.8 percent to 9.9 percent and outpatient expenses from $340 
to $203 (1984 dollars).24 Of the total of eight utilisation measures examined in 
the study, only inpatient expenditures do not vary significantly across insurance 
plans. However, this result is observed either because inpatient care is less re-
sponsive to price or because inpatient expenditures have a higher probability of 
exceeding the stop-loss as the size of inpatient expenditures are higher compared 
to outpatient expenditures. The price elasticity or the pure price response on 
medical care were found to vary by service type and prices (Newhouse and the 
Insurance Experiment Group 1993). The price elasticity of total medical care 
2 3The first plan had a 25 percent coinsurance rate for inpatient and ambulatory medical 
services and a 50 percent coinsurance rate for dental and ambulatory mental health service. 
The second plan had a 95 percent coinsurance rate for outpatient services, with a $150 ($450) 
annual limit on out-of-pocket expenses per participant (family). 
24See Table 2, p. 259 in Manning et al. (1987) for a summary of all the results. 
demand is -0.17 at the low coinsurance rates of 0-25 percent and -0.22 at the high 
coinsurance rates of 25-95 percent. The price elasticity for total outpatient care 
is higher than that of hospital care (-0.31 vs. -0.14) for the high coinsurance rates 
but similar (-0.17) at the low coinsurance levels. 
The results from the HIE showed that the demand for medical care is respon-
sive to insurance cost sharing. The magnitude of the price response of demand was 
also found to be smaller in the HIE as compared to other nonexperimental studies 
conducted in the United States (Zweifel and Manning 2000). This is consistent 
with the view that the estimates of the insurance response from observational 
studies of insurance are biased due to non-random self-selection into insurance. 
However, Manning et al. (1987) indicated that comparability between the HIE 
and nonexperimental studies is difficult because of differences in study designs. 
One difference is that the insurance policies in the HIE had a two dimensional 
cost sharing mechanism consisting of coinsurance rates and stop-loss provisions 
while most nonexperimental studies adopted only a constant coinsurance rate. 
2.4.2 Empirical Studies Using Observational Data 
This section reviews the literature on empirical studies that have used observa-
tional data to examine the impact of supplementary health insurance on medical 
care use. The review focuses on studies conducted in countries where the public 
sector plays a dominant role in financing and provision of medical services. In-
dividuals can opt to purchase supplementary private health insurance to finance 
expenditures on health services that are not covered under the public program or 
otherwise choose to afford these expenditures as out-of-pocket payments. 
Cameron et al. (1988) examined the effect of having private health insurance 
on the utilisation of seven health care measures within the context of a univer-
sal public health insurance program using data from the 1977-1978 Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Health Survey.25 The seven measures were visits to 
(1) doctors/specialists and (2) non-doctor health professionals; (3) the number of 
hospital admissions and (4) hospital days and the number of (5) prescribed, (6) 
25The universal public health insurance system that prevailed at that time was the Medibank 
program which provided free public hospital care. The Medibank program was financed through 
an income-based levy. Individuals could choose to opt out of the Medibank program and 
avoid paying the levy by purchasing private health insurance which, in addition to the benefits 
provided under the Medibank program, covers the fees charged to privately admitted patients. 
Unlike publicly admitted patients, private patients are allowed to be treated by doctors of their 
choice and received better quality services. 
non-prescribed and (7) total medications used. Two different regression models 
were estimated. The first model was a negative binomial regression model that 
accommodates the count data (non-negative integer) feature of the dependent 
variable. The second model was an instrumental variable regression model, which 
unlike the negative binomial regression, accounts for self-selection into insurance 
and to isolate the incentive effects of insurance. Individual specific characteristics 
such as sex, age, income and measures of individuals' health status were included 
as exogenous regressors that influence the use of medical care. The latter included 
binary variables indicating the presence of limiting and non-limiting chronic con-
ditions; the number of chronic conditions and illnesses and the number of reduced 
activity days due to illness and injury. The authors found that individuals with 
supplementary insurance utilised more doctor visits and prescribed medications 
and the insurance effects persisted after controlling for self-selection.26 Insurance 
does not have any significant effect on the number of hospital admissions and hos-
pital days. Measures of individuals' health status such as the presence of chronic 
conditions and the number of illnesses reported was found to affect medical care 
use to a larger extent as compared to individuals' insurance status and income. 
Also using Australian data from the 1998-1990 National Health Survey, Savage 
and Wright (2003) investigated if moral hazard effects are present in the utili-
sation of private hospital services. In contrast with Cameron et al. (1988) who 
did not make the distinction between public or private medical care use, Savage 
and Wright (2003) examined if the duration of private hospital stay is longer for 
individuals with private hospital insurance as compared to the uninsured. The 
intensity of private hospital stay is modeled as a hazard function and the binary 
insurance regressor is instrumented using the estimated probability of having in-
surance coverage which was estimated separately. Other exogenous regressors 
included in the hospital duration equation are gender, age, income of household 
head and spouse and the reasons for hospitalisation. The selection and moral 
hazard effects were found to vary by income unit types. Adverse selection effects 
were observed for income units consisting of young singles, young couples, couples 
26This result pertains to individuals from the rich sample where the estimates on the in-
surance binary variable is the difference in the intensity of medical care use between individu-
als with supplementary private hospital insurance (LEVYPLUS) and those covered under the 
public health insurance program (LEVY) (See Table VIII, p. 104). The predictions from a 
reduced-form logit regression where insurance status is the dependent variable were used as 
instruments for the endogenous insurance binary variable. The squared-age and activity days 
variables were not included as regressors in the insurance equation but were included in the 
utilisation equation. 
with dependents and old couples but not for old singles. Significant moral haz-
ard effects were found for individuals in income units consisting of couples with 
dependents and old couples, where the expected length of private hospital stay 
by insured individuals exceeded that of uninsured individuals by a factor of 1.9 
to 3.2. The authors also found that income has a negative relationship with the 
duration of hospitalisation which may be because individuals with higher income 
face a higher opportunity cost of time. 
Riphahn et al. (2003) exploited the panel data feature of the German So-
cioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) to investigate the presence of adverse selection and 
moral hazard in individuals with add-on insurance. The authors estimated a bi-
variate Poisson lognormal model of doctor and hospital visits that allows for the 
unobservables in both utilisation equations to correlate. Without controlling for 
self-selection effects, the authors' findings suggest that add-on insurance increases 
the expected number of hospital visits by between 22% to 55%. Evidence sug-
gestive of adverse selection was observed in the case of hospital visits but not for 
doctor visits.27 Based on the estimated effects of both the add-on insurance and 
the public insurance binary variables, the authors concluded that neither hospital 
nor doctor visits are significantly influenced by insurance status. Contrary to the 
findings by Riphahn et al. (2003), Harmon and Nolan (2001) found for the case 
of Ireland that the probability of having a hospital inpatient stay is 5.8% higher 
for individuals with private health insurance. The magnitude of the insurance 
effect on the probability of hospital use doubled from 3.1% to 5.8% when the en-
dogeneity of insurance was accounted for which is consistent with advantageous 
selection as opposed to adverse selection into private health insurance. 
Using Spanish data from the Catalonia Health Survey, Vera-Hernandez (1999) 
examined the utilisation of specialist services by individuals with and without 
duplicate private insurance coverage.28 The dependent variable of interest is the 
number of specialists visits in the 12 months prior to the survey. The negative 
2 7The authors estimated a linear instrumental variable model of medical care utilisation where 
predictions of add-on insurance status were used as instruments for the endogenous insurance 
regressor. The Hausman test was used to test for the endogeneity of the insurance variable. 
28Individuals who purchase private medical insurance have duplicate coverage as they are 
eligible to receive public medical care under the Spanish National Health Service as well as 
their entitlements under the private health insurance contracts. In addition to public providers, 
privately insured individuals can choose to seek medical care from private providers designated 
by the insurers (known as in-catalogue providers) where the expenditure on these services are 
covered under private health insurance. If individuals choose to visit private providers that are 
not designated by private insurers (out of catalogue providers), individuals will have to pay for 
these expenses out-of-pocket. 
binomial model was employed to model the count data nature of doctor visits 
and the insurance status was instrumented using the predicted probability of 
insurance estimated from logit equation of insurance coverage. Estimation was 
conducted using the General Methods of Moments (GMM). The authors found no 
significant moral hazard effects after accounting for the endogeneity of insurance 
in a subsample of consisting only of household heads. There is however evidence 
of moral hazard for the subsample of non-household heads. 
In contrast to the studies discussed above where the endogeneity of insurance 
status was addressed using instrumental variable techniques, Barros et al. (2008) 
adopted the strategy of focusing on a subsample of insured individuals where the 
insurance status may be regarded as exogeneous and uncorrelated to the health 
status of beneficiaries. The authors compared how the utilisation of medical care 
differs between civil servants and their dependents in Portugal with additional 
insurance coverage under the employer-based insurance scheme with individu-
als just covered under the Portuguese National Health Service. The propensity 
matching estimator was used to assign individuals to the treatment and control 
group, where the former consist of individuals with the supplementary insurance. 
The authors found significant moral hazard effects in the number of blood and 
urine examinations by individuals covered under the civil servant insurance pro-
gram. No evidence of moral hazard effects was observed for doctor visits and the 
probability of visiting the dentist. 
Of the studies reviewed above, the only study that distinguished between the 
utilisation of public versus private medical care is that by Savage and Wright 
(2003). For studies where this information was not available, the authors relied 
on the relationship between having supplementary medical insurance and the 
utilisation of both public and private medical care to investigate the issues of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. However, in the context of health systems 
where publicly financed health care is provided free at the point of use and where 
supplementary medical insurance serves to reduce the price of private medical 
services, moral hazard effects can only be identified from the relationship between 
having supplementary insurance and the utilisation of private medical services 
(Savage and Wright 2003). 
2.4.3 Methodological Issues in Using Observational Data 
for Insurance Studies 
Studies that attempt to empirically estimate the price or incentive effects of insur-
ance on the utilisation of medical care with the use of observational data are faced 
with two main methodological complexities. The first issue concerns the nature 
of medical care utilisation measures. Outcome measures of 'events' or 'episodes' 
such as the number of doctor visits or the number of hospital admissions are char-
acterised as non-negative integer value counts.29 The infrequency of utilisation or 
occurrence also implies that the outcome variable can contain a large proportion 
of zero observations. The second issue concerns the simultaneity of both insur-
ance and intensity of medical care use. This problem arises because selection into 
insurance is usually non-random and is influenced by individuals' health or other 
socioeconomic factors. As elaborated in Section 2.4, suppose self selection into 
insurance occurs in that individuals who are in poorer health are more likely to 
purchase insurance or enrol into insurance plans with more generous coverage. In 
the context of a regression model, the estimated incremental effect of insurance 
on the intensity of medical care use is biased upwards as it reflects both the price 
effects of insurance (moral hazard) and the effects of (adverse) self selection. In 
designing or selecting an appropriate econometric model, special considerations 
should be given towards accommodating the count data nature of the utilisation 
measures and addressing the endogeneity problem of insurance. 
A thorough treatment of the regression methods for analysis of count data is 
given by Cameron and Trivedi (1998). The simplest model for regression analysis 
of count data is the Poisson Regression Model (PRM). The PRM is derived 
from the Poisson distribution where the intensity factor is allowed to vary by 
a set of exogenous covariates. A major disadvantage in the use of the PRM is 
that it requires the restrictive assumption of equidispersion where the conditional 
mean of the data equals the conditional variance. This assumption however is 
often violated in many empirical applications where overdispersion - in which 
the conditional variance is larger than the conditional mean - is more frequently 
29 Medical care utilisation measures are not limited to non-negative integer values and can 
occur in the form of a continuous outcome (e.g. expenditure on medical care measured in 
dollars) or a binary outcome (e.g. whether an individual visits a general practitioner in the last 
two weeks). A wide variety of different statistical methods and econometric models exists and 
its application depends on the nature of the data and the specification of the research problem. 
See Jones (2000) for a review of the econometric methods applied to the analysis of health care 
data. 
observed. Overdispersion is a result of unobserved heterogeneity which can arise 
in many ways. One consequence of unobserved heterogeneity is the problem of 
observing an excessive number of zeros in the data. As briefly mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph, the problem of excess zeros is common in data on health care 
utilisation due to the infrequency of use. For such data, the Poisson distribution 
is not suitable as it often under-predicts the realisation of zero value counts. 
Mixed Poisson models have been developed to accommodate unobserved het-
erogeneity and overcome the restrictive assumption of equidispersion in the Pois-
son model. In Poisson mixture models, a heteorogeneity term is typically in-
troduced in the form of a random variable into the conditional mean equation. 
Different assumptions on the distribution of the random variable hence produces 
different mixture models. One mixture model is the Negative Binomial (NB) 
model. The negative binomial model may be motivated in a variety of different 
ways, of which its representation as a Poisson-gamma mixture has been most 
common (Cameron and TVivedi 1986). Unlike the Poisson model, the NB model 
accommodates overdispersion by allowing the variance to be either a linear or 
quadratic function of the mean. These models are referred to as the NB1 and 
NB2 models respectively. An attractive feature of NB regression, in addition to 
the flexibility over the PRM, is that the model is computationally simple and 
readily estimated using maximum likelihood. A second mixture model is the 
Poisson lognormal model which assumes that the logarithm of the heterogeneity 
term is distributed normal. Unlike the NB regression, the Poisson lognormal re-
gression cannot be estimated using conventional maximum likelihood methods as 
the likelihood function based on Poisson lognormal density does not have a closed 
form solution. As such, numerical integration techniques such as quadrature or 
simulation-based estimation are required. 
A variety of methods have been developed for the analysis of count data mod-
els with endogenous regressors. Mullahy (1997) and Windmeijer and Santos Silva 
(1997) proposed a generalised methods of moments (GMM) approach using in-
strumental variables. The former applied the model to examine cigarette smoking 
behaviour in which the measure of smoking habit is endogenous whereas the lat-
ter examined the determinants of doctors visits where individuals' self-reported 
health is an endogenous regressor. Terza (1998) proposed a full information max-
imum likelihood (FIML) and a two-step estimation approach for count data and 
an endogenous treatment binary variable. In the two-step approach, the first step 
involves estimating a reduced-form regression where the dependent variable is the 
binary treatment variable. In the second step, the residuals obtained from the 
regression in the first step are included as a regressor alongside the endogenous 
treatment variable and the remaining exogenous covariates in a Poisson regres-
sion model. Like the GMM approach, the two-step estimation also requires that 
valid instruments are available. An alternative two-step approach that is com-
mon in the empirical literature is the nonlinear analogue of the two-stage least 
square. Unlike the two-step residual approach mentioned above, the second step 
involves substituting the endogenous regressor by the predicted values obtained 
from the first step regression. This was applied by Savage and Wright (2003) 
who modeled the length of stay in private hospitals using a duration model in 
which the insurance status is an endogenous regressor. In terms of this approach, 
Terza et al. (2008) compared the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method and 
the two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS) method and found that the estimates 
from the 2SPS are substantially biased and recommends in favour of the 2SRI 
for nonlinear regression with endogenous regressors. 
Poisson mixture models can be extended to accommodate endogenous regres-
sors. Greene (2007) proposed a sample selectivity count data model based on 
a simultaneous equation model consisting of a Poisson lognormal and a probit 
regression dictating the selection process. Selectivity is incorporated by allowing 
the heterogeneity term in the Poisson lognormal to correlate with the error term 
in the probit selection equation. The likelihood function of the model does not 
have a closed-form solution and can be estimated using quadratures or simula-
tion based methods. Deb and Trivedi (2006) developed a count data model with 
endogenous multinomial treatment outcomes using a NB and multinomial mixed 
logit mixture with latent factors. The model was applied to examine the effect 
of insurance on the utilisation of medical care where individuals were enrolled in 
insurance plans offered by health maintenance organisations (HMO) or two other 
non-HMO plans. The model was estimated using maximum simulated likelihood. 
2.5 The Demand for Private Health Insurance 
Health insurance plays an important role in the financing of health care in many 
countries around the world. Health insurance may be defined as a way to dis-
tribute the financial risk arising from the unpredictability of individuals' health 
care expenditure by pooling cost across time and over individuals (Colombo and 
Tapay 2004). Individuals buy health insurance for a variety of reasons. Risk 
averse individuals generally prefer certainty to risk and are willing to afford reg-
ular insurance premium payments to have their medical expenses covered rather 
than face the prospect of potentially large financial outlays when they are ill 
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Friedman and Savage 1948). Insurance 
also provides individuals with access to expensive medical care that would other-
wise be unaffordable (Nyman 1999). In health systems where the public sector is 
a dominant provider of health services, individuals typically can purchase supple-
mentary private health insurance to finance expenditure on private health care 
services not covered under the public program. 
This section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the demand for 
private health insurance. The review focuses on studies that have examined the 
demand for supplementary private health insurance in health systems where the 
public sector is the dominant provider of health care. This institutional setting is 
consistent with that of Australia, where individuals may purchase private health 
insurance to finance private hospital services which are not covered under the 
public health insurance programme Medicare. The main objective here is not 
to comprehensively review the literature on insurance but rather focusing on the 
determinants of the decision to purchase private hospital insurance. 
A key theme of the discussion in Section 2.4 is that the demand for medi-
cal services is influenced by the availability of health insurance. The decision to 
purchase insurance by individuals and households will depend, amongst others, 
on the expected future utilisation of health services. This interdependence of the 
demand for health care and health insurance is emphasised in Cameron et al. 
(1988). The authors developed a theoretical model to analyse the determinants 
of the intensity of medical care use as well as the decision to purchase insurance. 
Individuals first decide on the optimum levels of consumption and health expen-
diture with each insurance strategy conditional on the realised health state and 
thereafter choose the insurance strategy that produces the highest expected util-
ity. Savage and Wright (2003) considered the decision to seek public or private 
hospital services in addition to the insurance choice. Within the framework of a 
three-period model, individuals can either choose to seek private hospital care in 
the second period, or wait on public hospital waiting lists and receive free public 
hospital care in the third period. The insurance decision is undertaken in the first 
period. The choice between public and private care depends, amongst others, on 
the net prices for private hospital services which varies with different insurance 
strategies. The optimal choice between public and private care conditional on 
the insurance strategy and health status is the care type that confers the largest 
indirect utility. 
Empirical evidence from Australian, British and European studies suggest 
that demographic and socioeconomic characteristics such as age, gender and in-
come are the main drivers of the decision to purchase private supplementary 
health insurance. Using data from the 1977-78 and 1983 Australian Health Sur-
veys, Cameron and Trivedi (1991) examined the determinants of the choice to 
purchase insurance for individuals for different household compositions and in-
come groups. Single females axe shown to have higher propensity of purchasing 
insurance as compared to their male counterparts. Household and individual in-
comes have a strong positive effect on the probability of having insurance. Age 
was observed to have a positive quadratic effect on having insurance in all sub-
samples except for low income individuals in the 1977-78 sample and the 1983 
family sample. For the family sample, evidence on the relationship between the 
number of dependents and the probability of having insurance is weak. Edu-
cational attainment was found to have a strong positive association with the 
propensity to insure. The effect on the insurance status is also influenced by 
occupations where individuals in Professional, Clerical and Farmer categories are 
more likely to have insurance as compared to Miners, Tradesmen and Service cat-
egories. Measures of previous health service use do not significantly influence the 
propensity to insure. Instead, individuals who consulted a specialist in the three 
months preceding the survey are more likely to be insured. In terms of the effect 
on individuals' health on insurance status, the authors found no evidence that 
health status influence the decision to insure. Among the health status measures 
examined were the type and length of illnesses that individuals experienced and 
the prevalence of limiting and non-limiting chronic conditions. In a related study, 
Savage and Wright (2003) found that the minor chronic medical conditions are 
more likely to be significant predictors of insurance status compared to major 
medical conditions. The authors findings were based on the 1989-1990 National 
Health Survey and the results were broadly consistent with that in Cameron and 
Trivedi (1991). 
Monetary and non-monetary prices of public and private health services and 
the cost of insurance in the form of premium payments are expected to influence 
the decision to purchase insurance. Studies as that described above that rely 
solely on the Australian National Health Survey to analyse the demand for pri-
vate health insurance suffer from an important data limitation in that the survey 
does not collect any information on the price of insurance, viz-a-viz, the insurance 
premiums that individuals pay. Butler (1999) used published data on the pre-
miums revenues received and benefit payments made by insurance companies to 
construct estimates of insurance premiums which were combined with data from 
the 1995 National Health Survey to estimate the price and income elasticities 
of private health insurance in Australia. Hospital and ancillary insurance were 
found to be price inelastic, and the elasticity estimates are -0.50 and -0.35 respec-
tively. Estimates of income elasticities are 0.24 for hospital insurance and 0.20 
ancillary insurance. Non-monetary prices of publicly provided health care and 
the relative quality differential between public and private health services were 
also found to influence the decision to purchase private health insurance. For the 
case of the United Kingdom, Besley, Hall, and Preston (1999) investigated if vari-
ations in the quality of the public National Health Service (NHS) care measured 
by the long-term waiting lists in NHS hospitals, NHS staffing numbers and public 
spending levels across different regions and through time explain differences in 
the number of individuals holding private health insurance. Using independent 
cross-sectional data from 5 waves of the British Social Attitudes Survey, the au-
thors found that long term waiting lists have a significant positive impact on the 
demand for private health insurance. Similarly, Costa and Garcia (2003) found 
that individuals' perceptions of the quality gap between private and public health 
care influenced the decision to purchase private health insurance for the case of 
Spain. The decision to insure may also be influenced by the perceived value of 
insurance. Using contingent valuation methods, Johannesson et al. (1998) found 
that individuals who perceived themselves as having a greater probability of us-
ing private health insurance are willing to pay a higher premium to purchase 
insurance. 
Political attitudes and beliefs on whether the provision of health care should 
be the responsibility of the public sector can be expected to influence whether 
individuals choose to purchase private health insurance. Propper (1993) hypoth-
esised that the decision to purchase private medical insurance is a two-stage 
process where individuals either considers private medical insurance as within 
or out of their choice sets and conditional on the former, whether individuals 
actually buy insurance. Using data from the UK, the author found that individ-
uals who are more receptive to having a private sector coexisting with the UK 
NHS are more likely to consider buying private medical insurance. Age, income, 
self-employment and housing tenure were also found to significantly influence 
whether one considers insurance as a option. On the other hand, the probability 
of purchasing insurance is associated with age, income and individuals' attitudes 
towards the risk of affording private health expenditures out-of-pocket. 
2.6 Summary 
As articulated in the introduction in Chapter 1, the main objective of this thesis 
is to conduct a thorough examination of the processes that underlie how individ-
uals seek hospital care and purchase private health insurance in a mixed public 
and private hospital system such as that of Australia. The theoretical analysis 
undertaken by Cameron et al. (1988) and Savage and Wright (2003) that have 
been reviewed in Section 2.5 allow us to understand the determinants of the de-
mand for health care and health insurance in a mixed system. However, neither of 
these papers adopted explicit functional forms which enable one to conduct com-
parative statics to study how the solutions from the theoretical models change 
as the model parameters and specifications are changed. A separate question of 
interest is how the interplay between illness severity and waiting times in pub-
lic hospital waiting lists influence individuals' decisions to seek public or private 
hospital care. Neither of the above two papers, nor any of the studies reviewed 
in Section 2.3 addressed this issue. 
Of the empirical papers reviewed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, none of these studies 
have empirically examined the demand for health insurance, the choice to seek 
public or private care and the intensity of care in a simultaneous framework. 
This approach enables one to isolate and identify the intertwining factors that 
motivate the three decisions surrounding the use of hospital care. Prom the 
perspective of econometric modeling and its applications, the development of a 
simultaneous equation econometric model to achieve this objective would make 
an interesting and important contribution to the literature reviewed in Section 
2.4.2 on empirical methods to analyse count data with endogenous regressors. 
Chapter 3 
Economic Model 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter contributes to the literature on the demand for hospital care and 
private health insurance in a health system where public care is available at 
zero monetary price through a National Health Service but rationed through 
the use of waiting lists. A private market coexists alongside the public sector 
which delivers medical care financed either through direct payments or private 
health insurance. As reviewed in Chapter 2.5, Cameron et al. (1988) examined 
the interdependence between health care utilisation and health insurance but 
does not make the distinction between public and private use. On the other 
hand, Savage and Wright (2003) analysed the choice between public and private 
hospital care and the decision to purchase health insurance but employed a general 
model that does not allow for comparative statics to identify how the utilisation 
and insurance decisions are influenced by the parameters of the model. The 
relationship between health status and the decision to seek public or private care 
is examined by Savage and Wright (2003) and Goddard et al. (1995) but neither 
papers modeled the interactions between the severity of individuals' illness and 
public hospitals waiting times. Illness severity is important because whether 
individuals are accepted into hospital waiting lists and the expected duration of 
wait conditional on being waitlisted will depend on the urgency of individuals 
medical conditions. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the determinants of the intensity of 
hospital care use, the choice to seek public or private hospital care and the decision 
to purchase insurance. To this end, a theoretical model with explicit functional 
forms is developed. The relationship between illness severity and waiting times 
is explicitly incorporated into the model. The model is used to examine how 
non-monetary and monetary prices of public and private care, viz-a-viz waiting 
times and private health insurance influence the intensity of hospital care use 
and the choice between public and private care. The effects of illness severity on 
the choice between public and private and decision to insure is also investigated. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 describes the specification of the 
model and the consumer resource allocation problem. Section 3.3 presents the 
expressions for the optimal use of hospital care and examines the factors that 
influence the intensity of care. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present the decision rules for 
the choice between public and private hospital care and the decision to purchase 
private hospital insurance respectively. Section 3.5.1 further examines the factors 
that influence the demand for private hospital insurance with the use of a simple 
case study. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings in Section 3.6. 
3.2 Model Specification 
Consider a representative individual with a utility function of the following gen-
eral form 
U = U{C,h\s) 
where C denotes the level of consumption and h is the health status of the 
individual. The state of nature or health state is given by s, where s = 0 ,1, . . . , N. 
The probability of the health state s is denoted by 7r(s). A specific functional 
form for U is given as 
U ^ C1 • h(s) (3.1) 
where 0 < 7 < 1. The parameter 7 captures the individual's attitudes towards 
risk.1 h(s) is the individual's health status which is influenced by the incidence of 
1A conventional approach to incorporate risk aversion in the model is to specify U = (C • h)1 
where the individual is said to be risk averse in both C and h. In addition to the conventional 
formulation, risk aversion has been modeled in different ways. For instance, the specification 
of the utility function in Cameron et al. (1988) is U = C • K<. The implicit assumption of 
the utility function in (3.1) is that risk aversion applies directly to the level of consumption, 
but indirectly to health status through resource allocation of income Y to consumption and 
medical services. 
illness associated with state of nature s. The utility accruing from consumption 
C depends on the individual's health status. For any given level of C, the benefits 
derived from consumption will be lower for smaller values of h(s). 
The individual's health status h(s) has the following functional form 
m + f3q , . 
Ks) m , a , x (3-2) m + pq + os 
where 0 < 8 < 1 and /3 > 0. m denotes the intensity of hospital care that 
the individual chooses to obtain. Measures of hospital care intensity include the 
number of hospitalisation episodes over a predetermined duration of time and the 
number of nights in hospital. The measures typically assume non-negative integer 
values, q is a composite index function that describes the quality of hospital care. 
The quality attributes of hospital care include the level of amenity associated 
with the hospital such as private hospital accommodation and the choice of one's 
treatment doctor. 8s is an illness variable that reflects the degree of reduction in 
the individual's health in state s. Health state s — 0 corresponds to the situation 
where the individual is well or in perfect health. In this instance, the individual's 
health status h(s) assumes a value of 1. Illness occurs in states s = ],..., N. 
The degree of reduction in health 8s due to illness is increasing in s. It can be 
interpreted that s == 1 , . . . ,N represent health states that are associated with the 
incidence of progressively more serious medical conditions. When illness occur, 
the individual's health status h(s) decreases given that 8s > 0. The individual can 
mitigate the reduction in health by using hospital care at intensity m and quality 
q. A property of the health production function h(s) is that 0 < < P 
Hence, it follows that the individual's health cannot be fully restored to its full 
value of 1 for m and q less than infinity in the presence of illness, that is s > 0.2 
It is also the case that the individual's utility from consumption is always lower 
in the presence of illness relative to perfect health. 
The properties of the health production function h(s) are given as follows 
I = - r T i r r i I 1 <3-> 
os (m + /jqmosy 
2From the perspective of a static analysis, the utility function can be perceived as measuring 
the net present value (NPV) of utility accruing from consumption and health over a stipulated 
period. The incidence of illness within the period would reduce the NPV of utility given that 
the individual will have a level of health status which is less than that of full health over the 
duration of illness. Hence the NPV of utility in the presence of illness is always less than that 
of perfect health. 
(> 0) (3.4) 
(> 0) (3.5) 
(< 0) (3.6) 
(> 0) (3.7) 
(< 0) (3.8) 
Prom the above equations, we can observe that the individual's health status is 
decreasing in s (3.3). For health states s > 0, the health production function h(s) 
is increasing in both m and q (3.5 & 3.7) and exhibits decreasing returns (3.6 & 
3.8). 
The individual may choose to seek publicly (Medicare) funded hospital care 
or obtain care as a private paying patient. Public hospital care is provided at zero 
monetary price but rationed through the use of waiting lists. To access public 
hospital care, the individual is required to wait on public hospital waiting lists. 
Ex ante, the duration of wait is uncertain. However, the individual forms an 
expectation of the wait duration with information on the severity of the medical 
condition. The expected duration of wait is denoted as te(s) and is assumed to be 
decreasing in the severity of illness, that is ^ ^ < 0. The relationship between 
illness severity and the expected duration of wait on public hospital waiting list 
well describes how elective hospital care in public hospitals in Australia is ra-
tioned. Patients seeking elective surgery in public hospitals are first assigned 
one of three clinical urgency categories by their treating specialist prior to being 
placed on hospital waiting lists.3 Prom these categories, patients can estimate 
3In public hospitals in Australia, patients seeking elective hospital care are assigned to one 
of three clinical urgency categories (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2003). Urgent 
medical conditions are those which have the potential to deteriorate quickly into an emergency. 
Semi-urgent conditions are those which may be the cause of some degree of pain, dysfunction 
or disability but are unlikely to deteriorate quickly. Non-urgent conditions are those causing 
minimal or no pain, dysfunction and disability and are unlikely to deteriorate quickly and have 
a very low probability of becoming an emergency. At the time this manuscript is prepared, 
the national standard for urgent, semi-urgent and non-urgent cases is for treatment to be 
d2h(s) _ 2(m + pq)62 
ds2 (m + /3q + 5s)3 
dh(s) 6s 
dm (m + /3q + 5s)2 
d2h(s) _ 26s 
dm2 (m + /3q + 5s)3 
dh(s) _ /36s 
dq (m + f3q + 6s)2 
d2h(s) _ 2/36s 
dq2 (m + /3q + 6s)3 
the maximum length of time they will be expected to wait for treatment. For 
publicly funded hospital care, in addition to being required to wait on waiting 
lists, the individual is not entitled to private hospital accommodation and does 
not have the choice of treating doctor. As such, given the characteristics of public 
hospital care, the quality level of public care is denoted by a fixed value q — 0. 
The individual may choose to avoid waiting on public hospital waiting lists, 
or obtain higher quality care, by choosing hospital care as a private patient. It 
is assumed that private hospital care is competitively supplied at a unit price of 
pm. It is further assumed that the quality of private hospital care is given by a 
fixed value q — l.4 The unit price of quality is denoted by pq, and applies to each 
unit of hospital care m that the individual obtains. Hence, the total expenditure 
on private hospital care is expressed as (pm + pq)m. This includes the charges 
for hospital and medical services such as hospital accommodation, theatre fees, 
surgical procedures, medications as well as doctors' fees. As a patient receiving 
private hospital care in Australia, Medicare covers 75% of the Medicare Benefit 
Schedule fee for eligible in-hospital professional services provided by doctors. The 
Medicare subsidy is incorporated into the model through the parameter 7/ which 
is applied to the price of medical care pm. The total private hospitalisation 
expenditure net of the Medicare subsidy is given as (rjpm + pq)m, 0 < 77 < 1. 
Suppose prior to the realisation of the health state s, the individual can decide 
to purchase private hospital insurance at a premium P (P > 0)which reduces the 
expenditure on private hospital care to a{r)pm + pq)m, where 0 < a < 1. The 
fraction a is the cost sharing parameter which denotes the proportion of the total 
private hospital expenses the individual is required to pay. The amount that is 
borne by private health insurer is (1 — a){rqpm + pq)m. Given that the individual 
either decides to purchase insurance at premium P or not to purchase insurance, 
the individual's choice is a binary one and is represented by the indicator variable 
d which takes the value of 1 when insurance is purchased. Finally, it is assumed 
that private hospital care is available to the individual without any time delay, 
that is te(s) = 0. 
The individual is assumed to receive income Y from both labour and non-
administered within 30, 90 and 365 days respectively. 
4It is assumed that the function q, which represents the quality of hospital care, takes only 
two values namely 0 for public care and 1 for private care. This assumption is imposed to make 
the theoretical model consistent with the empirical framework given that the quality measure 
adopted in the empirical analysis is a binary variable of whether hospitals are public or private 
in nature. 
labour sources. Labour earnings arises from devoting a pre-determined number 
of hours L to employment at a wage rate w. The individual allocates a proportion 
of this income to consumption and to meet hospital expenditures if required. Al-
though the monetary price for publicly funded hospital care is zero, the individual 
incurs a time cost which comprises of two components. The first component of 
time cost involved in seeking public hospital care is the monetary value of the 
expected duration the individual is required to wait on hospital waiting lists. The 
cost of waiting is expressed as T} • te(s), where 7] is the cost per unit of waiting 
time. Waiting confers a cost to the individual in two ways. Firstly, the value 
of hospital treatment decays with time (Lindsay and Feigenbaum 1984). Sec-
ondly, disutility arises from waiting because individuals on hospital waiting lists 
can be expected to be in less than perfect health (Propper 1995). In addition, 
the uncertainty surrounding the actual duration of wait and the outcome of the 
hospital treatment result in anxiety and imposes a cost on individuals waiting 
on hospital waiting lists. It is assumed that the cost of waiting enters into the 
utility function and reduces the utility the individual derives from consumption.5 
Hence, the utility function in (3.1) is modified accordingly as 
U = [C - Tx • te(s)]i • h(s) (3.9) 
While waiting on public hospital waiting lists does not impose an opportu-
nity cost of time because individuals on waiting lists are able to pursue market 
or leisure activities in the duration of the wait, individuals who seek hospital 
care incur an opportunity cost in terms of the time spent in obtaining hospital 
treatment which would otherwise be devoted to employment. This opportunity 
cost of time applies regardless if the type of hospital care obtained is public or 
private. This time-cost is applied at a rate of Tm for every unit of hospital care m 
obtained. The value of Tm depends on the availability of sick leave provisions in 
employment contracts. In the case of self employed individuals or paid employees 
who are not remunerated when they are absent from work, the time cost Tm may 
5Johannesson et al. (1998) argues that individuals can actually be worse off when the 
waiting time for medical care is reduced and hence it is not necessarily the case that individuals' 
willingness to pay (WTP) for a shorter wait is always non-negative (p.643). This is because 
there are both positive and negative discounting effects that arise which may increase or decrease 
individuals' expected present value utility from health and consumption when medical treatment 
is brought forward. The authors' found that the WTP to reduce the length of waiting time by 
one month is estimated to lie between £95 and £110. This empirical finding suggest that a 
reduction in waiting times would on average make individuals better off. 
be set equal to the wage rate w. It is assumed that /} and Tm are > 0. The price 
of the consumption good is normalised to 1. 
With the above assumptions, the individual faces a budget constraint that is 
dependent on the choices to purchase insurance and to obtain public or private 
hospital care. The relevant budget constraints of the individual who does not 
purchase private hospital insurance and who seeks public and private hospital 
care respectively are 
Y — Tmm = C (3.10) 
Tmm Mc + (vPm + Pq)m (3.11) 
The budget constraints of the individual with private hospital insurance and who 
seeks public and private hospital care respectively are 
Y-Tmrn = C + P (3.12) 
Y - Trnm = C + P + a{ripm + pq)m (3.13) 
The budget constraints (3.10) to (3.13) may be collapsed into 
Y - Tmm ^C + Pd+( 1 - d)q(Vpm + Pq)m + dqalyp™ + pq)m (3.14) 
Assuming that the individual is an expected utility maximiser, the individual 
solves the following allocation problem 
m a x m ) 9 , , 5 > ( s ) { [ C - Tt • t e(s)P • h(s)} (3.15) 
s 
such that 
m + pq 
Ks) = I m w m + /3q + 6s 
with budget constraint in (3.14) 
3.3 Optimal Intensity of Hospital Care 
The solutions on the optimal intensity of hospital care m* is obtained for each 
insurance strategy and choice of public or private hospital care conditional on 
health state s. These are derived by substituting (3.2) and the relevant budget 
constraint into (3.15) and differentiating the result with respect to m. In terms 
of notation, let the optimal values of m, conditional on health state s, be de-
noted by fn*d q where d — 0,1 denotes the non-purchase and purchase of insurance 
respectively, and q = 0,1 denotes public and private hospital care respectively. 
Consider m50(s), the optimal intensity of public hospital care by an individual 
without private hospital insurance in health state s.6 The first order condition 
for an optimal value of moio(s) is 
1 m C'i Ss 
m + 8s T - 1 m (m + <5s)2 
where C is the level of consumption net of waiting cost, that is C — 7} • te(s). The 
expression on the LHS of equation (3.16) is equivalent to taking the derivative of 
the utility function in (3.9) with respect to C, that is and dividing the result by 
the price of consumption which has been normalised to 1. Correspondingly, the 
RHS of (3.16) is equivalent to • g ^ y and further dividing the result by the time 
price Tm for public hospital care. Hence, the first order condition is interpreted 
as follows: conditional on health state s, the intensity of public hospital care that 
maximises the utility of the individual occurs where the utility gain per dollar 
from a unit increment in the use of public hospital care equals the loss of utility 
in decreasing consumption by one dollar. 
As presented in Section A of the appendix, the expressions for the optimal 
intensity of public hospital care in health state s by insurance status are 
mOfi s = \ 
6s 
7 Tm 
Y - Tite(s) + mm mm (3.17) 
mlfi[s) = 
\ 
Ss 
7 Tm 
Y — P — Tite(s) + mm 2 I 7 mm 
6The derivations are presented in Section A of the appendix. 
(3.18) 
Correspondingly, the solutions to the optimal intensity of private hospital care 
are 
m. 0,1 s = \ 
6s 
7 
Y 
(rjpm + j f l ) + ^ 
ft + -
_2\ 
(3.19) 
6s Y - P 1 
I B ® 
2 
im 7 a(r]pm + pi) + Tm 
(3.20) 
Equations (3.17) to (3.20) are a subset of the full set of solutions presented in 
Section A of the appendix as further assumptions are required to ensure that the 
solutions are defined.7 In addition, it can be observed that W h assumes both 
positive and negative values. Given the requirement that the optimal intensity 
of hospital care can take only non-negative values, it is further assumed that 
Y - m m t Tite(s) > ° (3-21) 
and 
Y Y - P 
f * qV f g] > 0 (3.22) 
a (rjpm +pq) a\j]pm +pq) 
where (3.21) requires that the individual's income net of the monetary cost of 
waiting and the insurance premium must be greater or equal to zero.8 The set of 
assumptions in (3.22) is reasonable given that the budget constraint will always 
be non-negative. 
7The first part of the solutions in equations (A.5), (A.7), (A.9) and (A.10) of Section A 
contains a square root function. Hence, the terms under the square root have to be greater 
than or equal to zero for m*d q to be defined. 
8Whether or not these assumptions are reasonable is an empirical question. Propper (1995) 
estimated that monetary value of waiting list time and the value of the uncertainty for individ-
uals waiting on hospital waiting lists in the British National Health Service and found that the 
estimates vary by the individuals' income. For individuals whose income are below £350 per 
week the estimated value of waiting list time and the value of uncertainty varies between £26.7 
to £32.4 per month of waiting and £13.4 to £27.3 respectively. For individuals whose income 
are above £350 per week, the estimates ranges from £37.7 to £39.5 per month of waiting and 
£11.3 to £28.5 for the uncertainty. Although there have not been similar studies done for the 
case of Australia, the results in Propper (1995) strongly suggest that the cost of waiting can be 
expected to be considerably low relative to income. 
3.3.1 Comparative Statics: Intensity of Hospital Care 
The results in equations (3.17) to (3.20) provide insights on how the optimal 
intensity of public and private hospital care varies with the assumptions in the 
model. In terms of the relationship between the utilisation of hospital care and 
the severity of illness, the use of hospital care, regardless of care type, is zero 
when the individual is in perfect health. This occurs when s = 0. Also, the 
intensity of care demanded by the individual is non-decreasing in the severity 
of illness.9 Individuals demand a greater intensity of hospital care to mitigate 
the larger reduction in health associated with more severe medical conditions. 
Moving on to the role of monetary prices, private hospital care use is decreasing 
in the effective unit price (rjpm+pq), which is defined as the market price less the 
subsidy provided through the Medicare Benefits Schedule. Here, the intensity of 
private care decreases as the unit prices for care pm and care quality pq increases. 
Also, the demand for care is increasing in the amount of subsidy r/. On the 
influence of hospital insurance on the demand for hospital care, the availability 
of private hospital insurance increases the intensity in the use of private hospital 
services. This result is observed from equation (3.20), where a reduction in the 
degree of cost sharing through a smaller a parameter reduces the out-of-pocket 
expenses required on the part of the patient. The presence of private hospital 
insurance and variations in the effective price for hospital care do not affect the 
intensity of public hospital care given that the individual faces zero monetary 
prices. 
Even in the absence of monetary prices, the utilisation of hospital care is 
constrained by the indirect cost of hospital care in the form of the opportunity 
cost of time, denoted as Tmm, involved in obtaining care which would otherwise 
be channeled into labour market activities.10 This is the case with public hospital 
care where direct monetary prices are zero or in the context of private hospital 
care where patients have private health insurance policies with zero patient cost 
sharing. Where the intensity of hospital care is measured by the number of days 
in hospital, the opportunity cost per unit of time may be proxied by the earnings 
9The proof is shown in Section A of the appendix. 
10Conversely, the individual may tradeoff leisure time or time devoted to other utility pro-
ducing activities to obtain hospital care. For example in Becker (1965), individuals face a 
constraint on the total time available which is allocated to labour market activities to purchase 
market goods. The market goods are combined with time inputs to produce basic commodities 
which enter directly into individuals' utility function. 
forgone with every additional day in hospital. As discussed earlier, the time cost 
Tm may be set equal to the wage rate w. Depending on the availability of sick 
leave provisions in employment contracts, individuals receiving higher wage rates 
face a higher indirect cost of hospital care and correspondingly demand a lower 
intensity of care. 
Waiting on public hospital waiting lists imposes a cost on the individual 
through the disutility of the illness as well as the uncertainty of the actual length 
of wait required. One can observe from equations (3.17) and (3.18) that the de-
mand for public hospital care is decreasing in the length of time the individual is 
expected to wait for any given level of illness severity s. The demand for public 
hospital care use is also decreasing in the unit waiting cost 7]. As described in 
the introductory sections, 7] can be interpreted as the individual's valuation of 
the physiological and emotional pain and suffering associated with each unit of 
time the individual waits for care on hospital waiting lists. 
3.4 Decision Rule: Hospitalisation as a Public 
or Private Patient 
The solutions to the optimal intensity of hospital care presented in equations 
(3.17) to (3.20) is used to characterise the decision rule on the choice of admis-
sion into hospital as a public or private patient. Conditional on health state s, 
the expression for the indirect utility function for an individual without private 
hospital insurance who chooses public hospital care is derived by substituting 
m£0(s) into the utility function (3.9) and the budget constraint (3.10). The 
indirect utility function Vb,o(s) is given as 
Vo,o(*) = W - Tmml0(s) - Tlt°(s)V • ^ ^ ^ (3.23) 
Correspondingly, the indirect utility function for an uninsured individual who 
chooses private hospital care is given as 
m* fs) 4- 8 
V o M = v - to" + P< + T „ K l ( s ) r . (3.24) 
Using equations (3.23) and (3.24), the decision rule on the choice between 
public and private hospital care for an uninsured individual is characterised as 
follows: conditional on health state s, an individual without private health insur-
ance will choose to be admitted as a public patient if 
V o M > V o M (3.25) 
Alternatively, the individual will choose to seek private hospital care if 
Vo,o(s) < V0tl(s) (3.26) 
With the availability of private hospital insurance, the insured individual will 
choose public hospital care if 
VltQ(s) > Vi,i(s) (3.27) 
in which 
TYl* ( S) 
Vli0(a) = [Y - P - TrrjKM- • . ff ' (3.28) 
1OV / ' 
tu* (s) + 3 
Vhi(s) = <*(VPm + P^mUis) + Tmrn^(5)r • ^ j ^ + fe (3"2 9) 
Correspondingly, the insured individual will choose private hospital care if the 
equality is reversed. More generally, the decision rule on the optimal choice of 
admission in hospital as a public or private patient is characterised as follows: 
conditional on health state s and insurance status d, the optimal patient type 
choice q* — [0,1] is such that 
mm = max Vdto(s),Vdti(s) (3.30) 
where q = 0 and q Ml denotes public and private hospital care respectively. 
3.4.1 Comparative Statics: Public &: Private Choice 
In this section, I examine how the decision to obtain public or private hospital 
care is influenced by changes in the parameters in the model. The first question 
of interest is how the choice between obtaining public or private hospital care 
varies with the severity of illness. Let us examine this for the case of an uninsured 
individual.11 This can be explored by examining how the indirect utility functions 
Vo,o(s) and Vo,i(s) changes as s increases. For the former, 
AFo,o (a) 
As 7 Y - Tmm*ofi(s) -
- 7 - 1 
s)-Tlte(s) —T •L r. W „ At
e(s) 
As 
mm 
As 
>o 
(a) 
™S,o(s) + S s 
>o 
+ 
S(s Amg|0(s) As - ™*o,o{s)) 
(m*0fi(s) + 5s)* 
>0 <0 
(3.31) 
Am.* (^s) 
where the terms in the last bracket is less than or equal to 0 given that s— 
m*00(s) <0 . 1 2 Using (3.31), AVb,0(s) As > 0 if 
iiThe application of the analysis, and consequently the analytical results, are similar and 
straightforward for the case of an insured individual. 
12See Section A for proof. 
Amo,o(s) „,* / \ 1 •S a s ^ moAS) 
^o,o(s)(m*0fi(s) + 8s) 
(3.32) 
where Ti-~ on the LHS of equation (3.32) is the reduction in waiting cost for 
public hospital care resulting from an incremental change in s. On the RHS, 
Am* (s) 
Tm—^— is the incremental opportunity cost of time associated with a higher 
optimal use of public hospital care given a unit increase in s. The expression in 
the first bracket on the RHS is the level of consumption C and the expression 
in the second bracket represents the rate of reduction in health resulting from a 
unit increment in s, which is denoted as 4^/As. On the contrary, the indirect 
utility function Vq,i(s) is non-increasing in s. This is because 
• -T 1 ?7 Am, 0,0 V As 8 + -7 Ym^ml^-W 
A V0tl(s) 
As = 7 
Y -pm^(s) 
7 - 1 
P~ 
Am*o,i(s) 
As 
mo,i(s) + P 
m*01(s)(3 + 8 s 
<0 
Y -pm*0 As) 
8(s A mga(s) As - m0,l(S) ~ P) 
(m*0tl(s)§P + 8sy 
(3.33) 
<0 
where p = r/pm + pq + Tm. The first set of terms on the RHS of (3.33) represents 
the decrease in utility that arises from the reduction in consumption as a result 
of increasing the intensity of hospital care given an increase in the illness severity. 
The second set of terms captures the decrease in utility of the individual arising 
from a reduction in the individual's health given a unit increment in s. Given 
that both sets of terms are less than or equal to zero, therefore < 0. If 
Vo,o(s) > Q 
As 
As VoM-VoM 
> 0 (3.34) 
The key insight that can be drawn from the results in equation (3.34) on the 
decision making between the choice of to seek public or private hospital care is 
that the propensity to seek public hospital care is increasing in the severity of 
illness. For more severe medical conditions, public hospital care becomes com-
paratively more attractive than private hospital care given that waiting times for 
public hospital services are lower. 
The influence of private hospital insurance on the choice between public and 
private hospital care can be investigated by examining how Vd,q(s) varies with the 
extent of insurance cost sharing, given by the parameter a. First and foremost, 
given that public hospital care is provided at zero monetary price, changes in 
the cost sharing parameter have no effect on the indirect utility functions that 
correspond to the case of public hospital care, regardless of insurance status. In 
other words, = 0. The effect of a unit change in a on (s)13, or , is 
< 0 given that 
dVi,i(s) 
da 1 7 
Y - p - (ap +Tm)m*11(s) 
7-1 
- p'ra* x(s) I (ap + Tm) da 
>o <o 
rrl*1A(s)+P 
m*1A(s) + p + Ss 
Y MP ~ (ap +Tm)m*11(s) oa — 
>0 <0 
(3.35) 
where p = rjpm +pq and < 0. In (3.35), it can be easily shown that 
13For the case of Vb,i(s), this is equivalent to setting a = 1 and P = 0 in Vj,i(s) 
p'ml 1 > (ap +Tm)—^~ (3.36) 
In equation (3.36), p'm* x represents the decrease in consumption associated 
with a unit increase in en. Given that a is expressed in the form of a percentage 
which takes value between 0 and 1, p'ml 1 denotes reduction in consumption given 
one percent increase in patient's cost sharing. (ap on the other hand 
is the increase in consumption arising from the reduction in the optimal intensity 
of private hospital care demanded as a result of one percent increase in patient's 
Equation (3.37) indicates that a decrease in the fraction of private hospital ex-
penses borne by the individual, given a reduction in cost sharing, increases the 
propensity to obtain private hospital care. More generally, the availability of 
insurance reduces the effective monetary price for private hospital care and in-
creases the probability that the individual seeks private relative to public hospital 
care. 
An increase in the parameter which is interpreted as the individual's pref-
erence for the quality attributes of private hospital care, increases the propensity 
for the individual to seek private as opposed to public hospital care. This result 
is observed when one examines how V^i varies with f3. Let us examine this for 
the case of an uninsured individual.14 The change in V0^(s) for a change in (3 is 
given by 
14 Again, the application of the algebra and the results are similar for the case of an individual 
with private hospital insurance 
cost sharing. Given that ^ ^ - 0 and ^ ^ < 0, 
S <o d (3.37) 
dp 
- 7 - 1 
7 Y 1 P-
L -1 L 
:dm*01 
dp 
m*0tl + P 
m*01 + P + Ss 
7 
+ Y - pm*0 i 
+ + 
(m*01+p + 5s)2 
>o >0 
(3.38) 
given that - 1 < < 0.15 Hence, 
d_ 
dp 
1 < 0 (3.39) 
An increase in the unit cost of waiting TJ decreases the propensity to seek 
public hospital care. This can be seen by examining the change in V^o for a given 
change in T}. For the case of an individual without private hospital insurance, 
avoo(s) • —qT i is g i v e n as 
d I 
= 7 Y - Tmm*0 0 - Ttte(s) 
B 
H T J- TT 
dm, 0,0 
> 0 
• - te s) m0,0 + 
>0 
+ Y lTmm*)0 - Tite(s) 
> 0 
where < 0. From (3.40), ^ ^ < 0 if 
dm. 0,0 
dTt (6s) 
[m, 0,0 
< 0 
(3.40) 
T J- rr 
dm. 0,0 
I t\s) (3.41) 
where the LHS of equation (3.41) is the reduction in the opportunity cost of time 
associated with decrease in the optimal intensity of hospital care arising from an 
incremental change in m and te(s) is the length of time the individual is expected 
1 5 The derivations are presented in Section A 
to wait on hospital waiting lists in health state s. Given that ^ f f i = 0, 
d_ 
m 
V0fi(s) - Vo^s) < 0 (3.42) 
3.5 Decision Rule: The Purchase of Private Hos-
pital Insurance 
The solutions on the optimal choice between public and private hospital care 
presented in Section 3.4 can be used to characterise the decision rule on whether 
to purchase private hospital insurance. Given the assumption specified in Section 
3.2 that the individual is an expected utility maximiser, the expected utility 
associated with the purchase of insurance is given as 
(3.43) 
where Vo,g*(s) is the indirect utility function associated with the optimal choice 
of public or private hospital care in each state s as specified in (3.30). Corre-
spondingly, the expected utility associated with not purchasing private hospital 
insurance is 
S B B H (3.44) 
Hence, the individual will choose to purchase private hospital insurance if 
EVi > EV0 
and not to purchase insurance if the equality is reversed. 
(3.45) 
3.5.1 Demand for Hospital Insurance: A Case Study with 
3 Health States 
In this section, I examine the factors that influence the demand for private hos-
pital insurance using a simple case study. First and foremost, suppose that there 
are only three possible health states, s — 0,1,2 where the probability of occur-
rence of the respective states are given as 7r(0), 7r(l) and 7r(2) and MB07t(s) = 1. 
As before, s — 0 corresponds to the state of perfect health or the absence of 
illness. Health states s = 1 and s = 2 correspond to the incidence of mild and 
severe illness conditions respectively. Suppose the mild medical conditions that 
occur in state s = 1 are conditions that are non-urgent in nature for which ac-
cess to treatment from the public hospital system involves a non-zero duration 
of wait which is denoted by te( 1) s= t. Also, suppose that the medical conditions 
that occur in state s = 2 are urgent in nature and require immediate medical 
attention. For these conditions, it is assumed that the expected duration of wait 
on public hospital waiting lists is zero, that is te(2) | | 0. As before, it is assumed 
that the length of wait to access private hospital care in all states is zero. 
Given the assumptions described above, the expressions of the optimal inten-
sity of public and private hospital care and the decision rule on the choice between 
public or private hospital care are modified by substituting the specific form for 
the parameters on health state s and expected waiting times te(s) into equations 
(3.17) to (3.20) and (3.30). To illustrate, the optimal intensity of public hospital 
care by an uninsured individual in state s — 1 and state s | | 2 are given by 
\ 
5 
- 2 A 
7 Tm 
Y m T l t - -<5 1 + -_ v I I 2 ^ l ) 
m;,0(2) = \ 
25 
7 Tm 
Y + <5 1 + 
7 
and the optimal intensity of private hospital care in state s = 1 and s = 2 are 
respectively 
< i ( i ) = \ 
Y 
(r)pm +pi) +Tn 
B 
m, m = \ 
25 
7 
Y 
(rjpm + pi)+ Tn 
L c 
2 
1 1 <5 + P + S + - • n P + 6+-
7 7 
where the subscripts d and q in m*dJs) denote the insurance status (d = 0: 
no private hospital insurance; d = 1: with private hospital insurance) and the 
choice of public (q = 0) or private care (q = 1) respectively. It is straightforward 
that irregardless of insurance status, the optimal intensity of both public and 
private hospital care in state s l o will be zero, that is m*dq(0) = 0. The 
expressions for the indirect utility functions for each patient type strategy are 
modified accordingly. They are 
Vb(0) = 
BB -
Y 7 
y — TmmQ0(l) rl)t moo(1)+<5. 
Vo.i(l) = Y-(TIPm+p" f •rm)m5il( 1) 
V 0 ,o (2) = Y - Tmm*0>0(2) 
™p, o(2) 
_m 0^(2)+<5 
H , i ( 2 ) = Y - (rjpm + p® + Tm)m*0A{2) 
m-0A{\)+P 
mgjCl )+P+6 
"i5,i(2)+/9 
(3.46) 
m.o 1(2)+f)+26 
For this uninsured individual, the decision on the choice between obtaining public 
or private hospital care is made by comparing the utility accrued from each patient 
type strategy. More specifically, the individual will choose public hospital care in 
health state s 
V0t0(s) > V0,i(s) s - 1,2 
Alternatively, private hospital care is chosen if Vo;o(s) < ^o,i(s)- Suppose Voi9«(s) 
denotes the utility that corresponds to the optimal choice of either public or 
private hospital care where 
MBm, = max Vo^Vo^s) s = 1,2 
The expected utility function that corresponds to the non-insurance strategy is 
expressed as 
EV0 = 7 r ( 0 ) F 7 + 7r( l ) V0,q*(l) + t t ( 2 ) Vq^{2) (3.47) 
Replicating the above for the case of an individual with private hospital in-
surance, the optimal intensities of public care are 
K o ( l ) = \ 7 Trr 
Y -PSTit + m mm 
< „ ( 2 ) = \ 
26 
Wm 
Y3P + (J| 1 + -
7 
-6[l + -
7 
and for private hospital care 
\ Y — P a(r)pm + pi) + Tn + i Uts+i 
\ 25 7 Y - P a(ripm + p") + T„ 
c 2 r 
+ E B B ! /? + <5 + -
7 7 
Correspondingly, the indirect utility functions are 
1 9 Y - P 
Vli0(l) = Y - P - S l i - Tit mT0(l)+<5 
H I = Y - P - | [a(ripm+pi) + Tm]mltl( 1) Tni,i(1)+/?+l5 (3.48) 
K,o(2)= Y-P-Tmml 0(2) 
K,i(2) I Y - P - [a(Vpm + jfl) + T m ]m^( 2) 
m^1(2)+/3 
m* 1(2)+/3+25 
The expression for the expected utility function corresponding to the insurance 
strategy is hence 
EVL = tt(0) Y - P + 7r(l) Vhq*(l) +?r(2) Vi,,.(2) (3.49) 
where 
Vi,q*{s) = max m^mM s 9 1.2 
The decision rule for on whether to purchase private hospital insurance is 
characterised as follows: the individual will purchase insurance if EVi > EV0 
and not purchase insurance if EVl < EV0. Alternatively, the inequalities may be 
rewritten as follows: the individual will choose to insure if 
7T(0) (Y-Py-Y1 +7T(1) - Vb,g.(l) +7r(2) Vi,g*(2) — Vo,q*(2) 
and not to insure if 
> 0 
(3.50) 
tt(0) [(Y- py - Y7J + 7T(1) [^, , . (1) - W ( 1 ) J + tt(2) [V^(2) - VV(2)J < o 
i 3.51) 
Equations (3.50) and (3.51) offer insights on the factors that affect the decision 
to purchase private hospital insurance. Fundamentally, the decision to insure 
depends on the expected use of private hospital care, which is influenced by the 
probability of illness and the propensity to seek private care when ill. Firstly, the 
individual will not purchase insurance if the probability of illness is zero. This 
result is observed when one substitute 7r(l) = 7r(2) g 0 and 7r(0) = 1. In this 
scenario, EVX - EV0 < 0 given that (Y SPy < Y1 for all values of P > 0. 
Secondly, the propensity to purchase insurance is positively associated with the 
probability of seeking private hospital care, if and when hospital care is required. 
This limited result is supported by two observations from the analytical model. 
Firstly, individuals who always seek public hospital care when ill will choose not 
to purchase private hospital insurance. Secondly, individuals who are likely to 
always seek to obtain private hospital care can be expected to purchase insurance. 
Before proceeding to validate the arguments made in the preceding section, it 
is important to first elaborate on the distinction between the probability of illness 
and the severity of illness. The former refers to the probability of the incidence 
of health states other than that of perfect health, which is denoted by s = 0. In 
terms of notations, the probability of illness refers to 7r(s / 0) or 1 — ?r(0). The 
severity of illness on the other hand, within the context of describing individuals 
with medical conditions of different severities, refers to the distribution of poor 
health states, conditional on the absence of perfect health. An increase in the 
illness severity refers to the change from health state with illness severity si to 
s2 where Si < S2, Vs > 0. 
To illustrate these results, consider the scenario that there are only two types 
of individuals: 'high users of public care' and 'high users of private care'. For 
convenience, the two types of individuals are referred to as Type I and Type 
II respectively. Suppose Type I individuals will always choose to obtain public 
hospital care when ill, regardless of insurance status. This may occur because 
Type I individuals have a weak preference for private hospital care (/3 parameter 
is small) or because waiting on hospital waiting lists confers a negligible cost 
(Ti is small). Conversely, suppose Type II individuals will always seek private 
hospital which is motivated by a strong preference for private hospital care ((3 
parameter is large) and that waiting on public hospital waiting lists confers a 
large cost (TJ is large). Following these assumptions, it is the case for Type I 
individuals that Vd,o(s) > Vd,i(s) and correspondingly for Type II individuals, 
^f,i(s) > Vd,o{s) for s = 1,2 and where subscript d denotes the availability of 
insurance. For Type I individuals, the decision rule to purchase private hospital 
insurance is characterised as 
EV1UEV0 = tt(0) (y - py - yi + 7T(1) HHi - mm • t t ( 2 ) Vi,o(2) - Vb,0(2) 
(3.52) 
Using the expressions in (3.46) and (3.48), one can observe that 
Vb,o(s) > Vi,o(s) 8 = 1,2 (3.53) 
for P > 0 and m*00 > m*lfi. Given that (Y - P)7 < Y, EVL - EV0 < 0. 
Hence, Type I individuals who always choose public hospital care will choose not 
to purchase private hospital insurance. Moving on to Type II individuals, the 
decision rule on whether to purchase insurance is characterised as 
EVa - EVq = tt(0) (y - py - y7 + 7T(1) P f M P f i + tt(2) [Vi,i(2) - Vb,i(2) 
(3.54) 
From (3.54), EVi. - EV0 > 0 if 
Vltl (s) > V0)1(s) s = 1,2 
and 
7T(0) (Y - py - Y1 <7T(1) Vi,i(1)-V&,i(1) +tt(2) V1a(2) - V0,i(2) 
On the former, it can be easily be shown using (3.46) and (3.48) that Vi^s) > 
V0,i(s) for s = 1, 2 if further two conditions hold. Under the first condition, 
Y -P Y 
> a{r)pm + pi) + Tm Tjpm +pi + T, 
(3.55) 
which implies that 
P < Y 1 -
a(r]pm+pi)+Tn (3.56) 
rjpm + jfl + Tm 
The terms on the RHS of the equality in (3.56) can be approximated by F[l|| a] 
if the unit price of private hospital care r]pm + pq is significantly larger than the 
unit opportunity cost of time Tm. The second condition is 
P i mi,i > iip™ -§- pq m. 0,1 (3.57) 
which require that the sum of the insurance premium P and the out-of-pocket 
expenditure on private hospital care given insurance cost sharing (LHS) be greater 
than the total expenditure on private hospital care in the absence of insurance 
(RHS). If the above conditions are valid, Type II individuals who always choose 
to obtain private hospital care when ill, will always choose to purchase private 
hospital insurance. 
The subjective distribution of illness states influences individuals' propensity 
to insure. Conditional on the availability of insurance, it can be expected that 
individuals are more likely to seek private hospital care in the event of a non-
urgent illness episode (health state s = 1) as opposed to a severe illness episode 
(health state s = 2). This is because waiting on public hospital waiting lists confer 
a positive waiting cost (denoted as Tit) on individuals accessing public hospitals 
for elective medical care. As demonstrated in Section 3.4.1, the propensity to 
seek private hospital care is expected to decrease with the severity of illness. 
Given this, both expectations on the probability of illness and the nature of the 
illness episode influence the propensity to insure. Conditional on the occurrence 
of illness, an increase in the probability 7r(l) of the occurrence of a non-urgent 
medical condition and a corresponding decline in the probability 7r(2) of a severe 
medical illness is expected to increase the likelihood of purchasing private hospital 
insurance. Corollary, individuals who expect to require elective treatment for 
which access to treatment in public hospitals are rationed through the use of 
waiting lists have a higher incentive to purchase private hospital insurance. 
In Section 3.4.1, it was shown that individuals with private hospital insur-
ance are more likely to seek private relative to public hospital care given that 
the availability of insurance reduces the effective monetary price of private care. 
An interesting question in this context would be why individuals with private 
hospital insurance choose instead to obtain public hospital care. The motivation 
underlying this decision can be examined by comparing Vi,o(s) and ^i.i{fl| in 
equation (3.48). In deciding to obtain public or private hospital care in health 
state 1, the insured individual trades off between the incremental benefits 
on health from a higher quality of care, combined with a lower level of consump-
tion arising from having to afford the patient's share of private hospital expenses 
a(r]pm + pq)m\ ,(1), with the incremental waiting cost Ttt involved in seeking 
public hospital care. Here, individuals facing a larger coinsurance rate or those 
with a smaller cost of waiting have a larger propensity to seek public hospital care 
even when private hospital insurance is available. The propensity for insured in-
dividuals to seek public hospital care is expected to be larger for severe relative 
to mild illness conditions. This is because waiting times in public hospitals is 
zero in the case of health state s = 2. 
The analysis above illuminates the interdependent relationship between the 
demand for private hospital care and hospital insurance. The decision to purchase 
private hospital insurance is influenced by expected utilisation of private hospital 
care. The choice to seek private hospital care is in turn affected, amongst others, 
by availability of private hospital insurance. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter presents the results from a theoretical model of demand for hospi-
tal care, the choice to seek public or private hospital care and the decision to 
purchase private health insurance. Results from a comparative statics analysis 
revealed that the optimal intensity of hospital care use is increasing in the sever-
ity of individuals' medical conditions and decreasing with the opportunity cost 
of time. The presence of private health insurance decreases the effective price of 
private hospital care but does not affect the intensity of public hospital care. Con-
ditional on the health status and the availability of insurance, individuals decide 
between public and private hospital care by choosing the strategy that maximises 
indirect utility. Individuals with more severe medical conditions are expected to 
have a higher probability of seeking treatment from the public sector because du-
ration of wait for public care is comparative shorter. The availability of private 
hospital insurance decreases the effective price of private care and increases the 
probability that individuals seek private treatment. Individuals' valuation of the 
cost of waiting on public hospital waiting lists and their preference for quality 
also influence the choice between public and private treatment. The decision to 
purchase private health insurance will depend on individuals' perceptions on the 
likelihood that illness occurs, and conditional on the former, on the severity of 
illness. 
The theoretical framework of the economic model described in this chapter 
is used to develop a novel simultaneous equation model that accommodates the 
count data feature of hospital care utilisation measures and the binary public-
private patient type and insurance outcome variables. The econometric model 
accounts for the simultaneity between the intensity of hospital use and the deci-
sions to seek public or private care and purchase private health insurance. This 
is described in Chapter 5. The empirical results are presented in Chapters 6 and 
7. The hospital care utilisation measure of interest in Chapter 6 is the number of 
hospital admissions and in Chapter 7 is the length of hospital stay as a publicly 
or privately admitted patient. 
Chapter 4 
Data 
4.1 Introduction 
This study uses microdata (also referred to as Confidentalised Unit Records Files 
or CURFs) from the National Health Survey 2004-05 conducted by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) between August 2004 to July 2005. The microdata of 
the 2004-05 NHS is available in two formats: A Basic CURF is available on both 
CD-ROM and through the Remote Access Data Laboratory (RADL) accessible 
via the internet. A more detailed version of the microdata is the Expanded CURF 
which is accessible only through RADL. This study uses the Basic CURFs. I am 
grateful to the Australian Bureau of Statistics for making the microdata available 
through the CURF arrangements with the Australian National University. The 
analysis, results and the views expressed herein are those of the author and do 
not represent those of the ABS. 
4.2 The 2004-05 National Health Survey 
The Australian National Health Survey (NHS) collects data on a nationally 
representative sample of Australian households. The survey collects detailed 
individual-level information such as demographic and socioeconomic characteris-
tics (age, gender, educational attainment, employment, personal income); health 
status (self assessed health, chronic and long term conditions, mental wellbeing); 
health risk factors (immunisation, alcohol consumption, smoking behaviour, ex-
ercise); health related actions and services use (visits to medical institutions, 
consultations with doctors, private health insurance), and on information at the 
household level (geography, dwelling structure, family structure and composition, 
household income).1 The survey is conducted using face-to-face interviews and 
carried out every three years.2 Trained interviewers conducted personal inter-
views with adult respondents and for children age 15 to 17 years where parental 
consent was given. For the remaining children, parents or guardians act as child 
proxies in answering the survey questions. 
The 2004-05 NHS was conducted using a multistage area sample of private 
dwellings (See Section 2 of (ABS 2006b) for more details). Households in smaller 
states and territories such as South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Cap-
ital Territory (ACT) are oversampled to provide reliable and detailed estimates 
for each state.3 Each state and territory in Australia was initially divided into 
geographically contiguous areas referred to as strata. Within each stratum con-
tains a number of Population Census Collection Districts (CD), which contains 
on average 250 private dwellings. Within each CD, a sample of private dwellings 
was selected. Prom each selected dwelling, a subsample of residents, consisting 
of one adult (age 18 years and over) and one child (age 0 to 17) was randomly 
selected. 
The total sample consist of 25,234 households, from which the active sample 
is 21,808 households as a result of sample loss due to reasons such as vacant 
dwellings or people moving out of scope. Of the active sample, a total of 19,501 
fully responding households remained with a response rate of 89.4%. Completed 
questionnaires were obtained for 25,906 persons. 
The analysis in this study uses unit record data of these 25,906 persons con-
tained in the NHS 2004-05 CURFs. Person level sampling weights are provided 
in the dataset. 
1More detailed information on the NHS 2004-05 is provided in ABS (2006a) 
2Before the 2001 NHS, these surveys were conducted once every 5 years. Prior to 2001, 
the NHS was previous carried out in 1977-78, 1983 (under the title of the Australian Health 
Survey), 1989-90 and 1995. 
3The sampling fraction for each state and territory is as follows: NSW (1/520), VIC (1/450), 
QLD (1/400), SA (1/150), WA (1/280), TAS (1/90), NT (1/335), ACT (1/75). 
4The sampling weights will not used in the regression analysis conducted in this study. 
As discussed in Cameron and Trivedi (2005), sample weights are not required if the analysis 
has a structural or analytical approach in which the research objective is the estimation of the 
conditional mean (pg. 820). In contrast, sample weights should be used if the research objective 
is to describe or summarise the data. 
4.3 Formulation of the Study Sample 
The primary focus of this study is to examine the determinants of and interactions 
between decisions on hospital use, the choice between public or private care and 
the purchase of private health insurance. To this end, respondents who are under 
the age of 20 years, as well as those under 25 years and engaging in full-time or 
part-time studies when the survey was conducted were excluded in forming the 
study sample. This exclusion was motivated by the reason that the study should 
include only individuals that are of age 21 years and older who are perceived as 
bearing the financial (and legal)5 responsibilities on decisions pertaining to his or 
her medical treatment needs. This approach is consistent with the classifications 
adopted by the private health insurance industry, where under private health 
insurance contracts, a dependent child may remain in his or her parent (s) policy 
if the child is unmarried and under the age of 21 years; or 25 years if the dependent 
child is undertaking full-time study.6 Based on this exclusion criterion, a total of 
7,345 observations were dropped from the full survey sample of 25,906. 
The sample was further restricted to respondents from one family households 
consisting of either single persons or couple households with or without dependent 
children. These four categories comprised 92% of all households structure types 
in the full survey sample. 1,370 observations corresponding to the fifth category 
'All other households' were dropped from the sample.7 Two key reasons moti-
vated the exclusion of the fifth household structure type. Firstly, of the three 
approaches - family, household and income units - that individuals residing in 
each selected dwelling are grouped, the income unit8 is the most appropriate de-
cision making unit on private health insurance.9 At the time of the survey, private 
5From a legal standpoint, individuals aged 18 years and over have full legal capacity, which 
includes decisions relating to health care although the legal age varies for some States in Aus-
tralia. For example, according to the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 
1995 (South Australia), "A person of or over 16 years of age may make decisions about his or 
her own medical treatment as validly and effectively as an adult". 
6Medibank Private http://www.medibank.com.au/homepage/family_fwac.asp. Accessed on 
14 March 2007. 
7This response category consists of multiple family households with or without dependent 
children under a single dwelling or group household consisting of non-family individuals co-
existing in a dwelling. 
8The income unit is defined by the ABS as a person or a group of related persons within a 
household whose command over income is shared. The relationships of individuals are restricted 
to those of registered or de facto marriage and parent/dependent child usually residing in the 
same household (para 7.6 on page 30, (ABS 1995)) 
9Even with income units, there are situations which calls for the income unit to be split or 
combined for the purpose of analysing decisions on private health insurance. See Appendix C 
health insurance in Australia was purchased by single individuals, couples within 
a marriage or a defacto relationship, sole-parent with children and two-parent 
families. Household and family units may contain related or unrelated individu-
als where combining these individuals for the purpose to purchase private health 
insurance is not permitted.10 Secondly, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, decisions 
surrounding the use of hospital services and or whether or not to purchase pri-
vate health insurance are expected to be influenced by individuals' incomes. As 
a representation of the economic resources available to individuals, measures of 
income should ideally consider how income and expenditure are shared among 
related individuals or families within a household.11 The appropriate statistical 
unit at which the measure of income should be examined is the income unit. 
Unfortunately, income measures corresponding to income units are not available 
in the basic version of the NHS data. Instead, this study relies on the equivalised 
household income.12 Hence, dropping multiple family household structures will 
avoid potential complications arising from multiple income units residing within 
a given dwelling. 
The data was further examined for incomplete or ambiguous responses on 
key outcome measures and explanatory variables. A further 17 observations were 
excluded where respondents indicated not knowing if they have private health 
insurance and 40 observations where the type of private health insurance policy 
(hospital, ancillary or both) held by individuals was not reported. A further 200 
observations for which respondents purchased insurance for less than 1 year at the 
time of the survey were excluded from the sample. Doing so would eliminate the 
possibility that these individuals may not have had private health insurance at the 
time when hospital care was obtained, given that the outcome measures of interest 
is the utilisation of hospital care in the 12 months preceding the survey. 250 
observations where individuals had indicated having post-school qualification but 
where the highest post-school educational attainment was reflected as unknown 
were dropped. Missing survey responses from the question on the availability of 
government health concession cards were imputed with an auxiliary regression 
using information on concession card status available in the dataset. This is 
in Butler (1999). 
10Examples include a family unit comprising of two adult siblings or a household unit com-
prising of two unrelated individuals. In both these examples, the individuals are required to be 
on separate policies if they wish to purchase private health insurance. 
11 See para 2.6 on page 5 of ABS (1995). 
12The definition of equivalised income will be discussed in Section 4.5 below. 
elaborated in Section 4.5. 
Prom the medical care utilisation measures captured in the survey, patients 
who had indicated that they have been admitted into hospital at least once in the 
past 12 months were asked whether they were admitted as a public (Medicare) 
or private patient. In 106 responses to this question, the choice of patient type 
was neither public nor private or was reflected as unknown and were dropped. 
After taking into account the responses dropped from the sample as described 
above, the size of the working sample is 14,594. Prom this working sample, 2,483 
respondents had indicated that they have been hospitalised at least once in the 
last twelve months. 
4.4 Dependent Variables: Private Health Insur-
ance and Hospital Use 
The key dependent variables examined in this study are whether individuals 
have private hospital insurance; the frequency of admissions to hospital in the 
12 months preceding the survey; the choice of hospital admission as a public or 
private patient and the number of nights individuals spent in hospital. Data 
on patient type choices and the intensity of hospital stay is only available for 
individuals who have been admitted into hospital at least once in the last 12 
months. Furthermore, the data only captures this information from individuals' 
last hospitalisation episode. 
4.4.1 Private Hospital Insurance Status and Duration 
Information on whether or not individuals have private hospital insurance was 
derived from two separate questions in the survey. Individuals were first asked if 
they had private health insurance cover. Insured individuals were further queried 
on the type of coverage. The response fields for coverage types include hospital, 
ancillary or both hospital and ancillary coverage. As this study focuses on how 
private health insurance influences the decisions on the choice of public or pri-
vate hospital care and the intensity of care, the relevant question pertaining to 
private health insurance status is whether or not individuals have private hos-
pital insurance. Individuals are regarded as having private hospital insurance 
if they possessed either hospital only or hospital and ancillary coverage. The 
Table 4.1: Private health insurance status and coverage type: Full Sample 
No private health insurance 7,469 (51.18%) 
With private health insurance 7,125 (48.82%) 
Coverage Type 
Hosp Hosp Anci Total 
& Anci° only only 
Purchased PHI before Aug 1999 4,497 850 399 5,746 
(78.3%)b (14.8%) (6.9%) (100.0%) 
Purchased PHI after Aug 1999 939 299 141 1,379 
(68.1%) (21.7%) (10.22%) (100.0%) 
Total 5,436 1,149 540 7,125 
(76.3%) (16.1%) (7.6%) (100.0%) 
Total Sample 14,594 (100.0%) 
aHosp and And refers to Hospital and Ancillary coverage respectively 
^Percentages in parenthesis sums horizontally to 100% 
variable representing the availability of private hospital insurance is coded as a 
dichotomous (0/1) variable which takes the value of 1 if the individual has private 
hospital insurance. 
The survey also queried individuals on the duration of insurance cover. Using 
this information13, individuals were assigned into two groups: whether they have 
been covered for either less than 5 years or 5 years and more. Given that the 
survey was conducted between August 2004 to July 2005, individuals who have 
had private health insurance coverage for less than 5 years at the time of the sur-
vey would have purchased the insurance coverage after August 1999. Individuals 
who have had insurance coverage for 5 years or more would have purchased cover 
before August 1999.14 
Table 4.1 describes the full sample by private health insurance status and cov-
erage type. In the sample of 14,594 individuals, 7,469 (51.2%) individuals did not 
have private health insurance. Of the remaining 7,125 (48.8%) individuals with 
private insurance coverage, 6,585 (92.4%) individuals had hospital cover while 
only 540 (7.6%) individuals had ancillary only coverage. On the duration of in-
surance purchase, 5,746 individuals (80.6%) purchased coverage prior to August 
13There are 5 response categories on the question on the duration of PHI cover: (i) Not 
applicable (No private health insurance); (ii) less than 1 year (after August 2003); (iii) 1 year 
to less than 2 years; (iv) 2 years to less than 5 years and (v) 5 years or more. 
14The date of insurance purchase may be constructed more accurately using information on 
the date of the NHS interview. However, the latter was not made available in the Basic CURF 
dataset. 
Table 4.2: Private Health Insurance by Age & Coverage (June 2004) 
Age Group 
Percentage of Population 
Hospital Cover Ancillary Cover 
0 — 24 years 44.0% 40.0% 
25 — 85 years 42.6% 42.4% 
All Ages 42.9% 41.3% 
Source: Author's calculation using data in ABS (2004) 
and PHIAC (2005). 
1999 while 1,379 individuals (19.4%) purchased it after August 1999. The com-
position of coverage types varies slightly by insurance duration. A slightly higher 
proportion of individuals insured prior to August 1999 had both hospital and 
ancillary coverage as compared to those who were insured for a shorter duration 
of time (93.1% vs. 89.8%). 
Based on Table 4.1, a total of 6,585 individuals in the full sample had private 
hospital coverage (that is hospital or hospital with ancillary) while 5,976 individ-
uals have ancillary coverage (ancillary only or hospital with ancillary). Therefore, 
the proportions of the full sample with hospital coverage and ancillary coverage 
are 45.1% and 40.9% respectively. These figures are broadly consistent with the 
national membership statistics for June 2004. Table 4.2 presents the percentages 
of the Australian population with hospital and ancillary coverage across three age 
bands: 0 — 24 years, 25 -§85 years and All Ages. These percentages were derived 
using insurance membership data published in PHIAC (2005) for June 2004 di-
vided by the estimated resident population in the respective age bands published 
in ABS (2004) for the same year. As one would observe, the proportion of the 
study sample with hospital coverage (45.1%) is slightly higher than that in Table 
4.2. For ancillary coverage, the proportions are comparatively similar. 
The distribution of private health insurance coverage and coverage type within 
the sub-sample consisting of individuals reported having been hospitalised at 
least once in the past 12 months is described in Table 4.3. In the sample of 
2,483 individuals, 1,207 (51.4%) individuals did not have private health insurance. 
Of the 1,276 (48.6%) individuals with private health insurance, 1,137 (94.2%) 
individuals had hospital coverage while the remaining 70 (5.8%) individuals had 
ancillary only policies. The distribution of insured individuals according to the 
duration of coverage and coverage type is generally comparable to that in the full 
sample. 
Table 4.3: Private health insurance status and coverage type: Sub-Sample 
No private health insurance 
With private health insurance 
1,207 (51.39%) 
1,276 (48.61%) 
Coverage Type 
Hosp Hosp Anci Total 
& Ancia only only 
Purchased PHI before Aug 1999 789 142 58 989 
(79.8%)b (14.4%) (5.9%) (100.0%) 
Purchased PHI after Aug 1999 161 45 12 207 
(73.9%) (20.6%) (5.5%) (100.0%) 
Total 950 187 70 1,207 
(78.7%) (15.5%) (5.8%) (100.0%) 
Total Sample 2,483 (100.0%) 
aHosp and Anci refers to Hospital and Ancillary coverage respectively 
^Percentages in parenthesis sums horizontally to 100% 
4.4.2 Hospitalisations, Patient-Type and Length of Stay 
On hospital care use, three measures of utilisation are of primary interest in this 
study. The first measure is the frequency of hospital admissions over the last 12 
months prior to the survey. In this version of the CURF microdata, the frequency 
of hospitalisation is recorded as 0, 1, 2 and 3 or more. The frequency distribution 
of hospital admissions is presented in Table 4.4. In the full sample of 14,594 
individuals, 12,005 (82.3%) individuals reported not having been admitted into 
hospital over the past 12 months. 1,894 (13.0%) respondents reported having 
been hospitalised once while 475 (3.3%) individuals were hospitalised twice and 
220 (1.5%) individuals were hospitalised 3 times or more. For the purpose of 
computing the summary statistics for the frequency of hospital admissions, the 
last category '3 times or more' is replaced by the lower bound. The mean number 
of hospital admissions is 0.240 and the variance is 0.338. The observation that 
the variance in the number of hospitalisation episode exceeds the mean has im-
plications on the econometric modeling approach. This will be further elaborated 
in Chapter 5. 
The second and third measures of hospital use are whether individuals chose 
to be hospitalised as a public or private patient and the number of nights in 
hospital at the most recent hospitalisation episode. Information on the length 
of hospital stay is recorded as 0 (no nights), 1 to 2 nights, 3 to 4 nights, 5 to 7 
nights and 8 nights or more. As I will elaborate in Chapter 5, the econometric 
Table 4.4: Number of Hospital Admissions: Summary Statistics 
Frequency of hospital Frequency Percent 
admissions over 12 months 
0 12,005 82.26 
1 1,894 12.98 
2 475 3.25 
3 or more 220 1.52 
Total 14,594 100 
Mean 0.240 
Variance 0.338 
model adopted in this study requires that the length of hospital stay be an integer 
value. Hence, the interval values on hospital nights are replaced by their lower 
bound wherever they occur. Column (5) of Table 4.5 presents the distribution 
of hospital length of stay for all the 2,483 individuals in the entire sub-sample. 
It is observed that a majority of these individuals stay no more than 2 nights in 
hospital, with 919 (37.0%) admitted on a day admission basis and 684 (27.6%) 
staying between 1 to 2 nights. 339 (13.7%) respondents spent between 3 to 4 
nights in hospital while 313 (12.6%) stayed for 5 to 7 nights. A total of 228 
(9.2%) individuals were hospitalised for 8 nights or more. The mean number of 
hospital nights for the entire sub-sample is 2.05 and the variance is 6.33. 
The decision tree illustrated in Figure 4.1 at the end of this chapter describes 
the distribution of individuals in the sample by private hospital insurance status 
and patient type, and presents the average length of hospital stay across each of 
the four groups. From Figure 4.1, one can first observe that the proportion of 
individuals who opted to be hospitalised as private patients is overwhelmingly 
higher for individuals who have private hospital insurance. Of the 1,137 privately 
insured individuals, 933 (82.1%) sought private hospital care. In contrast, only 97 
(7.2%) of the 1,346 individuals without private hospital insurance opted for pri-
vate hospital care. The proportion of uninsured individuals who sought hospital 
care as public patients is considerably higher than that for insured individuals. 
92.8% of uninsured individuals obtained hospital care as a public patient while 
only 17.9% of insured individuals sought public care. In terms of the frequency of 
admissions hospital to the past 12 months, individuals who sought public hospital 
care recorded a higher number of admissions (1.38, 1.39) compared with those 
Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics of Length of Stay by Insurance and Patient Type 
No Private Health Insurance With Private Health Insurance 
Nights Public Patient Private Patient Public Patient Private Patient Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0 nights 418 (33.5%) 38 (39.2%) 90 (44.1%) 368 (40.0%) 919 (37.0%) 
1-2 nights 364 (29.1%) 38 (39.2%) 46 (22.6%) 233 (25.3%) 684 (27.6%) 
3-4 nights 181 (14.5%) 7 (7.2%) 27 (13.2%) 124 (13.3%) 339 (13.7%) 
5-7 nights 152 (12.2%) 9 (9.3%) 22 (10.8%) 125 (13.9%) 313 (12.6%) 
8 or more nights 134 (10.7%) 5 (5.2%) 19 (9.3%) 69 (7.5%) 228 (9.2%) 
Total 1,249 97 204 933 2,483 
Mean 2.19 1.48 1.91 1.95 2.05 
Variance 6.70 4.50 6.65 5.94 6.33 
Note: Percentages in parenthesis sums vertically but may not sum up to 100% due to rounding. Cells are 
number of respondents. 
who obtained private care (1.34, 1.31). Moving on to the intensity of hospital 
stay, uninsured individuals who obtained public hospital care recorded the high-
est mean number of hospital nights (2.19 nights). In contrast, the average length 
of stay (1.48 nights) is lowest for uninsured individuals who sought private hos-
pital care. One would observe that amongst individuals who sought private care, 
insured individuals stay on average 0.47 nights longer than uninsured individuals 
(1.48 vs. 1.95 nights). 
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 4.5 presents the distribution of hospital length of 
stay by insurance and patient type. Two broad trends can be observed. Firstly, 
hospitalisation that involves day-admissions, that is zero nights in hospital, is 
lower for publicly admitted patients who do not have private hospital insurance 
relative to the remaining three subgroups. For example, 33.5% of uninsured pub-
lic patients were admitted on a day basis compared to 39.2% for insured public 
patients and 39.2% for uninsured private patients. Secondly, long hospital stays 
are associated with hospital admissions as a public patient relative to private 
patient - 10.7% of uninsured public patients and 9.3% of insured public patients 
reported having stayed in hospital for a duration of 8 nights or more as com-
pared to 5.2% and 7.5% for uninsured and insured private patients respectively. 
The differences in the distribution of hospital stay across the four subgroups are 
expected to be influenced, amongst others, by heterogeneity in patients' medical 
conditions and the direct and indirect prices of medical care that individuals face. 
4.5 Explanatory Variables 
The following sections describe the two study samples using relevant individ-
ual and household-specific information collected in the survey. This information 
can be classified into six broad categories: demographic composition, socioeco-
nomic characteristics, health status, risk factors and geography. The descriptive 
statistics of the variables within each of the six categories are presented in Table 
4.6 for the full study sample consisting of 14,594 individuals and Table 4.7 for 
the sub-sample corresponding to the 2,483 individuals who reported having been 
hospitalised at least once in the 12 months preceding the survey. An additional 
sub-sample of interest is the 12,005 individuals who have reported not being hospi-
talised in the 12 months leading up to survey.15 The descriptive statistics for this 
sub-sample is presented in Table 4.8. Apart from describing the characteristics 
of the two study samples, the following discussion also compares the hospitalised 
and non-hospitalised sub-samples wherever it is appropriate. Readers are referred 
to Table 4.9 for the definitions of the variables. 
As elaborated at the beginning of this chapter, missing or ambiguous re-
sponses on key explanatory variables were dropped from the sample in formu-
lating the study sample. Missing responses on the availability of government 
concession cards were imputed for 683 respondents. The types of government con-
cession cards include those issued by the Department of Veteran Affairs (DVA), 
Health Care Cards, the Pensioner Concession Card and the Commonwealth Se-
nior Health Cards. Eligibility criteria vary according to the concession card in 
question but generally, individuals from low income households, seniors and pen-
sioners and individuals in disadvantaged circumstances are eligible to apply.16 A 
simple probit regression on concession card status using data that is available was 
performed with household income decile and age as explanatory variables. The 
estimates from the regression were used to calculate an expected probability of 
having a concession card. Observations with missing responses were replaced by 
15The sum of the sample size of the hospitalised (2,463) and non-hospitalised (12,005) sub-
samples does not add up to the full sample (14,594). This is because some observations from 
the full sample were dropped in the formulation of the hospitalised sub-sample as these have 
missing or ambiguous responses on important dependent and explanatory variables such as 
whether the respondent was admitted into a public or private hospital. This was described 
earlier in Section 4.3. 
16 More information on the types of cards and the eligibility rules can be found at 
http://www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/payments/conc_cards.htm [Assessed on 15 
June 2009] 
the expected probability values. 
4.5.1 Demographic Variables 
The key demographic variables that are of relevance to this study are gender, age, 
marital status and income unit type. Prom Tables 4.6 to 4.8, we first observe a 
higher proportion of females as compared to males in the full sample and both 
the hospitalised and non-hospitalised sub-samples. The proportion of females 
is lower in the non-hospitalised sub-sample (53%) relative to the hospitalised 
sample (60%). The ages of respondents vary from a minimum of 22 years to a 
maximum of 85 years. The average age of individuals in the hospitalised sample 
(52.4 years) is approximately 3.3 years older as compared to the non-hospitalised 
sample (49.1 years). The information on respondents' age is available only in five-
year age intervals in the version of the data that is utilised in the study. Hence, 
respondents' ages are represented by the middle value of each age interval. In 
both study samples, approximately 15% to 20% of females respondents are of 
childbearing age, which is defined as being in the age range of 20 to 39 years. 
The proportion of females in this age category is smaller in the non-hospitalised 
group (15.0%) as compared to the hospitalised group (19.7%). On marital status, 
approximately 55% of individuals reported that they are married in a registered 
or defacto marriage. The distributions of households by income unit types is 
fairly similar across respondents in the full and sub-samples. The two major 
income unit categories are households from couple units (33.2% in full sample, 
33.3% in the hospitalised sample) and one-person units (33.5%, 35.0%), followed 
by units comprising of couples with dependents (26.3%, 25.3%) and one-parent 
units (6.9%, 6.6%). 
4.5.2 Socioeconomic Variables 
The main socioeconomic variables that are relevant to this study are income, ed-
ucational attainment, employment status and occupational type. On measures of 
income, two types of individual and household income are available in the data. 
The first measure is the gross weekly personal cash income of the respondent.17 
17Only regular and recurring cash income are included. The components of cash income are 
employee cash income (wages and salary), unincorporated business cash income (profit/loss from 
unincorporated business or share in partnership), government cash pensions and allowances 
(students and the unemployed, pensions for aged and those with disability) and other cash 
The second measure is the gross equivalised cash income of the household. The 
equivalised cash income of the household is calculated by first summing the gross 
(pre-tax) weekly personal cash income for all household members to derive the 
total gross household income and thereafter dividing this total by an equivalence 
factor. The equivalence factor depends on the number of adults and children 
living in a given household18. Equivalising household incomes allows for compar-
ative analysis across households with different household size and composition. 
Both personal and equivalised household income are available only in the form 
of income deciles instead of actual values. Indicative values are constructed us-
ing information published in ABS (2006a) on the income ranges corresponding 
to each income decile. For the first to the ninth deciles, the indicative value is 
calculated as a simple average of the lower and the upper decile cut-off values. 
This is described in Table 4.10. As described at the bottom of Tables 4.6 and 
4.7, the average gross weekly equivalised cash income of households in the full 
and sub-sample is $612.38 and $542.47 respectively. Comparing between the non-
hospitalised and hospitalised sub-samples, one would observe that the household 
income in the former, at $627.31, is significantly higher than that of the latter. 
It was reported above that total of 2,090 observations where the measure of 
household income was either reported as unknown or not stated were dropped. 
The parameter estimates from the regression analysis obtained where listwise 
deletion is used to handle item non-response will be biased if the missing data 
is not missing completedly at random (MCAR). The assumption of MCAR is 
violated if individuals or households with high income are those who did not 
provide information on their income. Listwise deletion have been shown to be 
acceptable if the missing observations constitute less than 5% or less of the total 
sample (Schafer 1997) but however for this study this proportion is considerably 
higher. A variety of approaches have been developed to handle missing data and 
are discussed in Cameron and Trivedi (2005). These are however not explored in 
this study and will be deferred for future work. 
A source of information on the amount of education received by respondents 
income (property, superannuation, dividends and interest). See pages 136-138 in ABS (2006b) 
for more information. 
18The ABS calculates the household equivalence factor using the 'modified OECD' equiva-
lence scale of allocating weights to each individual in the household. The first adult (over the 
age of 15 years) is assigned a weight of 1 point. Thereafter, each additional adult receives a 
weight of 0.5 points while each child under the age of 15 is allotted 0.3 points. The household 
equivalence factor is derived by summing up the weights for all individuals in the household. 
See Explanatory Notes in Appendix 3 of ABS (2005) 
in the sample is the highest level of post-school educational attainment. The re-
sponse categories are school qualifications; basic/skilled vocational qualification; 
undergraduate and associate diploma; and bachelor degree, postgraduate diploma 
and higher. The distribution of survey respondents by educational attainment is 
roughly similar across the full and sub-samples. Approximately half of respon-
dents in both samples have no post-school qualification, while roughly 23% of 
individuals have basic or vocational qualifications. 10% to 11% of respondents 
have diplomas while 16% to 18% have bachelors degrees or higher. Information 
on employment status, sector and occupation types are also collected in the sur-
vey. As reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, the proportion of respondents engaged in 
either full-time or part-time employment is higher in the full as compared to the 
sub-sample. In the full sample, 42.2% of respondents are in full-time employment 
as compared to 28.3% in the sub-sample. Correspondingly, 55.1% of individuals 
in the sub-sample are out of the labour force, relative to 40.7% in the full sample. 
Among employed individuals, the three largest occupational types categories are 
"Professionals" (12.7%, 9.4%), "Intermediate Clerical, Sales and Service Work-
ers" (9.8% in full sample, 7.7% in sub-sample), and "Associate Professionals" 
(8.0%, 6.4%). 
On the issuance of Government health concession cards, the proportion of 
respondents with these cards in the full-sample (42.1%) and that of the non-
hospitalised sample (39.5%) is considerably lower than that of the sub-sample 
(54.3%). The types of Government health concession cards in question include 
those issued by the Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA), Health Care Cards, 
the Pensioner Concession Card and the Commonwealth Senior Health Cards. 
4.5.3 Measures of Health Status 
The data contains a series of self-reported health measures that describes the 
health status of the individuals surveyed. The relevant measures are a five-point 
self-assessed measure of general health and the types and number of long-term 
chronic medical conditions. We can observe from Tables 4.6 and 4.7 that the 
distribution of individuals by self-assessed health in the full and sub-samples differ 
significantly. A higher proportion of individuals in sub-sample, which contains 
respondents who reported having been hospitalised at least once in the last 12 
months, rated their health as being "poor" (12.8% in sub sample, 5.6% in full 
sample) and "fair" (19.4% vs. 13.5%). Correspondingly, a lower proportion of 
individuals in the sub-sample rated their health as "very good" (26.7% vs 34.1%) 
or "excellent" (12.1% vs. 18.1%). 
The prevalence of long-term and chronic medical conditions of respondents 
in the two samples is presented in the summary tables. By definition, long-term 
conditions are medical conditions which are current at the time of the survey, 
had lasted at least six months prior to the survey and is expected to last for six 
months or more. The summary statistics describe the proportion of respondents 
in both samples that have indicated that they suffer from medical conditions 
in each of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, 
Australian Modification (ICD10-AM) disease categories. Medical conditions that 
are especially prevalent in respondents from both the full and sub-samples are 
diseases of the eye (e.g Cataract, Glaucoma), diseases of the musculoskeletal 
system and connective tissue (e.g. Gout, Arthritis) and diseases of the respiratory 
system (e.g. Bronchitis, Asthma, Chronic Sinusitis). The prevalence of medical 
conditions in disease categories such as musculoskeletal, circulatory, endocrine 
and ear are relatively higher in the sub-sample as compared to the 'full sample. 
As given in foot of Tables 4.6 and 4.7, the average number of long-term chronic 
conditions suffered by individuals in the sub-sample is 3.48, compared with 2.97 
in full sample and 2.86 in the non-hospitalised sample. 
4.5.4 Health Risk Indicators 
The survey collects information on respondents' behaviour in relation to four 
health related risk factors that influence the health of individuals. The health 
risk factors are the consumption of alcohol and tobacco, overweight and physical 
inactivity. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 presents the summary statistics of the key health 
risk indicators that are of interest in this study. The first indicator is whether 
or not individuals are considered as being of high alcohol risk measured using 
the frequency and intensity of alcohol consumption over a period of 3 days. The 
proportion of respondents that are of high alcohol risk is higher in the full sam-
ple (14.9%) as compared with the hospitalised sub-sample (12.9%). The second 
indicator of health risk is the consumption of tobacco. Approximately 20% to 
22% of respondents in both samples are regular smokers, defined as individuals 
who are current smokers who smoke on a daily basis. The third health risk indi-
cator is whether or not the respondent is Grade 2 overweight or higher, defined 
as having a Body Mass Index of 30 or more. In both samples, 20% to 22% of 
respondents are overweight by this measure. The final health risk indicator is 
the measure of physical activity, defined by whether or not individuals walked for 
sports, recreation and fitness at least once over the last two weeks. Close to half 
of all respondents reported having done so. 
4.5.5 Geography 
The distribution of respondents across the States and Territories in Australia and 
by remoteness category is presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. The remoteness in-
dicator is based on the Australian Standard Geographical Classification (ASGC) 
developed by the ABS. Approximately 60% of respondents in both samples are 
located in major cities in Australia while 24% are located in inner regional areas. 
Roughly 16% of respondents are in the "ASGC - Others" category, which include 
outer regional areas, remote, very remote and migratory Australia. 
4.5.6 Concluding Comments 
This study uses data from the 2004-05 National Health Survey to empirically 
examine the determinants of the demand for hospital care and private health 
insurance in Australia. The data is appropriate for this purpose as it contains 
detailed information on individuals' use of health care services and private health 
insurance status. In addition, the data contains a wealth of information on in-
dividuals' characteristics such as age, household income, employment and health 
status. An important limitation of the data however is that the information 
on key outcome variables of interest, namely the number of hospital admissions 
and hospital nights, is made available as interval values as opposed to continu-
ous values which limits the richness of the data. There is also the possibility of 
inaccurate reporting given that the NHS data is self reported. 
Figure 4.1: Decision Tree: Insurance, Patient Type, Number of Hospital Admis-
sions and Length of Stay 
Private Hospital Insurance 
Yes 
(N=1,137) 
Public 
(N=204) 
HOSPADM = 
1.39 times 
LOS = 
1.91 nights 
Private 
(N=933) 
HOSPADM= 
1.31 times 
LOS = 
1.95 nights 
No 
(N=1,346) 
Private 
(N=97) 
HOSPADM= 
1.34 times 
LOS = 
1.48 nights 
Public 
(N=1,249) 
HOSPADM = 
1.38 times 
LOS = 
2.19 nights 
Legend: Number of hospital admissions in the last 12 months (HOSPADM). Average 
length of stay at the most recent hospitalisation (LOS) 
Table 4.6: Means of explanatory variables: Full-Sample 
Sample Size JV=14,594 
Binary explanatory variables 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
Female 0.543 SAH-Very Good 0.341 
Childbear 0.157 SAH-Excellent 0.181 
Maristat 0.552 ICD10-lnfectious/Parasitic 0.012 
Depchild 0.333 ICD10-Neoplasm 0.031 
IU-Couple 0.332 ICDIO-Blood 0.020 
IU-Couple_Dep 0.263 ICD10-Endocrine 0.184 
IU-One_Parent 0.069 ICDIO-Mental/Behavioural 0.134 
IU-One_Person 0.335 ICDIO-Nervous 0.104 
COB-Aust 0.738 ICD 10-Eye 0.698 
COB-Main_Eng 0.125 ICDIO-Ear 0.185 
COB-Others 0.137 ICDIO-Circulatory 0.287 
Edu-School 0.477 ICD 10-Respiratory 0.335 
Edu-Voc 0.232 ICDIO-Digestive 0.100 
Edu-Dip 0.110 ICDIO-Skin 0.045 
Edu-Degree 0.182 ICDIO-Muscular 0.457 
Hconcard 0.421 ICD 10-Genitourinary 0.047 
Occup-N_Emloy 0.407 ICDIO-Congenital 0.047 
Occup-Mgmr / Adm 0.064 ICDIO-Others 0.010 
Occup-Prof. 0.127 Alcohol 3-day 0.149 
Occup-A/Prof. 0.080 Smoker Reg 0.215 
Occup-TradesP 0.066 Walk 0.514 
Occup-Adv Clr/Svc 0.021 Overweigh 0.195 
Occup-Int Clr/Svc 0.098 NSW 0.205 
Occup-Prod/Trans 0.048 VIC 0.164 
Occup-Ele Clr/Svc 0.040 QLD 0.161 
Occup-Labour 0.048 SA 0.177 
Employ-FT 0.422 WA 0.108 
Employ-PT 0.171 TAS 0.109 
Employ-Not 0.022 NT 0.006 
Employ-NILF 0.385 ACT 0.072 
SAH-Poor 0.056 ASGC-Major Cities 0.611 
SAH-Fair 0.135 ASGC-Inner Region 0.231 
SAH-Good 0.288 ASGC-Others 0.158 
Continuous and Count explanatory variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AGE 49.74 16.73 22 85 
HHINC 612.38 381.47 119.00 1279.00 
LTCOND 2.97 1.74 0 5 
Table 4.7: Means of explanatory variables: Hospitalised Sample 
Sample Size iV=2,483 
Binary explanatory variables 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
Female 0.603 SAH-Good 0.290 
Childbear 0.197 SAH-Very Good 0.267 
Maristat 0.550 SAH-Excellent 0.121 
Depchild 0.318 ICD10-lnfectious/Parasitic 0.016 
IU-Couple 0.333 ICDIO-Neoplasm 0.068 
IU-Couple_Dep 0.253 ICDIO-Blood 0.034 
IU-One_Parent 0.066 ICDIO-Endocrine 0.249 
IU-One_Person 0.350 ICD10-Mental/Behavioural 0.159 
COB-Aust 0.754 ICDIO-Nervous 0.122 
COB-Main_Eng 0.123 ICDIO-Eye 0.745 
COB-Others 0.123 ICDIO-Ear 0.231 
Edu-School 0.500 ICDIO-Circulatory 0.396 
Edu-Voc 0.237 ICD10-Respiratory 0.347 
Edu-Dip 0.103 ICD 10-Digestive 0.173 
Edu-Degree 0.160 ICDIO-Skin 0.050 
Hconcard 0.543 ICDIO-Muscular 0.538 
Occup-N_Emloy 0.551 IC D10- Genitourinary 0.085 
Occup-Mgmr / Adm 0.050 IC D10-Congenital 0.013 
Occup-Prof. 0.094 ICD10-Others 0.177 
Occup- A/Prof. 0.064 Alcohol 3-day 0.129 
Occup-TradesP 0.043 Smoker Reg 0.198 
Occup-Adv Clr/Svc 0.014 Walk 0.497 
Occup-Int Clr/Svc 0.077 Overweigh 0.224 
Occup-Prod/Trans 0.032 NSW 0.210 
Occup-Ele Clr/Svc 0.037 VIC 0.162 
Occup-Labour 0.038 QLD 0.158 
Employ-FT 0.283 SA 0.170 
Employ-PT 0.166 WA 0.125 
Employ-Not 0.019 TAS 0.109 
Employ-NILF 0.532 NT 0.003 
Public Sector 0.104 ACT 0.063 
Private Sector 0.345 ASGC-Major Cities 0.596 
SAH-Poor 0.128 ASGC-Inner Region 0.247 
SAH-Fair 0.194 ASGC-Others 0.158 
Continuous and Count explanatory variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AGE 52.44 18.06 22 85 
HHINC 542.47 372.34 119.00 1279.00 
LTCOND 3.48 1.66 0 5 
Table 4.8: Means of explanatory variables: Non Hospitalised Sub-Sample 
Sample Size iV=12,005 
Binary explanatory variables 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
Female 0.531 SAH-Very Good 0.357 
Childbear 0.150 S AH-Excellent 0.194 
Maristat 0.554 ICD10-lnfectious/Parasitic 0.011 
Depchild 0.337 ICDIO-Neoplasm 0.023 
IU-Couple 0.333 ICDIO-Blood 0.017 
IU-Couple_Dep 0.267 ICD10-Endocrine 0.169 
IU-One_Parent 0.070 ICD 10-Mental/Behavioural 0.129 
IU- One_Person 0.330 ICDIO-Nervous 0.101 
COB-Aust 0.733 ICDIO-Eye 0.688 
COB-Main_Eng 0.126 ICDIO-Ear 0.174 
COB-Others 0.140 ICDIO-Circulatory 0.263 
Edu-School 0.472 ICD10-Respiratory 0.333 
Edu-Voc 0.230 ICD10-Digestive 0.084 
Edu-Dip 0.111 ICDIO-Skin 0.044 
Edu-Degree 0.187 ICDIO-Muscular 0.439 
Hconcard 0.395 ICDIO-Genitourinary 0.039 
Occup-N_Emloy 0.376 ICDIO-Congenital 0.008 
Occup-Mgmr/Adm 0.067 ICDIO-Others 0.117 
Occup-Prof. 0.134 Alcohol 3-day 0.154 
Occup-A/Prof. 0.083 Smoker Reg 0.218 
Occup-TradesP 0.071 Walk 0.518 
Occup-Adv Clr/Svc 0.023 Overweigh 0.190 
Occup-Int Clr/Svc 0.103 NSW 0.203 
Occup-Prod/Trans 0.052 VIC 0.164 
Occup-Ele Clr/Svc 0.041 QLD 0.162 
Occup-Labour 0.051 SA 0.178 
Employ-FT 0.451 WA 0.106 
Employ-PT 0.173 TAS 0.109 
Employ-Not 0.023 NT 0.006 
Employ-NILF 0.353 ACT 0.074 
SAH-Poor 0.040 ASGC-Major Cities 0.615 
SAH-Fair 0.122 ASGC-Inner Region 0.227 
SAH-Good 0.288 ASGC-Others 0.158 
Continuous and Count explanatory variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AGE 49.08 16.33 22 85 
HHINC 627.31 381.87 119.00 1279J 
LTCOND 2.86 1.73 0 5 
Table 4.9: Variable names and description 
Variable Description 
Maristat 
Depchild 
Female 
Age 
Age-Sq 
Childbearing 
Country of Birth (COB) 
Australia 
Main English 
Others 
Education 
School 
Vocation 
Diploma 
Degree 
Hconcard 
Household Inc 
Household Inc-Sq 
Occupation 
Not Employed 
Manager /Admin 
Professional 
Asc Professional 
Tradesperson 
Adv Clerical/Service 
Int Clerical/Service 
Production/Transport 
Ele Clerical/Service 
Labourer 
Employment 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Unemployed 
NILF 
Public Sector 
Private Sector 
LT Chronic Cond 
SAH 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Very Good 
Excellent 
ICD10 
Infectious/Parasitic 
Neoplasm 
Blood 
Endocrine 
Mental/Behavioural 
Nervous 
Eye 
1 if the respondent is married in a registered or defacto marriage 
1 if the respondent has at least one dependent child 
1 if the respondent is female 
The middle value in each age interval decile 
Squared age 
1 if the respondent is female and age between 30 to 39 years 
1 if the respondent is born in Australia. 
1 if the respondent is born in main English speaking countries 
1 if the respondent is born in other countries 
1 if the respondent has no post-school education 
1 if the respondent has a basic or skilled vocational qualification 
1 if the respondent has a undergraduate or associate diploma 
1 if the respondent has a Bachelor degree or higher 
1 if the respondent has a Government health concession card 
Gross weekly equivalised cash income of household. Middle values of decile 
Square of Household Inc 
1 if the individual 
1 occupation is in 
1 occupation is in 
1 occupation is in 
1 occupation is in 
1 occupation is in 
1 occupation is in 
1 occupation is in 
1 occupation is in 
1 occupation is in 
is not employed 
category "Managers and Administrators" 
category "Professionals" 
category "Associate Professionals" 
category "Tradesperson/Related Workers" 
category "Advanced Clerical/Service Workers" 
category "Intermediate Clerical/Service Workers" 
category "Intermediate Production/Transport Workers" 
category "Elementary Clerical/Sales/Service Workers" 
category "Labourers and Related Workers" 
= 1 if the respondent is engaging in full-time employment 
= 1 if the respondent is engaging in part-time employment 
= 1 if the respondent is unemployed 
= 1 if the respondent is not in the labour force 
= 1 if the respondent works in the public sector 
= 1 if the respondent works in the private sector 
= The number of long term chronic conditions 
= 1 if the respondent self-assessed health is poor 
= 1 if the respondent self-assessed health is fair 
= 1 if the respondent self-assessed health is good 
= 1 if the respondent self-assessed health is very good 
= 1 if the respondent self-assessed health is excellent 
=1 Infectious & parasitic diseases 
=1 Neoplasm 
=1 Diseases of the blood/blood forming organs 
=1 Endocrine, nutritional & metabolic diseases 
=1 Mental & behavioural problems 
=1 Diseases of the nervous system 
=1 Diseases of the eye and adnexa 
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Table 4.9: Variable names and description: Cont. 
Variable Description 
Ear J ^ H = 1 Diseases of the ear and mastoid 
Circulatory =1 Diseases of the circulatory system 
Respiratory =1 Diseases of the respiratory system 
Digestive = 1 Diseases of the digestive system 
Skin =1 Diseases of the skin & subcutaneous tissue 
Muscular =1 Diseases of the musculoskeletal system & connective tissue 
Genitourinary B=1 Diseases of the genito-urinary system 
Congenital =1 Congenital malformations, deformations & chromosomal abnormalities 
Others =1 Symptoms, signs & conditions not elsewhere classified 
Alcohol 3-day = 1 if the respondent's alcohol 3-day risk level is high 
Smoker Regular = 1 if the respondent currently smokes daily 
Walk = 1 if the respondent walked for sport, recreation or fitness (last 2 weeks) 
Overweigh = 1 if the respondent is Grade 2 or 3 overweigh 
NSW = 1 if the respondent lives in New South Wales 
VIC = 1 if the respondent lives in Victoria 
QLD = 1 if the respondent lives in Queensland 
SA = 1 if the respondent lives in South Australia 
WA = 1 if the respondent lives in Western Australia 
TAS = 1 if the respondent lives in Tasmania 
NT = 1 if the respondent lives in Northern Territory 
ACT = 1 if the respondent lives in Australian Capital Territory 
ASGC_Major = 1 if the ASGC remoteness area category is "Major Cities" 
ASGCJnner = 1 if the ASGC remoteness area category is "Inner Regional Australia" 
ASGC.Others = 1 if the ASGC remoteness area category is "Others" 
Table 4.10: Intra Decile Income Range and Indicative Value 
Decile Income Range ($) Indicative Value ($) 
1 < 238 119 
2 238 to 294 266 
3 295 to 379 337 ^ 380 to 478 429 
5 479 to 583 531 
6 584 to 636 636 
7 689 to 822 755.5 
8 823 to 996 909.5 
9 997 to 1278 1137.5 
10 I 1279 1279 
Chapter 5 
Econometric Modeling and 
Estimation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter contributes to the literature on the econometric analysis of count 
data models with endogenous regressors. Within this literature, a variety of meth-
ods have been developed which include the GMM approach by Mullahy (1997) 
and Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997), the FIML approach by Terza (1998) 
and Greene (2007) and the two-step residual inclusion and predictor substitution 
methods. These were surveyed in Chapter 2.4.3. In this chapter, a novel simul-
taneous equation econometric model is developed that accommodates count and 
binary outcomes variables as well endogenous binary regressors. The structure 
of the econometric model is based on the theoretical framework of the economic 
model of demand for hospital care and private hospital insurance described in 
Chapter 3. The model is estimated to empirically examine the determinants of 
the demand for hospital care and hospital insurance. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the issues of dis-
creteness and the non-negative integer value (or count) nature of the dependent 
variables. The section further explores the problem of self-selection in the utilisa-
tion of hospital care and the choice of patient type and examines its implications 
for the design of an appropriate econometric model. Section 5.3 presents a two-
equation econometric model of demand for hospital care and private hospital 
insurance where the hospital care utilisation measure of interest is the frequency 
of hospital admissions. Section 5.4 expands on the framework outlined in Section 
5.3 and develops a three-equation econometric model of demand for hospital care, 
the choice of hospital admission as a public or private patient and the choice to 
purchase private hospital insurance. The hospital care utilisation measure of in-
terest here is the length of hospital stay. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter with 
a discussion of the estimation approach. 
5.2 Bridging Theory and Practice: Designing 
the Econometric Model 
Prom the theoretical model of demand for hospital care and private hospital 
insurance described in Chapter 3, the results of interest are (1) the expressions 
on the optimal intensity of hospital care (2) the optimal choice between 
public or private hospital caxe which is the outcome of the decision rule V^ q* (s) = 
maa;[Vdio(s)) ; and (3) the decision that underpins the insurance choice 
EVd* 5 max \EV\, EXo] where the subscripts d and q denote the insurance status 
(d = 0: no private hospital insurance; d — 1: with private hospital insurance) 
and the choice of public (q: = 0) or private care (q — 1) respectively. These 
expressions form a system of ten equations where m^q(s) and Vd,q(s) each have 
four equations with EVd consisting of two equations. 
Prom the perspective of econometric analysis, estimating the above system of 
equations is not possible as not all ten equations are observed given the data. The 
first issue to consider in the design of the econometric model is the discreteness in 
the outcome variables for insurance and patient type choices. On the former, one 
observes from the data whether or not individuals have private hospital insurance. 
For individuals with private hospital insurance, one can imply that EX\ > EV0, 
where the equality is reversed for individuals without private hospital insurance. 
Similarly, in the choice to seek hospital care as a public or private patient, what 
one observes from the data is whether individuals obtained public or private 
hospital care. The former implies that Vdfi(s) > V ^ s ) , and the reverse Vdfi(s) < 
Vdi(s) is true for individuals who obtained private hospital care. One can observe 
that the utility function Vd,q(s) from each patient type strategy q depends on the 
availability of insurance, denoted by d. This is because of the sequential decision 
making process surrounding the insurance and patient type choice. Prior to the 
incidence of illness, the individual decides whether to purchase insurance. On 
the onset of illness in state s, the individual decides whether to seek hospital 
care as a public or private patient, depending on the availability of insurance. 
This scenario is an example of selectivity or self-selection given that the patient 
type choice depends on a prior decision to purchase insurance. The issue of 
self-selection will be discussed further later in this section. 
An approach to model the discreteness in the insurance and patient type 
choice variables is the discrete choice model. Using the insurance decision as 
an illustration, consider the decision on whether to purchase private hospital 
insurance. Suppose subscript i denotes the i-th observation of N individuals and 
define d j M E V x - EV0)l where 
= + m (5.1) 
where Wt is a vector of exogenous regressors that are invariant across the insur-
ance strategy, 7 is a vector of coefficients and r/i is an error term. The functions 
in (5.1) may be generalised to include regressors that are both varying and in-
variant across the insurance alternatives. This is however not applicable given 
that the data employed in this study does not contain information on insurance 
premiums or waiting times in public hospitals which can, if available, serve as 
alternative-varying regressors on the insurance and patient type decisions. Sup-
pose the binary insurance variable assumes the value of 1 if d* > 0, that is 
di = l[d*> 0] (5.2) 
Prom (5.1), the probability that individual i decides to purchase insurance (that 
is d = 1) is given by 
m i l l ] = P[d* > 0] 
= P[Wj7 + r/j > 0] (5.3) 
= p[Vi>-Wi 7] 
Assuming that 77 is normally distributed with mean zero and variance cr^ , 77 is 
symmetrically distributed around zero and 
P[Vi<Wn] 
= ) (5.4) 
where $ is the cumulative standard normal distribution. Given that 7 and av are 
not separately identifiable, it is frequently assumed that Bpl. The resultant 
model is commonly referred to as the probit model1 and is readily estimated via 
maximum-likelihood. 
A second consideration on the design of an appropriate econometric model 
concerns the count data nature of the hospital care utilisation measures available 
in the data. These measures, which include examples like the number of hospital 
admissions or the length of hospital stay, take on non-negative integer values. 
The simplest model for count data is the Poisson regression model (PRM). To 
elaborate on the PRM, suppose m* is the hospital utilisation measure of interest 
for individual i, Xi a vector of exogenous covariates and 6 a set of parameters. 
Under the PRM, TO* given X t follows a Poisson distribution with probability 
density function 
K M - " P " ^ (5.5) 
mil 
The conditional mean /i, or E(mi\Xi) may be specified as 
^ k exp(X^) (5.6) 
A major limitation of the PRM is the property of equidispersion that follows 
the assumption of Poisson distribution. As discussed in Chapter 4, the hospital 
utilisation measures in the data sample exhibit overdispersion in that the un-
conditional variance is greater than unconditional mean. To accommodate the 
presence of overdispersion, one can consider introducing a normally distributed 
variable as a heterogeneity term in the conditional mean equation.2 Using (5.6), 
the conditional mean can be respecified as 
exp(Xi<9 + 1 | Ml | | 
= exp(Xj0)exp(£i) 
where exp(£) is distributed log-normal. In addition to allowing one to account 
for overdispersion in the data, the Poisson-lognormal mixture provides a conve-
nient framework to accommodate the presence of endogeneous regressors in the 
1See Maddala (1983), pp. 13 - 26, for a discussion of regression models where the dependent 
variable is dichotomous. 
2 Greene (2007) proposed the lognormal Poisson model as an alternative to the standard log 
gamma count data models for introducing heterogeneity in the conditional mean equation in 
traditional count data models which also serves as a convenient platform for further extensions 
into two-part models such as zero inflation, hurdle and sample selection models. 
conditional mean /j, resulting from selectivity in the utilisation of hospital care. 
This model, referred to as the lognormal random effects Poisson model, is one of 
the several models that will be estimated in the empirical analysis. 
A third consideration on the design of an appropriate econometric model is 
that of selectivity or self-selection. As we have seen in Section 3.4.1 the decision 
to seek hospital care as a public or private patient, conditional on the insurance 
choice, depends on the net utility that accrue across the alternatives. The same 
applies to the decision to purchase private hospital insurance which is likely to 
depend, amongst others, on the expected use of private hospital care. One ap-
proach to characterise the choice to receive public or private hospital care is the 
binary choice model. Let q* denote the net utility accruing to individuals when 
obtaining public versus private hospital care. Suppose we assume that 
where Z% and a are vectors containing the exogenous covariates and the coeffi-
cients; di the binary insurance variable and the error term m In equation (5.8), 
di is endogenous given that the decision to purchase private hospital insurance is 
based on individual self-selection. To accommodate the presence of the endoge-
nous insurance binary variable in the patient type choice equation, the patient 
type choice equation in (5.8) and the insurance choice equation in (5.1) are com-
bined to form 
where it is assumed that v and 77 are independent of W and Z and are dis-
tributed as bivariate normal with mean zero, with each having unit variance 
and correlation parameter p. In notational term, the equivalent expression is 
[v,rj\ ~ iV2[(0,0), (1,1 ),p]. If p — 0, then di and Wj are uncorrelated and equa-
tion (5.8) can be estimated using a simple probit model. If p ^ 0, di and vx are 
correlated, estimation of (5.8) using a simple probit model produces inconsistent 
estimates of a and (3. From equation (5.8), the effect of the availability of private 
hospital insurance d on the probability of obtaining private hospital care q is of 
primary interest. The average treatment effect of insurance d, conditional on the 
exogenous covariates Z is given as &(Za + (3d) - ${Za). 
The problem of selectivity also applies to the hospital care utilisation equation. 
qi Ml[Zia + t3di + Vi > 0] (5.8) 
q i 4 \[ZiOL +pd i + Vi > 0] 
di § \[Wa + 9 > 0] 
(5.9) 
This is because rather than observing a measure of hospital care intensity m* 
under each insurance and patient type strategy, one observes in the data the 
length of hospital stay, given the choice to obtain public or private care and the 
availability of private hospital insurance. Suppose the conditional mean equation 
in (5.7) is modified to include binary variables 
Hi = exp (Xtf + Xidi + X2qi + &) (5.10) 
where Xi denotes a vector of exogenous covariates and the heterogeneity term 
The binary variables di and qi represent whether or not the individual has 
private hospital insurance and chose to receive public or private hospital care 
respectively. In equation (5.10), both di and q% are endogenous given that the 
decision to purchase insurance and the choice to receive public or private care 
are based on individual self-selection. If individuals who because of unobserved 
individual specific reasons are more likely to stay longer in hospitals (that is those 
with higher are more likely to purchase private health insurance), then di and 
will be correlated. To accommodate the endogeneity of di and qi, one can allow 
the error term £ in (5.10) to correlate with the error terms r/ and v in the patient 
type and insurance equations described in (5.9). For example, one can assume 
that Vi and r]i are distributed multivariate normal (MVN) with mean vector 
zero with covariance matrix 
m / 1 Pl 2 Pl3 
Vi g | jV3 0 > Pl2 1 P23 
m W \Pl3 P23 1 / 
Detailed discussions on the application of this approach are deferred to Sec-
tions 5.3 and 5.4 below. If pi2, Pi3 ^ 0, estimation using single count data models 
such as the Poisson regression model or the Negative Binomial Model will produce 
inconsistent coefficient estimates of 6 and As. Correspondingly, if p12 = P13 = 0, 
one can estimate the utilisation equation using single equation methods. 
Two questions of interest can be examined using the model specification in 
(5.10). The first question concerns whether or not the average intensity of hospital 
care use differs between publicly and privately admitted patients, conditional on 
insurance d and exogenous covariates X. This is the average treatment effect 
of q on hospital utilisation measure m and is given as exp(X9 + Aid + A2) -
exp(X9+\id). The second question of interest is whether or not the moral hazard 
effect is present for private hospital care. This can be examined by augmenting 
the conditional mean equation (5.10) with an interaction term di • q% 
Hi = exp(Xi9 + Aidi + X2qi + A3di • qt + (5.11) 
Here, the moral hazard effect is given as E(rrii\qi — 1 ,di = 1, X ) - EfmJo.-Bj! 
= 0, JsT). 
5.3 An Econometric Model of the Demand for 
Hospital Admissions and Private Hospital 
Insurance 
This section describes a two-equation econometric model employed to empiri-
cally examine the demand for hospital admission and private hospital insurance. 
The hospital utilisation measure of interest here is the frequency of hospital ad-
missions. Let the dependent variable be the observed frequency of hospital 
admission by individual i (i = 1 , . . . , N). Furthermore, let us assume that condi-
tional on the exogenous covariates X{ and the endogenous variable di, rrii follows 
a Poisson distribution with probability density function 
M U m I ^ ^ ^ H (5.12) 
mil 
where the conditional mean parameter /i, is 
Hi= exppQfl + Mdi) (5.13) 
To accommodate the presence of overdispersion observed in the data, a hetero-
geneity term is introduced into the conditional mean equation Hi as a normally 
distributed random variable with mean 0 and variance a2. This heterogeneity 
term is standardised by the standard deviation a and where ^ is distributed 
standard normal, that is & ~ N[0,1]. The conditional mean equation is rewritten 
as 
Hi = exp(Xid + Aidi -1-
= exp(X,0 -I- Aidi)exp(cr£i) 
The decision rule surrounding the decision to purchase private hospital insur-
ance is given by a continuous latent variable d* where 
d* = Wi-y + rji (5.15) 
where r/j ~ N[0,1]. d* is not observed in the data. Instead, we observe the 
indicator variable di where 
di = l[d* > 0] (5.16) 
The insurance binary variable di in the conditional mean equation in (5.14) 
is allowed to be endogenous by assuming that p and r/j are correlated. More 
specifically, it is assumed that and rji are distributed bivariate normal, that is 
[&,rfc]~iV2[(0,0),(l , l) ,p] (5-17) 
In the above notation N2[(hi, ^2), (of, <t2)> P]> p, denotes the mean, a2 the vari-
ance and p the correlation parameter. By the assumption of joint normality3, 77, 
conditional on may be expressed as 
Vi = + e i ( l - p2)1/2, i ~ N[0,1] (5.18) 
Substituting (5.18) into (5.15) and using the decision rule (5.16) for observing 
di, we can derive the probability of observing di — 1 which is expressed as 
ml m1 i>( ^ w r + p e A P{di = l ) = ^ U > ~ ( 1 _ p 2 ) i / 2 1 
(5.19) 
J r Wg + ptA 
I j g a - P 2 ) i / 2 ; 
where the second line follows given the symmetry of the normal distribution. The 
probability of observing d, = 0 is 
P W | 0 ) = P ( £ 1 > ^ | ) (5.20) 
Using the above assumptions, let us now proceed to specify the joint con-
ditional density of the data. Let the joint conditional density function of the 
3See Section 3.10.1 in page 87 of Greene (2000). 
observed data / (m, , di\Qi) be expressed as 
r+oo 
f(mu di | Qi) = / f{mu di | fii, (5.21) 
where the standard normal density and = (XiUWi). Given the previous 
assumption that rrii and di are related only through the correlations between ft 
and r/j, rrii conditioned £t is independent of di. Hence, f ( rn u di | fli) in (5.21) may 
be expressed as 
f(mu di | Qi, £ J • f(rrii \ di,'£$) • g(di | Wt, (5.22) 
where f(rrii | X,, di, £$) is the conditional Poisson density function in (5.13) and 
g(di | Wj, f t ) is the conditional density function of di given W{ and g,. Using (5.19) 
and (5.20), g(di | Wj,£j) may be expressed as 
g{di\Wi,Zi) = $ y* • 
Wj 7 + 
(1 - p2)V2 (5.23) 
where yi — 2di — 1 and $ denotes the cumulative normal density function. The 
joint conditional density function of the data is derived by substituting (5.22) 
and (5.23) into (5.21) to obtain 
/
+oo 
f(mi\Xi,di,Zi) •oo 
Equation (5.24) is used to construct the log-likelihood function which will be used 
to estimate the two-equation model. The estimation strategy will be discussed in 
Section 5.5. In the next section, I will expand on the two-equation model outlined 
in this section and develop a three equation econometric model of demand for 
hospital care, the choice of hospital admission as a public or private patient and 
the choice to purchase private hospital insurance. 
Vi • 
Wj 7 + pjj 
(1 - p2)1^ 
(5-24) 
5.4 An Econometric Model of the Demand for 
Hospital Stay, the Choice of Public or Pri-
vate Patient and Private Hospital Insurance 
This section describes a three-equation econometric model employed to empiri-
cally examine the demand for hospital stay, the choice of hospital admission as a 
public or private patient and private hospital insurance. The hospital utilisation 
measure of interest here is the length of hospital stay. Let the dependent vari-
able rrii be the observed hospital length of stay by individual i (i — 1, . . . , N). 
Furthermore, assume that conditional on the exogenous covariates Xi and the 
endogenous variables qt and d,, m l follows a Poisson distribution with probability 
density function 
firm 1 9 1 1 B i '=• S S S (5-25) rrii'. 
where the conditional mean parameter is 
Hi = exp(Xid + Aidi + \2qi + cr£i) ^ 
= exp(Xj(9 + Ai di + A2&)exp(cr£i) 
Similar to Section 5.3, the heterogeneity term £ is introduced to accommodate 
the presence of overdispersion. The decision rule surrounding the binary variable 
representing the choice of hospital admission as a public or private patient is 
given by a continuous latent variable q* where 
q* = Z i a + M i + Vi (5.27) 
where i\ ~ N[0,1]. q* is not observed in the data. Instead, the indicator variable 
qi is observed where 
q i = 1 [q* > 0] (5.28) 
The decision rule surrounding the decision to purchase private hospital insur-
ance is given by d* where 
d* = Wi 7 + 7;, (5.29) 
where rji ~ N[0,1]. As above, the indicator variable d l is observed where 
di B I m I o] (5.30) 
The patient type and insurance binary variables in equations (5.27) in (5.29) 
are allowed to be endogenous by assuming that a Vi and ^ are correlated. One 
possible specification is the assumption that v^  and rji are distributed multi-
variate normal (MVN) with mean vector zero and covariance £ where 
1 Pl2 Pl3 
£ i f Pi 2 1 P23 
. Pl3 P23 1 
Let g(^i,Vi,r/i \ Qj) denote the conditional MVN density where 
(5.31) 
where fij = (Xi U Zi U Wi) and # | p Vi rji). Following Terza (1998), the joint 
conditional density for the observed data f(mu q^ , di \ Qi) for individual i can be 
expressed as 
I j —< (1 - 9 i ) 0 - d^firm | XL* = 0,di = 0,&) Pfa = 0 ,d j = 0 | 
(fc)(l - di)f{mi | Xi,q i | 1 , 1 = 0,&)'J(</i = M * = 0 | 
( 1 1 g i)(d i)/(m i | Xi ,q i = 0,di = 1 1 1 = 1 | 
feXWK I Qi = 1 = U i ) = M i 1 1 I fii,&)J p (5.32) 
where /(m* \X i ,q i ldi,^i) is the conditional probability density function of m l 
as defined in (5.25). The model can be estimated by constructing the overall 
log-likelihood function which involves taking the logarithms of (5.32) and there-
after summing the result for a lH = 1 , . . . , N. Given that (5.32) does not have 
a closed form solution, the overall log-likelihood function may be approximated 
using simulation methods and estimated via maximum simulated likelihood. This 
approach is computationally cumbersome as it involves drawing random numbers 
from the truncated multivariate normal distribution. A simpler approach involves 
decomposing the trivariate normal density function into a series of conditional bi-
variate normal probability density functions. This method is more tractable as 
it reduces the number of integrals that axe required to compute the likelihood 
function. This approach is adopted in this study.4 The assumption that Vi 
and rji are trivariate normal with covariance matrix in (5.31) implies that every 
pair of them is a bivariate normal. Specifically, 
[ & , ^ ] ~ i V 2 [ ( 0 , 0 ) , ( l , l ) , p 1 2 ] (5.33) 
M ~ W 2 [ ( 0 , 0 ) , ( 1 , 1 ) , P I 3 ] (5.34) 
[vi,Vi]~N2[(0,0),(l,l),p23] (5.35) 
This in turn implies that (vt | and (77, | are distributed bivariate normal 
N, (5.36) Pi2&\ / I - P 1 2 P23 - P12P13 
J ' y>23 - P12P13 1 - Pl3 I 
Prom (5.36), (5.27), (5.28), (5.29) and (5.30), we can deduce that the joint 
probability of the four possible outcomes of the pair (<£, di) conditional on Z;, W* 
and & can be succinctly written as 
g(qu ^ | ZuM&) = $2[t/ii©i, ViiQ2, P*] (5-37) 
where 
n _ Zja + fad* + P12& 
1 ~ (1 - P?2)1/2 
n _ W g 4- P13& 
2 " (1 -P? 3 ) 1 / 2 
p* = vu • V2i • {r~p T3L 
4See Section 3.1, pages 14-18 of Greene (2007) for an application of this approach to count 
data models with sample selection. 
In the above, yu - 1 and t/2t — — 1. $2 denote the bivariate normal 
cumulative density function. 
Using the expression in (5.37), the joint conditional density for the observed 
data which was originally specified in (5.32) can be re-written as follows. Let the 
joint conditional density for the observed data /(ra^, qi, di | f2j) be expressed as 
/
+00 
f(rrii, qu dt | Qi, (5-38) -00 
where </>(&) is the standard normal density. Given the previous assumption that 
77ij, qi and di are related only through the correlations between Vi and r]%, 
conditioned on m* is independent of ql and di. Hence, f(rrii,qi,di | in 
(5.38) may be expressed as 
/ ( ra j , qu di | f & ) - f{m,i \ Xu qu di, • gfa, di \ Ziy ^J (5.39) 
Substituting (5.37) into (5.39), we obtain 
/
+00 
f(rrn | ^ qu du & • ^[yuQuyA P*] MWi (5'4°) •00 
Equation (5.40) will be used to construct the log-likelihood function which we 
will use to estimate the three-equation model. The estimation strategy for the 
three equation econometric model outlined above will be discussed in the next 
section. 
5.5 Estimation Strategy 
The solutions to the joint conditional density functions in (5.24) and (5.40) require 
the evaluation of one integral. If these expressions have a closed-form solution, 
the models can be estimated using maximum likelihood. Consider the estimation 
of the joint conditional density function in (5.40).5 Suppose a vector of param-
eters, denoted by O, is introduced into the joint conditional density function 
/ ( ra j , qi, di | Qj, 0 ) , together with the i subscript which denotes the observations 
5These principles are similarly applied in the estimation of the two equation model based 
on the joint conditional density function in (5.24) 
for i-th individual. For a sample of N independent observations of rrii, q% and di, 
the likelihood and log-likelihood6 functions are formulated using (5.40) and are 
expressed as follows 
N 
L ( © ) B Q B J H 1 1 1 , e ) (5.41) 
i=i 
N 
In L (B) - ^ In f{mu qu d{ | gjg ©) (5.42) 
i=1 
The maximum likelihood (ML) estimate is the parameter vector O ml that 
maximises the likelihood or log-likelihood of observing the data in our sample. It 
is likely that (5.40) does not have a closed-form expression. For this case, one may 
approximate the integral using deterministic numerical integration techniques 
or quadrature.7 Alternatively, (5.40) may be approximated using Monte Carlo 
simulations. This study adopts the simulation approach. As in (5.40), the joint 
conditional density function for the i-th observation in the sample is 
/
+oo 
/(mi | qu di, &) • $2[yii©i, 2/2i©2, P*] -oo 
Let & denote the s-th draw of £ from the standard normal density <£(&). The 
simulated joint conditional density function for the i-th observation is 
Correspondingly, the simulated likelihood and log-simulated likelihood functions 
are 
6Because /(m, q,d\tl, 0 ) is the joint conditional density function rather than the full joint 
density function /(m, q,d,Cl\ 8 ) , the likelihood function constructed using the former is the con-
ditional (log)likelihood function which is in most applications required for consistent estimation 
of the model (Cameron and Trivedi 2005) 
7See Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Section 12.3.1, pages 388 - 390 for a discussion of quadra-
tures techniques. 
N J S 
L(B) I n I g j l I Cli, qi, di, £?) • (5.43) 
i=1 1 
H | I 
The principle of ML is applied to obtain an estimate of 0 . The maximum sim-
ulated likelihood (MSL) estimator OMSL maximises the simulated log-likelihood 
function in (5.44). 
The number of simulations S has a considerable effect on the properties of the 
MSL estimator. Gourieroux and Monfort (1996) showed that the MSL estimator 
is asymptotically equivalent to the ML estimator if the ratio of square root N 
and S approaches zero ( \ / ~ N / S —> 0) when the sample size N and the number 
of simulations S approaches infinity. While this consistency condition provides 
some indication on how S should increase given an increase in the sample size 
N, it does not provide any guidance of the appropriate number of simulations S 
for a given sample size N. A more formal test-based approach for choosing the 
number of simulations S is proposed in Hajivassiliou (2000) which is based on the 
principle of selecting a value of S to reduce the simulation noise to a desirable 
level. Clearly, the benefits of increasing S to minimise simulation noise has to 
be balanced with the computational burden that comes with increasing of the 
number of simulations. 
This study addressed the task of choosing an appropriate number of simula-
tions S as follows: First and foremost, the Halton sequence was used to generate 
quasi-random draws that is required for the simulation of the log-likelihood func-
tion. Unlike the generation of pseudo-random numbers which selects S pseudo-
random points within the domain of integration, the Halton sequence is a quasi-
Monte Carlo method that creates draws based on non-random, but more uni-
formly distributed selection of points over the integration domain.8 Simulations 
using the Halton sequence have been demonstrated to be considerably more ac-
curate, that is to lower simulation errors, with a significantly smaller number of 
8 A comprehensive and descriptive guide to the Halton sequence is provided in Section 9.3.3 
of Train (2003) 
i S M M H M I > (5.44) 
draws and computational time as compared to the pseudo-random method.9 The 
Halton sequence is generated in Stata using the -mdraw program and saved as 
part of the data in the dataset. To simulate the log-likelihood function in 5.40, 
the uniformly distributed quasi-random draws from the Halton sequence are con-
verted to random draws from the standard normal distribution using the inverse 
cumulative normal transformation. Secondly, in an attempt to select a practical 
number of simulations, S is increased stepwise by a factor of 2 starting from a 
minimum of 50 to a maximum of 2000 for a given model specification. Thereafter, 
the regression estimates were examined to see if the results vary significantly for 
increasing values of S. The choice on the number of simulations is determined as 
the lowest number of simulations for which the estimates obtained are observed 
not to vary significantly with higher values of S. 
The Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (BHHH) quasi-Newton algorithm was 
used to maximise the simulated likelihood using the statistical software Stata. 
Numerical derivatives were used via the - I f - method in Stata which requires one 
to specify only the log-likelihood function. The variance of the MSL estimates 
was computed using the robust 'sandwich' formula (White 1982). The robust 
approach, as opposed to the information matrix and outer product formulae, is 
more appropriate as it takes into account the influence of simulation noise that is 
present when the number simulations S is finite (Mcfadden and Train 2000). In 
addition, the robust 'sandwich' formula produces accurate standard errors of the 
MSL estimates in the event that the joint density function is misspecified, that 
is the true joint density function of the data is not as that in (5.40). 
In the data, the observed length of hospital stay is recorded for the most recent 
hospitalisation episode y, where {y = 1,2, 3 or more). For each set of observations 
y, the conditional mean for length of stay is expressed as E(m | X, Y = y, a). The 
conditional mean of length of stay for the sample is expressed as E(m \ X, a) — 
E(m | X, y, a) which is calculated as a weighted average of the mean length of 
stay for each realisation of Y. The empirical distribution of y is used as weights 
for the computation. 
Marginal effects were calculated using the appropriate formulae depending 
on the functional form assumptions for continuous and discrete variables. Given 
the probit structure of the patient type and insurance equations, the marginal 
9Bhat (2001) and Train (2003) found that 100 Halton-based draws provide at least the same 
accuracy than with 1000 pseudo-random draws. Also, the use of the Halton sequence has shown 
to dramatically decrease the computation time to complete the simulations. 
effect of a change in the continuous variable Xk is given as 4>(Xj3) • d(X/3)/dXk 
where /3 are the estimates of the coefficients. For discrete explanatory vari-
ables, the marginal effect when Xk changes from 0 to 1 is given as <&{Xj3 \ Xk = 
1) — \Xk = 0). Given the exponential mean equation in the hospital 
use equation, the marginal effect of a change in a continuous variable is Xk is 
exp(X/3 + 0.5a) • d(X{3 + 0.5a)/dXk. For discrete explanatory variables, the 
marginal effect is given by e x p p ^ + 0.5a \ Xkm l )^exp(X/? + 0.5a | Xk = 0). In 
all instance, the marginal effects are computed with the remaining covariates at 
their sample means. Standard errors of the marginal effects are calculated using 
the delta method via the -predic tn l - in Stata.1 0 
10 An alternative approach is to calculate the standard errors of the marginal effects via Monte 
Carlo techniques. See Deb and Trivedi (2006). 
Chapter 6 
Demand for Hospital Admissions 
and Private Hospital Insurance 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter contributes to the literature on the demand for health care and 
health insurance in a mixed public and private health care system. As reviewed 
in Chapter 2, empirical studies where the health utilisation measures of interest 
are characterised as non-negative integer values or counts have largely employed 
instrumental variable techniques such as the two-step residual inclusion and pre-
dictor substitution methods to account for the simultaneity between insurance 
and health care utilisation. In this chapter, the simultaneous equation model 
described in Chapter 5.3 is applied to analyse the determinants of the inten-
sity of hospital admissions and the choice to purchase private health insurance. 
The results suggest that the insurance binary variable is not endogenous which 
implies that one can examine the utilisation and insurance equations with sepa-
rate regressions. The chapter is organised as follows. The choice of explanatory 
variables for the hospital admission and insurance equations is first discussed in 
Section 6.2. Issues pertaining to the identification of the econometric model and 
the number of simulation draws are presented here. Issues on model selection 
between the simultaneous equation model and the single equation version are 
discussed in Section 6.3. The empirical results of the determinants of private 
health insurance are detailed in Section 6.4. The determinants of the intensity 
of hospital admissions are discussed in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 concludes with a 
discussion of the results. 
6.2 Explanatory Variables, Exclusion Restric-
tions and Simulation Draws 
Table 6.1 presents the explanatory variables included in the hospital admission 
and insurance equations. First and foremost, the insurance binary variable was 
included as an endogenous regressor on the right hand side of the hospital admis-
sion equation. The remaining explanatory variables in each of the two equations 
can be classified into the following categories: demographics; socioeconomic char-
acteristics; health risk; health status and geographic indicators. The results from 
previous studies that used data from Australia suggest that health status (e.g. 
the presence of chronic health conditions) plays an important role in determining 
the use of health care services while income is an important factor in the decision 
to purchase insurance (Cameron et al. 1988, Cameron and Trivedi 1991). To 
facilitate the comparison of the results in this study with these Australia based 
studies, a similar set of explanatory variables was chosen. Demographic variables 
such as gender, income unit type and age were included in both equations. A 
childbearing variable, which is a binary variable that represents females between 
the ages of 25 to 40 years was included to capture the effects of childbearing 
on hospital admissions. Country of birth was included in the insurance choice 
equation. Of the socioeconomic variables, the equivalised household income was 
included in both equations. The level of educational attainment was included as 
regressors in insurance equation. Two different variables capturing information 
on the individuals' employment characteristics were included separately in each 
of the two equations. The first variable was the individuals' employment status, 
that is whether the individual was employed full-time, part-time, unemployed 
or not in the labour force (NILF). This was included in the hospital admission 
equation. Information on individuals' occupation type was included in the in-
surance equation. Also in the insurance equation was information on whether or 
not individuals have health concession cards. Health risk factors such as tobacco 
and alcohol consumption were included in the insurance equation. Two measures 
of individuals' health status were included. The first consists of a set of binary 
variables of the ICD10 disease categories. The second is a count variable of the 
number of long term chronic medical conditions that individuals suffered from. 
These health status indicators were included in both equations. Lastly, infor-
mation on the locality of individuals' were captured using state/territory and 
remoteness dummies. 
6.1: Explanatory variables in hospital admission fc insurance equations 
Endogenous Regressors 
Equations 
Hospital 
Admission 
Insurance 
Insurance X 
Exogenous Regressors 
A. Demographics 
Female X X 
Income Unit: Dependents X X 
Income Unit: Couple X X 
Age, Age-squared X X 
Childbearing X 
Country of Birth X 
B. Socioeconomic 
Income, Income-squared X X 
Education X 
Employment Status X 
Occupational Category X 
Health Concession Card X 
C. Health Risk 
Regular smoker X 
Alcohol X 
D. Health Status 
ICD-10 Chronic Conditions X X 
Number of Chronic conditions X X 
E. Geography 
State/Territories X X 
Remoteness X X 
There is an issue of whether the econometric model is identified given the 
presence of an endogenous regressor in the hospital admission equation. For-
mally speaking, the model is identified by the nonlinearity of the functional form 
assumed.1 To add robustness of the identification of the model, exclusions re-
strictions are applied in that there is at least one variable that is in the insurance 
equation but not in the hospital admission equation. To this effect, variables mea-
suring health risk such as smoking and alcohol consumption are included only in 
the insurance equation. These health risk measures are proxies for individuals' 
attitudes toward risk that is likely to affect the decision to purchase health in-
surance. While there has been some evidence that risk attitudes influence the 
use of preventive medical care, it is not likely that they play a role in the utilisa-
tion of curative hospital care (Anderson and Mellor 2008). In addition, variables 
such as the childbearing indicator, education attainment, and the availability of 
health concession card is included only in the insurance equation as guided by 
the related studies cited above. 
Estimation of the lognormal random effects Poisson and the simultaneous 
equation model described in Chapter 5.5 requires one to determine an optimal 
number of simulations used to simulate the likelihood function. Here, the choice 
of the number of simulations S was determined in a stepwise manner in which 
S was increased from 50 to 3000. The choice on the number of simulations is 
determined as the lowest number of simulations for which the estimates obtained 
are observed not to vary significantly with higher values of S. The analysis below 
used S=3000 based on Halton quasi-random draws.2 Convergence for the estima-
tion of the simultaneous equation model was achieved after 47 iterations requiring 
approximately 22 hours to complete on an Intel 2.67 Ghz processor with 6 GB 
RAM. 
1See point 6 on page 668 of Greene (2000). 
2Deb and Trivedi (2006) remarked that simulations in nonlinear simultaneous equation mod-
els as that adopted in this study, where the dependent variables from some equations enters 
as regressors in other equations, require considerably larger number of simulation draws as 
compared to seemingly unrelated system of equations model that are often used in multino-
mial choice models. In their analysis, the authors used 2000 simulations based on the Halton 
sequence on a sample consisting of 8129 observations. If one were to take the choice on the 
number of simulations S=2000 given the sample size N=8129 in Deb and Trivedi (2006) as a 
point of reference to decide on the number of simulations required for the sample size of N=2406 
in this study, the minimum number of simulations required to fulfil the consistency requirement 
(that S increases more than VN) is 2000 + VJ40498129 « 2076. 
Table 6.2: Estimates of correlation parameter & model selection 
Correlation Selection Criterion 
Model P Loglikelihoodc AIC BIC 
(1) SEM (2 equation) 
(2) Single Eq (p 1 0 ) 
-0.45 -16222.45 32648.89 
-16223.62 32649.23 
33422.91 
33415.66 
Model Null H0 LR Stat6 
Best Model 
LR Test AIC BIC 
(1) vs. (2) p = 0 -2.33 (2) (1) (2) 
**•,**, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
a. The correlation parameter estimates reported here are the arc-tangent functions of the correlation parameter p 
b. Critical value for LR test: Xi a=o 05 = 3.84 
c. The log likelihood value for Model (2) is the sum of log likelihood values from the two single equation models. 
6.3 Model Selection 
In the empirical analysis, both the simultaneous equation model (SEM) and sep-
arate single equation models were estimated. The former is the two equation 
simultaneous model described in Chapter 5.3 which treats the insurance binary 
variable on the right hand side of the hospital admission equation as endogenous. 
Under the SEM, the correlation parameter p measures the degree of correlation 
between the unobservables in the hospital admission and insurance equations. For 
the single equation models, the hospital admission and insurance equations were 
estimated using the lognormal random effects Poisson and the probit regression 
model respectively. Table 6.2 reports the estimates of the arc-tangent function of 
the correlation parameter, the log-likelihood values and the informational criteria 
values from the SEM and the single equation models. The information criterion 
statistics presented are the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC). 
As reported in Table 6.2, the estimate on the correlation parameter p is not 
statistically significant. This result suggest that the insurance binary regressor in 
the hospital admission equation is exogenous and that the hospital admission and 
insurance equations may be estimated separately. The results from the model 
selection criteria are supportive of this view. Based on the LR statistics, one 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that 0. The AIC prefers the SEM while the 
more stringent BIC indicated that Model 2 is preferred. Hence, there is strong 
justification for estimating separate single equation models over the SEM. Given 
this result, the discussion in the following sections will be based on the estimation 
results from the use of the probit regression to model the demand for hospital 
insurance and the lognormal random effects Poisson to model the demand for 
hospital admission. 
6.4 Demand for Hospital Insurance 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6.3 presents the marginal effects and their respective 
standard errors3 in the regression analysis for the demand for private hospital 
insurance. Given the nonlinear nature of the probit model, the regression co-
efficients cannot be interpreted directly as it is with linear regression models. 
Hence, the discussion focuses on the marginal effects, which are interpreted as 
the increase in the probability of being insured given a change in the explanatory 
variable.4 
6.4.1 Demographic Variables 
Holding all else constant, the propensity to purchase private hospital insurance 
by females is higher than that for males. The marginal effect of change in the 
female binary regressor on the probability of insurance is 0.035. On average, 
the proportion of females with private health insurance is 3.5 percentage points 
greater than males. The propensity to insure is positively associated with age. 
An additional year corresponds to a 1 percentage point increase in the probability 
of insurance. 
On the propensity to insure by income unit types, individuals from couple 
income units are 0.91 percentage points more likely to purchase private health in-
surance compared to individuals from singles. Similarly, income units with depen-
dent children are 5.4 percentage points more likely than units without dependents 
to be privately insured. There is evidence that the propensity to insure depends 
on whether or not individuals were born in Australia, with the results suggesting 
that respondents born outside of Australia are less likely to have private health 
insurance. The proportion of individuals from main English speaking countries 
(e.g. Zealand, Ireland and United Kingdom) with private health insurance is 11.6 
3The standard errors of the marginal effect coefficients are computed via the delta method 
using the -predictnl- command in Stata. 
4For binary explanatory variables, dF/dX denote the change in P(Insured \ X) when the 
explanatory variable X changes from 0 to 1. For continuous variables, dF/dX^ is computed as 
<f>(Xp) • S(Xp)/5Xk. 
Table 6.3: Regression Results - Demand for Hospital Insurance &; Admissions 
AT—14,594 
Hospital Insurance Hospital Admissions 
dF/dX S.E dF/dX S.E 
Heterogeneity a a -0.935*** 0.026 
Insurance 0.014*** 0.004 
Female 0.035*** 0.011 -0.0056 0.007 
Age 0.0099*** 0.00050 -0.00041** 0.0002 
Childbearing 0.038*** 0.015 
Couple 0.091*** 0.010 0.0011 0.004 
Depchild 0.054*** 0.012 0.0041 0.004 
Country of Birth: 
Main English -0.116*** 0.013 
Others -0.117*** 0.013 
Health Card -0.202*** 0.015 
Education: 
Vocational 0.019 0.012 
Diploma 0.052*** 0.016 
Degree 0.109*** 0.016 
Household Inc6 0.045*** 0.002 0.0039 0.0072 
Household Inc-Sq 
Employment Status: 
Pull-Time -0.040*** 0.0062 
Part-Time -0.018*** 0.0046 
Occupation: 
Manager/Admin 0.142*** 0.024 
Professional 0.019 0.020 
Asc Professional 0.039* 0.021 
Tradesperson -0.043* 0.022 
Adv Clerical/Service 0.116*** 0.035 
Int Clerical/Service 0.0035 0.019 
Production/Transport -0.074*** 0.024 
Ele Clerical/Service -0.0070** 0.0032 
Labourer -0.117*** 0.023 
ICD10: 
Infectious/Parasitic -0.052 0.040 0.021 0.016 
Neoplasm 0.038 0.026 0.092*** 0.015 
Blood -0.020 0.033 0.016 0.011 
Endocrine 0.029** 0.013 0.011 0.0044 
Mental/Behavioural -0.029** 0.014 0.0050 0.0047 
Nervous 0.015 0.016 0.0075 0.0053 
Eye 0.050*** 0.012 0.0082 0.0042 
Ear -0.019 0.012 0.0076* 0.0043 
Circulatory -0.0088 0.012 0.025*** 0.0046 
Respiratory 0.0038 0.010 -0.055* 0.0033 
Digestive 0.015 0.015 0.052*** 0.0074 
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Table 6.3: Continued from the previous page 
JV=14,049 
Hospital Insurance Hospital Admissions 
dF/dX S.E ~dF/dXa S.E 
Skin 0.030 0.022 -0.00034 0.0071 
Muscular 0.0033 0.010 0.010*** 0.0036 
Genitourinary 0.043** 0.022 0.050*** 0.0097 
Congenital 0.069 0.047 0.018 0.017 
Others 0.013 0.014 0.021*** 0.0053 
Alcohol 3-day Risk -0.037*** 0.013 
Smoker Regular -0.168*** 0.011 
Region 
VIC 0.027* 0.015 -0.0029 0.0050 
QLD 0.016 0.016 -0.0094* 0.0049 
SA 0.062*** 0.015 -0.066 0.0048 
WA 0.071*** 0.017 0.0097 0.062 
TAS 0.085*** 0.019 -0.011* 0.056 
NT 0.241*** 0.056 0.0066 0.023 
ACT -0.045** 0.020 -0.0090 0.065 
Remoteness 
Inner Aus -0.048*** 0.013 0.046 0.0044 
Others -0.098*** 0.014 0.040 0.0050 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
a. This refers to the estimate of standard deviation of the heterogeneity term a. 
b. Marginal effect given a $100 increase in weekly household income. 
percentage points lower compared to their Australian born counterparts. Those 
born in countries in the 'Others' category (e.g. Germany, Vietnam and Italy) are 
11.7 percentage points less likely to have insurance. 
It can be argued that the age and income unit type variables discussed above 
performs in part the role of proxies for the 'economic price' of hospital insur-
ance. This 'price' of insurance is commonly defined as the difference between 
the insurance premium and the expected benefit or payout (Phelps 1997).5 In 
Australia, regulations require that insurance premiums be community rated. In-
surance funds are not allowed to discriminate on the basis of age, sex, health 
5 One approach to express the price of insurance is the ratio of the insurance premium and 
the expected benefits (Butler 1999). In this specification, the ratio of premium to expected 
benefit is interpreted as the price paid per dollar of expected benefits received. If the premium 
is actuarially fair, that is the premium equals the expected benefit, the price of insurance is 1. 
With the presence of a loading fee L applied by insurers unto insurance premiums, the price of 
insurance is given as (1 + L). 
status and claims history in setting the premiums.6 With community rated pre-
miums, given that the benefits from insurance is expected to be increasing with 
age , the economic price of insurance is hence expected to be negatively corre-
lated with age. Therefore, the observed positive effect of age on the propensity to 
insure may in part represent this economic price effect. In addition, to the extent 
that individuals' health deteriorates with age, the age variable may capture the 
health effects if heterogeneity in individuals' health status are not completely or 
adequately accounted for using the health status measures available in the data. 
In terms of the propensity to insure across income unit types, we should expect 
that the probability of having insurance is higher in income units with dependent 
children as compared to those without given that the economic price of insurance 
is comparatively lower for the former.8 This is consistent with what we observe 
from the results. 
Differences in the propensity to insure across income unit types may be the 
outcome of the interaction between residual household income effects and the 
incentivisation through the Medicare Levy Surcharge. 'Couple' income units on 
average have higher equivalised household income as compared to 'single' income 
units.9 Hence, the positive marginal effect of the couple binary variable may cap-
ture additional income effects that remain after having accounted for households' 
equivalised income. The difference in the propensity to insure between couple 
6An exception to community rated premium is the Lifetime Community Rating policy that 
came into effect in July 2000 which allows private health insurance funds to vary insurance 
premiums according to individuals' age at the time of first purchase of private health insurance 
and the number of years individuals remained insured. 
7Butler (1999) constructed estimates of hospital benefits of individuals by age, sex and state 
in 1995 using data published by the Private Health Insurance Adminstration Council (PHIAC). 
In the author's calculations (see Figure 1, p. 14), the age gradient in hospital benefits for males 
is approximately flat between the ages of 5 to 39, moderately increasing for ages 40 to 59 years 
and rapidly raising for ages 60 years and above. The hospital benefits estimates for females are 
similar in trend to the males, except for the ages 20 to 44 years where the benefits received 
by females within these age groupings are high as a result of using private hospital services for 
maternity and childbearing. 
8Butler (1999) argues that cross-subsidisation in favour of families with children may occur 
as a result of community rated premiums which allow the premium for couples to be double 
that of singles but do not allow for any further premium increases according to the number of 
dependent children. The author showed that the estimated price of hospital insurance is lower 
for family as compared to singles policies for all ages up to 50-54 years. 
9Based on approximation from the interval-value measure of equivalised household income 
available in the data, the mean equivalised household income for couple and single income units 
in the sample are $633.89 and $413.68 respectively. The average unequivalised household income 
for couple units can be calculated as $633.89 x 1.5 s$950.84, where the latter is the equivalence 
weight for a two-adult household. For single units, the equivalised and unequivalised household 
income are the same. 
and single income units is obfuscated by the Medicare Levy Surcharge income 
threshold which for couples is double that for single individuals. Untangling the 
income effects from those induced by the Medicare Levy Surcharge will require 
more detailed information on households' income which is not available in this 
data set. 
6.4.2 Socioeconomic Variables 
Moving on to the socioeconomic factors that influence the purchase of insurance, 
the propensity to purchase private hospital insurance is positively associated with 
income of households. An increase of $100 in the weekly equivalised cash house-
hold income is associated with an increase in the probability insurance by 4.5 
percentage points. This result is likely to be driven by pure income effects and 
well as the incentives created through the Medicare Levy Surcharge as discussed 
above. Post-school educational attainment is positively associated with the pur-
chase of insurance. Individuals with diplomas, and with bachelor degrees or 
higher, are 5.2 and 10.9 percentage points more likely respectively to be privately 
insured than those with their counterparts with no post-school education qualifi-
cations. A significant factor that influences whether individuals purchase private 
hospital insurance is the availability of government health concession cards.10 
The regression estimates indicate that individuals with concession cards are 20.2 
percentage points less likely to be privately insured. Those with concession cards 
are more likely to be less economically well off, older and of poorer health status. 
These individuals may perceive themselves as being high users of public hospital 
care and hence do not need to have private hospital insurance. The propen-
sity to insure differs across occupational groups where individuals in professional 
and related occupations such as managers and administrators are more likely to 
purchase private health insurance whereas those in production/transport or are 
labourers are less likely to have insurance. The reference category here comprises 
of unemployed individuals and those who are not in the labour force.11 
10Types of government health concession cards include the Pensioner Concession Card, Health 
Care Card, Commonwealth Senior Health Card and the Department of Veterans' Affairs Card. 
Cardholders are generally eligible for a range of health care related concessions from cheaper 
prescription medicines, bulk-billed General Practitioner appointments and higher benefits under 
the Medicare Safety Net. 
11 An alternative variable that may be used to examine the effect of occupation or employment 
on insurance purchase is the individuals' employment status. There is no difference in the 
propensity to purchase insurance among individuals who are in either full-time or part-time 
6.4.3 Health Status and Health Risk Factors 
Three sets of explanatory variables that describe respondents' health were sep-
arately included in the regression analysis. First, a set of dummy variables rep-
resenting the sixteen ICD10-AM disease categories12 of long-term chronic condi-
tions reported by survey respondents were included to capture heterogeneity in 
the health status of individuals. Mental and behavioral problems and medical 
conditions associated with the circulatory & muscular system and of the ear are 
negatively associated with insurance purchase. Having a chronic medical con-
dition of the endocrine system (e.g. diabetes, high cholesterol) and conditions 
relating to the eye (e.g. cataract, glaucoma) are positively associated with the 
purchase of insurance. It is particularly surprising that having a chronic con-
dition of the circulatory system is negatively associated with the propensity to 
purchase insurance given that the conditions that fall within this category such 
as ischaemic heart diseases, haemorrhoids and varicose veins are associated with 
high volumes and long waiting lists in public hospitals (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare 2008). The second measure of health status is the number 
of long-term chronic medical conditions from which individuals suffered. This 
measure reflects the extent of good health of individuals, where a higher number 
of chronic conditions implies a lower health status. The results indicate that the 
propensity to purchase insurance is increasing in the number of long-term medical 
conditions. The third measure of health status did not produce any statistically 
significant results. This is a binary variable that indicates if the individual has at 
least one chronic condition requiring medical procedures that are associated with 
high volume and hence long waiting lists in public hospitals.13 One would expect 
that the presence of medical conditions for which treatment is associated with 
employment as compared with the individuals who are unemployed or not in the labour force. 
12The sixteen categories are infectious and parasitic diseases; diseases of the neoplasm; disease 
of blood and blood forming organs; endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases; mental and 
behavioural problems, diseases of the nervous system; diseases of the eye and adnexa; diseases 
of the ear and mastoid; diseases of the circulatory system; diseases of the respiratory system; 
diseases of the digestive system; diseases of the skin and subcutaneous system; diseases of the 
musculoskeletal system and connective tissue; diseases of the genito-urinary system; congenital 
malformations, deformations and chromosomal abnormalities; symptoms, signs and conditions 
not elsewhere classified. 
13These conditions are referred to as indicator procedures (Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare 2003): cataract extraction, cholecystectomy, coronary artery bypass graft, cys-
toscopy, haemorrhoidectomy, hysterectomy, inguinal herniorrhaphy, myringoplasty, myringo-
tomy, prostatectomy, septoplasty, tonsillectomy, total hip replacement, total knee replacement 
and varicose veins stripping and ligation. 
long waiting times in public hospitals to be positively associated with private 
hospital insurance purchase. 
The probability of purchasing insurance is positively associated with good 
health habits. Health risk factors such as alcohol risk and regular smoking gen-
erally decrease the propensity to purchase private hospital insurance.14 These 
variables behave as proxies for individuals' health status, risk aversion and atti-
tudes towards good health. 
6.4.4 Geography 
Dummy variables representing the states and territories in Australia and the 
remoteness classification of respondents' residences are included to capture the 
geographical effects on the propensity to purchase insurance. Individuals living 
in Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territories 
have a higher probability of purchasing private hospital insurance relative to 
those living in New South Wales. On the propensity to insure by remoteness 
classification, individuals residing in inner and outer regional areas of Australia 
are less likely than their counterparts living in major cities to purchase private 
hospital insurance. This may be because private hospital facilities are limited in 
supply in regional areas (Lokuge et al. 2005), hence reducing the incentives for 
individuals residing in more remote parts of Australia to purchase insurance. 
6.5 Demand for Hospital Admissions 
Columns 4 & 5 of Table 6.3 presents the regression results for the demand for 
hospital admissions. First and foremost, the coefficient on the estimate of a on 
the heterogeneity term is -0.94 and statistically significant. This result suggests 
the presence of overdispersion in the data while implies that the use of the simple 
Poisson regression model is inappropriate.15 
14Cutler et al. 2008 showed that risk tolerance affects the propensity to insure in addition 
to risk type. The authors examined the purchase of five types of insurance: life insurance; 
acute private health insurance; annuities; long-term care insurance and supplementary Medigap 
plans in the United States. The results showed that individuals who undertake risky activities 
(smoking, have a drinking problem, possess a risky job) or do not engage in risk reducing 
behaviour (usage of preventive health care and seat belts) are less likely to purchase these 
insurance. The effects of risk preference heterogeneity varies across the five insurance markets. 
15For a Poisson lognormal model, the conditional variance V\mt \ Xi] is given by 
E[rrii | + TE[mt | where rH[exp(<r2 ) - 1] (See equations 2.2-23 and 2.2-26 
The marginal effect of the insurance variable as presented in Table 6.3 is 0.014 
and is statistically significant. The interpretation of this result is that the differ-
ence in the expected number of hospital admissions per year between individuals 
with insurance and those without insurance is 0.014. An alternative interpreta-
tion of the insurance effect is the proportional change in the expected number 
of hospital admissions when the insurance binary variable changes from 0 to 1. 
This is calculated as the exponential on the coefficient estimate on the insurance 
binary variable.16 For a coefficient estimate of 0.173, the annual number of hos-
pitalisations by those with private health insurance is 1.19 times the number of 
those without such insurance. Everything else constant, this estimate suggest 
that having private hospital insurance increases the expected number of hospi-
tal admission by 19 percentage points each year. Given that the definition of 
hospital admission in question includes both admissions into public and private 
hospitals, the positive insurance effect on hospital admissions is likely to be driven 
by the higher frequency of private hospital admissions by individuals with pri-
vate hospital insurance as compared to those without. This result is expected and 
consistent with the results from the theoretical model discussed in Chapter 3.3.1 
which showed that the availability of insurance reduces the effective monetary 
price for private hospital care and increases utilisation. 
Moving on to the demographic variables, the demand for hospital admissions 
is higher for females in their childbearing years of 25 to 40. The frequency of 
hospital admissions by females in this age category is 0.038 more than for women 
in the other age categories. The intensity of hospital admissions does not vary 
across couple or single income unit types or whether households have dependent 
children. Prom the estimate of the marginal effect, age has an overall positive 
effect on the frequency of hospital admissions. The coefficient estimates which 
were not reported above revealed a quadratic relationship between age and the 
intensity of hospital care use: the expected number of hospital admissions initially 
decreases with age and before increasing at higher age values. 
Of the socioeconomic variables, the expected number of hospital admissions 
are 0.040 and 0.018 less for individuals engaged in full-time and part-time em-
ployment respectively relative to those who are unemployed. As suggested by the 
in Greene (2007)). Overdispersion is present in the data if V[rrii \ Xt] > E[rrii \ Xu p j which 
occurs if |<J| > 0. 
16The proportional change in the expected number of hospital admissions arising from a 
change of the binary variable from 0 to 1 is calculated as E{m \ d = 1, X)/E(m \ d = 0, X) = e&d 
where /3d is the coefficient on the insurance binary variable. 
results of the theoretical model, a possible explanation for this empirical result is 
that working individuals face a higher opportunity cost of time involved in seeking 
hospital care and hence utilise hospital care at a lower intensity. The intensity of 
hospital admissions is not influenced by individuals' household income. 
In terms of the effects of health status on the intensity of hospitalisation, the 
expected frequency of hospital admissions is increasing in the number of chronic 
conditions that individuals have. An additional chronic condition increases the 
expected frequency of hospitalisation by 0.018 (Not reported in Table 6.3). Of the 
ICD-10 chronic conditions binary variables, having diseases of the Neoplasm, Ear, 
the Circulatory, Digestive, Muscular and Genitourinary systems are positively 
associated with a higher number of hospital admissions. In contrast, having a 
respiratory condition is negatively associated with the utilisation of hospital care. 
Lastly, on the geographic variables, respondents from Queensland and Tas-
mania are hospitalised at a lower frequency as compared to their counterparts 
from New South Wales. The frequency of hospital admissions does not appear to 
vary by the remoteness of localities. 
6.6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The initial results from the simultaneous equation model suggest that the insur-
ance binary variable in the hospital admission equation is not endogenous. An 
implication is that the hospital admission equation and the insurance equation 
may be estimated using two separate regressions. One conclusion that can be 
drawn from the exogeneity of the insurance variable is that there is no evidence 
of self selection into insurance. As discussed in Chapter 2.4, insurance status 
may be correlated with individuals' health status which can be either unobserved 
or inadequately accounted for with the health status proxies that are available. 
Although there is no evidence of self selection, the estimates of the insurance 
effect on hospital admissions suggest the presence of moral hazard. The expected 
number of hospital admissions is 19% higher for individuals with private health in-
surance as compared to those who are not privately insured. The results obtained 
in this study are consistent with the literature in on some aspects but differ on 
others. Cameron et al. (1988) and Harmon and Nolan (2001) found evidence of 
both self selection and moral hazard in hospital use for the case of Australia and 
the UK respectively.17 Riphahn, Wambach, and Million (2003) found evidence of 
adverse selection into add-on insurance using German data but concluded that 
there axe no moral hazard effects once self selection has been accounted for. 
There is one important caveat in using the term "moral hazard effects" for the 
estimated insurance effects in this study. Within the context of a health system 
where both public and private health care coexist, the moral hazard effects refers 
to the incremental use of private health care resulting from a decrease in the effec-
tive price of private health care due to the presence of private insurance. In this 
study as well as those that were cited above, information on whether the hospital 
use was public or private was not available and hence the estimated insurance 
effect here is the incremental utilisation of both public and private hospital care 
as a result of private health insurance. The issue of the moral hazard effect of pri-
vate health insurance is re-examined in Chapter 7 using data on hospital length 
of stay where information is available on whether the hospitalisation episode in 
question was public or private. 
The results obtained in this study on the determinants of private health in-
surance status are broadly consistent with Australian studies by Cameron and 
Trivedi (1991) and Savage and Wright (2003) as well as those from international 
studies. Demographic and socioeconomic factors such as age and gender, marital 
status, education attainment, household income and the availability of govern-
ment concession cards have significant influences on the propensity to insure. 
Health status appears to have a more limited effect in the decision to purchase 
insurance but this result is not unexpected given that the purpose of private 
health insurance is to insure against medical expenditures in private hospitals. 
Individuals who are of significant health risk and expect to incur large expendi-
tures on medical care have access to hospital care in the public system at zero 
monetary cost. 
17The presence of self selection effects were not explicited mentioned in Harmon and Nolan 
(2001) but the authors found that the insurance effects roughly doubles from 3.1% if insurance 
status is taken as exogenous to 5.8% when insurance is treated as endogenous. This result 
is indicative of the presence of advantageous selection as opposed to adverse selection into 
insurance that is more frequently observed in insurance studies. 
Chapter 7 
Demand for Public & Private 
Hospital Care and Hospital 
Insurance 
7.1 Introduction 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, previous Australian studies have examined the relation-
ship between private health insurance and the intensity of health care use (Savage 
and Wright 2003, Cameron et al. 1988) while several Australian and UK studies 
have investigated the determinants that influence the choice between public or 
private health care (Srivastava and Zhao 2008, Propper 2000, Martin and Smith 
1999). The results presented here is the first attempt to empirically examine the 
demand for health insurance, public or private choice and the intensity of health 
care in a simultaneous framework. The results are based on the three-equation 
econometric model described in Chapter 5.4 which accommodates the count data 
feature of hospital length of stay and the binary public-private type and insurance 
outcomes variables. The simultaneity between the intensity of hospital use, and 
the decisions to seek public or private hospital care and purchase private health 
insurance are considered in the econometric modeling. 
The chapter is organised as follows: The choice of explanatory variables for the 
insurance, patient-type and length of hospital stay equations are first discussed in 
Section 7.2. Issues pertaining to the identification of the econometric model and 
the number of simulation draws are presented here. Issues on model selection 
between the simultaneous equation model, the nested variants and the single 
equation version are discussed in Section 7.3. The empirical results of how private 
hospital insurance influences the choice of public or private hospital care, and how 
the intensity of hospital care, vis-a-vis the length of hospital stay, varies by patient 
type and insurance status are detailed in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 further explores 
the determinants that influence the choice of patient type and the intensity of 
care. Section 7.6 discusses the sensitivity of the results to the imputations on 
the length of stay dependent variable. Section 7.7 concludes with a discussion 
of the results. The determinants of the demand for private hospital insurance 
have been discussed in Chapter 6. Given that the results for the sub-sample 
are comparatively similar to that of the full sample, the discussion would not be 
repeated here. As a reference, the regression results on the determinants of the 
demand for private hospital insurance are presented in Appendix C located at 
the end of this chapter. 
7.2 Explanatory Variables, Exclusion Restric-
tions and Simulation Draws 
Table 7.1 presents the explanatory variables included in the length of stay, pub-
lic/private patient type and insurance equations. The first set of explanatory 
variables described in the table are the endogenous patient type and insurance 
variables that were included on the righthand side of the length of stay and patient 
type equations. In the former, an interaction term consisting of the two endoge-
nous variables was included. The inclusion of these variables was guided by the 
results from the economic model described in Chapter 3 in which the expressions 
of the optimal intensity of hospital care varies by the insurance and patient type 
choices. Prom the perspective of the empirical analysis, the interaction term al-
lows one to examine the effect of private health insurance on the length of hospital 
stay for public and privately admitted patients separately. In the public/private 
patient type equation, a private health insurance dummy variable was included 
as a regressor given that the decision on the choice to receive hospital care as 
a public or private patient is expected to depend on the availability of private 
hospital insurance. 
The remaining explanatory variables in each of the three equations are clas-
sified into the following categories: demographics; socioeconomic characteristics; 
health risk; health status and geographic indicators. To facilitate the comparison 
Table 7.1: Explanatory variables in each of the three equations 
Endogenous Regressors 
Equations 
Length of Stay Public/Private Insurance 
Public/Private Patient X 
Insurance X X 
Insurance*Public/Private X 
Exogenous Regressors 
A. Demographics 
Female X X X 
Income Unit: Dependents X X X 
Income Unit: Couple X X X 
Age, Age-squared X X X 
Childbearing X 
Country of Birth X X 
B. Socioeconomic 
Income, Income-squared X X X 
Education X 
Employment Status X 
Employment Sector X 
Occupational Category X 
Health Concession Card X 
C. Health Risk 
Regular smoker X X 
Alcohol X X 
D. Health Status 
ICD-10 Chronic Conditions X X X 
E. Geography 
State/Territories X X X 
Remoteness X X X 
of the results in this study with related studies such as Cameron et al. (1988), 
Cameron and Trivedi (1991), Savage and Wright (2003) and Propper (2000), a 
similar set of explanatory variables was chosen. Demographic variables such as 
gender, income unit type and age are included in all three equations. A child-
bearing variable, which is a binary variable that represents females between the 
ages of 25 to 40 years was included to capture the effects of childbearing on 
the length of hospital stay. Country of birth was included in the patient type 
and insurance choice equations. Of the socioeconomic variables, the equivalised 
household income was included in all three equations. The level of educational 
attainment was included as a regressor in the insurance equation. Three different 
variables capturing information on the individual's employment characteristics 
were included in each of the three equations. The first variable is the employ-
ment status of individuals, that is whether respondents were employed full-time, 
part-time, unemployed or not in the labour force (NILF). The employment sec-
tor variable reflects whether employed individuals work in the public or private 
sector. These two employment variables were included in the length of stay and 
public/private choice equations respectively. Lastly, information on individuals' 
occupation type was included in the insurance equation. Also in the insurance 
equation is information on whether or not the individual has a health concession 
card. Health risk factors such as tobacco and alcohol consumption are included 
in the public/private patient type and insurance equations. Health status in-
dicators, which consist of binary variables of the ICD10 disease categories, are 
included in all three equations. Lastly, information on the locality of individuals' 
is captured by state/territory and remoteness dummies. 
There is an issue of whether or not the econometric model is identified given 
the presence of endogenous regressors in the length of stay and public/private 
patient equations. Formally speaking, the model is identified by the nonlinearity 
of the functional form assumed.1 To add robustness to to the identification of the 
model , exclusions restrictions are applied in that there is at least one variable in 
the insurance equation but not in the patient type and length of stay equations. 
In addition, there should be at least one variable in the patient type equation 
that is not in the length of stay equation. To this effect, as in the case for Chap-
ter 6, variables measuring health risk such as smoking and alcohol consumption 
are included only in the insurance equation. The employment sector variable is 
xSee point 6 on page 668 of Greene (2000). 
Table 7.2: Estimates of correlation parameters & model selection 
Correlation" Selection Criteria 
Model P12 Pl3 P23 Loglikelihoodc AIC BIC 
(1) SEM 
(2) Single Eq (plj = 0) 
0.205 0.160 -0.382*** -6792.56 13851.11 
-6796.13 13852.26 
14624.80 
14838.75 
Best Model 
Model Null H0 LR Stat LR Test AIC BIC 
(1) vs. (2) Pij 9 1 -7.14 (1) (1) (1) 
***,*•, * denote significance a t 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
a. T h e correlation parameter estimates reported here are the arc-tangent functions of the correlation parameter p 
c. T h e log likelihood value for Model (4) is the sum of log likelihood values from the three single equation models. 
included only in the patient type choice equation as there is some evidence in 
Propper (2000) that public sector workers are more likely to seek public hospital 
care. 
Moving on to the issue on the number of simulations, the choice of the number 
of simulations S was determined in a stepwise manner in which S is increased from 
50 to 2000 as described in Chapter 5.5. The choice on the number of simulations is 
determined as the lowest number of simulations for which the estimates obtained 
are observed not to vary significantly with higher values of S. The analysis below 
used S=2000 based on Halton quasi-random draws.2 Convergence was achieved 
after 150 iterations requiring approximately 7 hours to complete on an Intel 2.67 
Ghz processor with 6 GB RAM. 
7.3 Model Selection 
In the empirical analysis, the full simultaneous equation model (SEM) described 
in Chapter 5 was estimated. This model treats the insurance and public/private 
patient choice binary variables on the right hand sides of the length of stay and 
patient type choice equation as endogenous. Under the SEM, in addition to 
the coefficients parameters on the regressors, three correlation parameters that 
measure the degree of correlation between the endogenous regressors and the un-
observables in each of three regression equations were estimated. In addition, 
2If one were to take the choice on the number of simulations S=2000 given the sample 
size N=8129 in Deb and Trivedi (2006) as a point of reference to decide on the number of 
simulations required for the sample size of N=2406 in this study, the minimum number of 
simulations required to fulfil the consistency requirement (that S increases more than VN) is 
2000Wv / 8129g240611924. 
each of the three equations was estimated separately as single equation models. 
Table 7.2 reports the estimates of the arc-tangent function of the correlation pa-
rameters, the log-likelihood value, and information criterion values from the full 
SEM and the single equation models. The information criterion statistics pre-
sented are the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian Information 
Criteria (BIC). Model 1 refers to the full SEM. In Model 2, the single equation 
model for the length of stay equation is the lognormal random effects Poisson 
and the single equation model for the public/private patient choice and the in-
surance choice was the probit model. Examining the estimates of the correlation 
parameters from Model 1 using Table 7.2, one observes that only the correlation 
parameter p23 is statistically significant from zero. Both parameters p\2 (p-value 
= 0.41) and p 1 3 (p-value = 0.28) were found be statistically insignificant. 
Formal statistical methods were employed to assist in choosing between mod-
els 1 and 2. The three methods are the log likelihood ratio test (LR) and the 
information criterion AIC and BIC. The results from the model selection tests 
are presented at the bottom of Table 7.2. For the LR test, the null hypothesis 
HQ and the LR statistics (LR Stat) are presented. The results indicate a strong 
preference for the SEM over the single equation models. 
In the light of this result, the discussion of the empirical results in the following 
section will based on Model 1. In the discussion of the insurance and patient 
effects on hospital length of stay in Section 7.4, the results from Model 1 will be 
compared with that obtained under separate single equation models (Model 2) to 
examine how the regression estimates differ under the endogeneity and exogeneity 
assumptions of the public/private patient type and insurance binary variables. 
7.4 Insurance and Patient Type Effects 
Table 7.3 presents the coefficients, marginal effects and the respective standard er-
rors of the insurance and patient-type binary variables in the public/private choice 
and hospital length of stay equations. Two sets of coefficients are presented, 
with each obtained under the endogeneity and exogeneity assumptions. Under 
the former, the results are that obtained from the simultaneous equation model 
(henceforth joint model). Under the exogeneity assumption, the public/private 
patient type and the insurance binary variables are treated as exogenous regres-
sors in the length of stay and public/private choice equation. The single equation 
Table 7.3: Key coefficients and marginal effects under endogenous and exogenous 
assumptions 
Endogenous Exogenous" 
Coeff S.E dF/dX S.ET Coeff S.E dF/dX S.E 
Insurance 
Public/Private Patient 
2.766*** 0.179 0.815***6 0.030 2.253*** 0.077 0.714*** 0.017 
Patient-Type 
Moral Hazard Effect 
Insurance on Pub_Patc 
Hospital Length of Stay 
-0.995*** 0.514 -1.105* 0.570 -0.512*** 0.159 
0.429 0.279 
0.026 0.713 
-0.575*** 0.174 
0.479*** 0.122 
-0.036 0.127 
Correlation Parameters 
P13 
Pl3 
P23 
0.205 0.249 
0.160 0.148 
-0.382*** 0.147 
Log likelihood' -6792.56 -6796.13 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
a. Regression models under the exogenous assumptions are the lognormal random effects Poisson and Probit models. 
b. P(Private Patient | Insured, X) - P(Private Patient | Non-Insured, X) 
c. E(LOS | Insured, Public, X) - E(LOS | Non-Insured, Public, X\ 
d. E(LOS | Insured, Private, X) - E(LOS | Non-Insured, Private, X) 
e. Under the exogeneity assumption, this refers to the sum of loglikelihood values from three single equation models. 
Probit and the lognormal random effects Poisson regression models are applied 
to estimate the public/private choice equation and the hospital length of stay 
equation respectively. Estimates of the three correlation parameters from the 
joint model are presented at the bottom of Table 7.3. These estimates reflect the 
degree of correlation between the insurance binary variable and the unobserv-
ables in the public/private patient choice and hospital length of stay equation 
which provides evidence on whether the insurance binary variable is endogenous. 
The following discussion of the results focuses on the estimates from the joint 
model and where appropriate contrasts these results with that obtained under 
the exogeneity assumption. 
In the public/private patient choice equation, the estimates of the coefficient 
and marginal effect of the insurance binary variable are positive and statistically 
significant. All else being equal, individuals with private hospital insurance are 
81.5 percent points more likely to admit into hospital as a private patient rather 
than a public patient. This result is expected and is consistent with the results 
from the theoretical model discussed in Chapter 3.4.1 which showed that the 
availability of private hospital insurance reduces the effective monetary price for 
private hospital care and increase the probability that insured individuals seek 
private relative to public hospital care. 
Moving on to the hospital length of stay equation, the marginal effect of the 
patient-type binary variable is -1.11 and is highly significant. The marginal ef-
fect of the patient-type binary variable is interpreted as follows: controlling for 
other explanatory variables that influence the intensity of hospital care, the aver-
age length of hospital stay by individuals who chose to be admitted as a private 
patient is 1.11 nights shorter than compared with publicly admitted (Medicare) 
patients. It is highly plausible that this result is driven by the presence of sys-
tematic differences in the types of medical treatments provided to individuals 
who seek private as opposed to public hospital care. Generally, patients who opt 
for private hospital care seek medical and surgical treatment for conditions that 
are elective in nature. Admissions for elective surgery typically involve shorter 
hospital stays where many are performed on a day-admission basis.3 One can 
infer from the result that the patient type binary variable acts as a proxy for 
the case-mix that broadly differentiates the categories of medical conditions for 
which individuals seek public or private hospital care. This result is consistent 
with the insights from theoretical model. First and foremost, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 3.3.1, the optimal intensity of hospital care increases with illness severity. 
Secondly, individuals with more severe illness conditions are likely to seek public 
relative to private hospital care. Hence, to the extent that the severity of indi-
viduals' illness conditions is reflected in the need to use hospital care at a higher 
intensity, one can expect that individuals seeking public care stay in hospital for 
a longer duration of time as compared to those seeking private hospital care. 
The insurance and patient-type binary variables, combined with an interac-
tion term between the variables allow one to examine the effect of insurance on 
the length of hospital stay for private and public patients separately. Here, two 
effects are of interest. The first is the moral hazard effect4 which is defined as 
the difference in the expected length of hospital stay between privately admit-
ted individuals with or without private hospital insurance. Prom a theoretical 
3Sundararajan et al. (2004) found that the increase in private hospital activity between 
1998-99 and 2002-03 is driven largely by hospital admissions for surgical and elective procedures. 
This increase followed the expansion in the proportion of the Victorian population with private 
health insurance from 1997 to 2001. Hopkins and Freeh (2001) examined the utilisation of 
public and private hospitals between 2000 and 2001 and found that the number of same-day 
separations from private hospitals increased significantly more than that of public hospitals 
4The conditional mean equation is E(LOS | Po + Pipatype + /32insurance + fepjtype * 
insurance -I- /3X). The moral hazard effect te calculated as E(LOS \ insurance = 1, patype = 1, 
X) - E (LOS | insurance = 0, patype = 1, X). 
perspective, as demonstrated in Chapter 3.3.1, individuals with private hospi-
tal insurance face a lower effective monetary price for private hospital care as 
compared to those without insurance. As a result, the former is expected to use 
private hospital care at a greater intensity. Hence, one would expect that the 
moral hazard effect is positive. Empirically, based on the data in this sample, 
there is no evidence to suggest the presence of the moral hazard effect among 
individuals who chose to receive private hospital care. The estimate of this effect 
is 0.43 but is not statistically significant. This is in contrast with the estimates 
obtained from under the exogeneity assumption which indicate that the expected 
length of private hospital stay by privately insured individuals is 0.48 nights longer 
than that for the uninsured. 
The second result of interest is the effect of insurance on length of hospital stay 
for publicly admitted patients. This is termed as the insurance on public patient 
effect.5 The insurance on public patient effect is defined as the expected differ-
ence in the length of stay between publicly admitted individuals with or without 
private hospital insurance. The theoretical results suggest that the availability 
of private hospital insurance does not affect the intensity of public hospital care 
amongst patients who chose to obtain public care. The empirical evidence sup-
ports this view. The estimate of the insurance effect amongst publicly admitted 
patients is not statistically significant. 
The estimates of the correlation parameters P23 is statistically significant. 
This result suggest that the insurance binary variables in the length of hospital 
stay. This result supports the simultaneous equation approach in taking into 
account the endogeneity of the insurance binary variable in the specification of 
the econometric model. 
7.5 Determinants of Patient Type Choice and 
Intensity of Care 
The following two sections present the regression results on the determinants that 
influence the choice between hospital admission as a public or private patient and 
the length of hospital stay. The results are based on the joint model specification 
that was discussed in the preceding sections. 
5The insurance on public patient effect is calculated as E(LOS | insurance = 1, patype = 0, 
X) - E(LOS | insurance = 0, patype = 0, X). 
Table 7.4: Regression Results - Public/Private Choice and Hospital Length of 
Stay 
AT=2,483 
Public Private Patient Length of Hospital Stay 
dF/dX S.E dF/dX S.E 
Heterogeneity a a 1.052*** 0.031 
Female 0.043 0.028 0.0067 0.082 
Age 0.005*** 0.001 0.022*** 0.004 
Childbearing 0.864*** 0.216 
Couple 0.026 0.030 0.104 0.078 
Depchild 0.084* 0.038 0.197 0.111 
Country of Birth: 
Main English -0.030 0.038 
Others -0.077** 0.036 
Household Inc6 0.017** 0.001 0.004 0.022 
Household Inc-Sq 
Employment Status: 
Pull-Time -0.296*** 0.103 
Part-Time -0.148 0.096 
Employment Sector: 
Private 0.065 0.043 
Unemployed+NILF 0.028 0.047 
ICD10: 
Infectious/Parasitic 0.107 0.108 -0.117 0.262 
Neoplasm -0.077* 0.044 -0.058 0.130 
Blood -0.026 0.079 0.105 0.201 
Endocrine -0.057* 0.030 -0.030 0.082 
Mental/Behavioural -0.019 0.038 0.224** 0.108 
Nervous -0.089** 0.036 -0.065 0.104 
Eye 0.052 0.035 0.055 0.090 
Ear -0.034 0.032 -0.070 0.083 
Circulatory -0.037 0.029 0.021 0.079 
Respiratory 0.020 0.027 -0.048 0.069 
Digestive -0.037 0.033 0.013 0.091 
Skin -0.068 0.055 -0.040 0.146 
Muscular 0.056** 0.027 -0.178** 0.077 
Genitourinary -0.021 0.043 -0.0024 0.118 
Congenital 0.046 0.116 0.713* 0.420 
Others -0.012 0.034 0.103 0.093 
Alcohol 3-day Risk 0.031 0.047 
Smoker Regular -0.187 0.037 
Continued on next page 
Table 7.4: Continued from previous page. 
Public Private Patient Length of Hospital Stay 
dF/dX S.E dF/dX S.E 
Region 
VIC 
QLD 
SA 
WA 
TAS 
NT 
ACT 
-0.005 0.042 
0.117*** 0.045 
-0.014 0.040 
-0.027 0.044 
0.137** 0.055 
0.061 0.103 
0.066 0.064 
0.139 0.120 
0.194 0.132 
0.170 0.121 
0.447*** 0.155 
0.541*** 0.185 
0.159 0.622 
-0.122 0.159 
Remoteness 
Inner Aus 
Others 
-0.032 0.035 
-0.042 0.038 
0.050 0.091 
0.071 0.103 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % respectively. 
a. The estimate refers to the coefficient on the heterogeneity term a. 
b. Marginal effect given a $100 increase in weekly household income. 
7.5.1 Choice of Public or Private Patient 
The marginal effect estimates of the regressors on the choice of hospital admis-
sion as a public or private patient are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 
7.4. Of the demographic variables, holding all else equal, the presence of depen-
dent children in the household and the respondents' age are positively related 
with the propensity to seek hospital care as a private patient. Compared with 
income units without dependent children, units with dependent children are 8.4 
percentage points more likely to seek private hospital care. An increase in an 
individual's age by one year increases the probability of seeking private care by 
0.5 percentage points. Individuals whose origin of birth is neither Australia nor 
the main English speaking countries are 7.7 percentage points less likely to seek 
private care compared to Australian born individuals. This result may be due 
to differences in the preference for private hospital care across individuals from 
different ethic and cultural backgrounds. The propensity for private hospital care 
does not differ by gender as well as between single and couple income unit types. 
Moving on to the socioeconomic variables, the propensity to seek private hospital 
care is positively associated with household income. A $100 increase 6 in the 
equivalised household income increases the propensity for private hospital care 
by 1.7 percentage points. 
6 T h e mean equivalised household income in the sample is $543.19 per week. 
One key factor that influences individuals' choice of hospital admission as 
a public or private patient is the health condition for which hospital care was 
obtained. For example, one would expect that individuals are more likely to 
seek private care for elective treatments that are associated with long waiting 
times in the public hospitals. Unfortunately, information on types of medical 
conditions is not available in the data set that is used in this study. Instead, the 
ICD10 categories of long-term and chronic medical conditions that respondents 
are suffering from are used as proxies for individuals' health status. As reported 
in Table 7.4, having a neoplasm, or diseases of the endocrine or nervous system 
decrease the propensity that the individual seeks private hospital care. On the 
other hand, individuals suffering from diseases of the musculoskeletal system are 
more likely to have obtained private care. 
Finally, there is evidence of a geographical effect on the patient type choice 
on hospital admission. Compared to respondents from New South Wales, indi-
viduals from Queensland and Tasmania are more likely to seek hospital care as a 
private patient. Individuals living in regional and rural areas does not appear to 
differ in their propensity to obtain public or private care when compared to their 
metropolitan counterparts. 
7.5.2 Length of Inpatient Stay 
Columns 4 to 5 of Table 7.4 presents the regression results for the expected length 
of stay in hospital. First and foremost, the positive and statistically significant 
estimate on the standard deviation (a) of the heterogeneity term in the condi-
tional mean strongly suggests the presence of overdispersion7 in the data, which 
suggest that the simple Poisson regression model is inappropriate. For the de-
mographic variables, holding all else constant, age has a small and positive effect 
on the length of time individuals stay in hospital. There is strong evidence link-
ing a higher intensity of inpatient stay for childbirth given that females in the 
childbearing years stay in hospital for an average 0.86 nights more. Conditional 
on having accounted for childbearing effects, the intensity in the utilisation of 
hospital care does not differ by gender. In addition, the intensity of care does not 
appear to vary across income unit types. 
7For the Poisson lognormal model, the conditional variance V[rrii \ Xi] is given by 
E[rrii | + TE[rrii | where r = [exp(<r2) - 1] (See equations 2.2-23 and 2.2-26 
in Greene (2007)). Overdispersion is present in the data if V[rrii | Xi] > E[rrii X^, which 
occurs if a > 0. 
Of the socioeconomic variables, the expected length of hospital stay is 0.30 
nights shorter for individuals engaged in full-time employment relative to those 
who are unemployed. A possible explanation for this result may - as suggested 
by the theoretical model - that individuals in full-time employment face a higher 
opportunity cost of time involved in seeking hospital care which can otherwise 
be devoted to work or leisure. The length of hospital stay is not influenced 
by individuals' household income. In the length of stay equation, two sets of 
health indicators were included as proxies for individuals' health status. The 
first set of health indicators are the binary variables representing the ICD10 
disease categories for chronic and long-term conditions. The second is a count 
measure of the number of chronic and long-term conditions from which individuals 
suffer. A priori, one would expect that individuals with poorer health should on 
average require a greater intensity of care when hospitalised. As presented in 
Table 7.4, mental & behavioural health conditions are associated with relatively 
longer length of stay. On the other hand, muscular conditions are associated with 
a lower intensity of hospital nights. Incidentally, as mentioned in the discussion 
of the results on admission choice as a public or private patient, individuals with 
muscular conditions are more likely to seek private as opposed to public hospital 
care. The marginal effect estimate on the count measure of medical conditions is 
not significant. This is contrary to expectations, though it is plausible that this 
definition of health status may not be sufficiently precise and sensitive to capture 
heterogeneity in health status severity, particularly in relation to defining the 
intensity of hospital care that individuals need. 
Finally, in terms of the geographical effects, individuals from Western Aus-
tralia and Tasmania have on average a longer length of stay as compared to those 
from New South Wales. Length of hospital stay does not appear to be influenced 
by remoteness of locality. To the extent that individuals' health status is ade-
quately controlled for, the geographical variations in the length of stay observed 
for Western Australia and Tasmania may be indicative of differences in medical 
norms and practices surrounding the treatment of hospital patients. 
7.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the length of hospital stay variable which was origi-
nally made available as intervals values have been imputed by their lower bound 
Table 7.5: Sensitivity Analysis: Lower and Upper Bound Assumptions 
Variable 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Joint RE Poisson Joint RE Poisson 
Patient_Type -1.105* -0.575*** -1.235** -0.635*** 
Moral Hazard 0.429 0.479*** 0.517 0.545*** 
Ins Pub_Pat 0.026 -0.036 -0.072 -0.113 
wherever they occur. To assess the sensitivity of the results to this imputation, 
the joint model and the single equation lognormal Poisson were re-estimated with 
the length of stay variable taking the upper bound values.8 The estimates of the 
marginal effects on the patient type binary variable, the moral hazard effect and 
the insurance on public patient effect where the length of stay variable takes ei-
ther the lower bound or upper bound value are presented in Table 7.5. In all 
three estimates, the magnitude of the marginal effects for the upper bound is 
slightly larger than that when the lower bound was used. For example, in the 
case of the joint model, the difference in the lower and upper bound estimate on 
the length of hospital stay by public and private patients is 0.13. Apart from 
small changes in the magnitude of the estimates, the results appear to be quite 
robust with respect to how the interval values are imputed. 
A limitation of the strategy to replace the interval values by their lower and 
upper bound is that the upper bound for the largest category (8 nights or more) 
is unknown. As a result, the lower bound value of 8 nights was used in the 
sensitivity analysis involving upper bound values. This is likely to lead to an 
underestimation of the differences in the average length of stay between private 
and publicly admitted patients if the mean number of hospital nights by public 
patients in the largest category is greater than that for private patients. If the 
latter were to be correct, this further reinforces the study's findings that hospital 
admissions by private patients involve shorter length of hospital stay than public 
patients. 
Observations with interval values of "1 to 2 nights" were replaced by 2 nights, "3 to 4" 
nights by 4 and "5 to 7" nights by 7. Observations with "8 or more nights" take the value of 8 
as before. 
7.7 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Individuals' decision-making on the utilisation of hospital services in the mixed 
public-private hospital system in Australia involve the decision on whether to pur-
chase health insurance, to obtain public or private hospital care and the intensity 
of care. Previous Australia-based studies have examined only the demand for pri-
vate health insurance and health care, while several Australian and UK studies 
have investigated the determinants that influence the choice of public or private 
health care. To my knowledge, this work is the first attempt to empirically ex-
amine the demand for health insurance, public or private choice and the intensity 
of health care in a simultaneous framework. This approach enables one to isolate 
and identify the intertwining factors that motivate the three decisions surround-
ing the use of hospital care. To achieve this, a simultaneous equation count data 
regression model was developed which allows for simultaneity in the insurance 
and patient type decisions. The empirical results revealed that insurance choice 
is an endogenous variable in both the public/private patient choice and the hospi-
tal care utilisation equation which supports the simultaneous equation modeling 
approach. 
The results in the current study suggest that the availability of private hospital 
insurance is a key factor that influences the decision to seek hospital care as a 
private patient. This result is similar to that in Srivastava and Zhao (2008) 
where the authors found that individuals with private cover are 76 percentage 
points more likely to seek private hospital care relative to public care.9 This 
result is also consistent with Gertler and Roland (1997) who found that private 
health insurance is associated with significant increases in the frequency of visits 
to private medical care providers and a reduction in visits to public providers 
for both curative and preventive care in the case of Jamaica. The findings in 
the current study also indicate that individuals' household income has a positive 
effect on the propensity to seek private hospital care. In addition to the traditional 
income effects, one possible channel by which income can affect the propensity for 
private hospital care is through the relationship between income and the monetary 
valuation of the time spent on hospital waiting lists (Propper 1990, 1995). If the 
9Although both studies use the same dataset, the minor difference in this result compared 
with that obtained in the current study is likely to be due to the differences in the empirical 
strategy. For example, Srivastava and Zhao (2008) considers adults age 18 and over while this 
study focuses on respondents age 25 and over. There are also some differences in the explanatory 
variables that was used in both studies. 
disutility of waiting on hospital waiting lists is positively associated with income, 
one would expect that high income individuals, all else being equal, would prefer 
private as compared to public hospital care in which the latter is frequently 
associated with significant waiting lists. Apart from insurance and income, the 
results from this study indicate that employment in the private sector, age and 
the presence of dependent children are factors that increases the probability of 
obtaining private hospital care. 
The results in this study indicate that the average length of hospital stay by 
privately admitted patients is 1.11 nights shorter than that of public (Medicare) 
patients after controlling for the effects of other factors that influence the intensity 
of hospital stay.10 This is suggestive that systematic differences exist in the types 
of medical conditions that individuals choose to seek public or private hospital 
care. This finding is consistent with the evidence presented in Sundararajan 
et al. (2004) and Hopkins and Freeh (2001) and supportive of the view that 
the public hospital system is utilised by patients with more complex and severe 
medical conditions requiring a greater intensity of treatment than that in private 
hospitals. 
Prom a policy perspective, the results of this study suggest that the impact of 
private health insurance on alleviating the burden on the public hospital system 
is not expected to be large. With the increase in the uptake of private hospi-
tal insurance, individuals that are most likely to substitute private for public 
hospital care are those already waiting on public hospital waiting lists or have 
been discouraged by the long queues and have forgone seeking treatment alto-
gether. Given that the expected duration of wait on public hospital waiting 
lists is inversely related to the severity of medical conditions, and the urgency of 
treatments, what follows is that individuals who seek private hospital care do so 
for non-urgent medical conditions where the required treatment is simpler and 
elective in nature. Hence, the effects of government initiatives to encourage the 
purchase of private hospital insurance are likely to be limited to reducing public 
hospital waiting lists and lowering waiting times for public treatment. However, 
the available evidence suggests that this impact is likely to be small.11 
10This is likely to be a lower-bound estimate given that the interval values of hospital length 
of stay available in the data are represented by their lower bound values. 
11For example, Duckett (2005) concluded that contrary to popular rhetoric on the benefits 
and effectiveness of private health insurance in relieving demand on the public hospital system, 
funding the provision of elective surgery directly through the public system is likely to be more 
effective in reducing public hospital waiting times. 
The empirical results in this study did not find any significant moral hazard 
effect amongst patients who sought hospital care as a private patient. This result 
is in contrast with the findings of Australian based studies by Savage and Wright 
(2003) and Cameron et al. (1988) who found significant moral hazard effects 
among specific sub-population groups. For example in Savage and Wright (2003), 
the authors estimated that the duration of private hospital stay is approximately 
1.5 to 3.2 times longer amongst individuals with insurance for elderly couples, 
couples with dependents and young singles.12 Similarly, Cameron et al. (1988) 
found a higher number of hospital days for insured relative to non-insured in-
dividuals in lower income groups but not for those in higher income brackets. 
Comparability of the results in this study from the preceding ones however is 
limited given that the studies differ in the data employed as well as the empiri-
cal methods. One significant methodological difference is that the current study 
adopted the approach of jointly modeling public/private hospitalisation choice 
and length of hospital stay and taking into consideration the endogeneity of the 
insurance variable in influencing these two outcomes. In comparison, the study 
by Savage and Wright (2003) examined the effects of insurance on the duration 
of hospital stay by considering only privately admitted patients while Cameron 
et al. (1988) on the other hand does not make the public/private distinction. 
A second difference lies in the treatment of the study sample in the analysis. 
Savage and Wright (2003) estimated separate regressions models for individuals 
from different ages groups and income unit types while Cameron et al. (1988) 
distinguished between individuals from different income groups. On this regard, 
given the constraints in the size of the sample in the current study, the approach 
here was to estimate a model using a pooled sample and to control for the effects 
of these covariates on the outcomes through the use of binary variables as regres-
sors. An alternative is the use of interaction terms to allow the moral hazard 
effect to vary across sub-populations of interest but this approach is potentially 
cumbersome and is likely to lead to difficulties in the interpretation of the results 
given that it involves the interaction of at least three or four explanatory vari-
ables. One can consider estimating the simultaneous equation model developed in 
12 The authors found that the estimated moral hazard effect differs for individuals from 
different income unit composition. The length of hospital stay by elderly individuals from 
couple-type income units with private hospital insurance are 3.23 times higher than equivalent 
individuals who are uninsured. Duration of stay by privately insured couples with dependents 
are 2.78 times higher as compared to the equivalent without insurance. No evidence of moral 
hazard were observed for the remaining income unit groups. 
this study using the same dataset that was utilised in Savage and Wright (2003) 
and adopting similar methodological approaches to validate their results. This 
however will not be addressed in this study and left as a potential area for future 
work. 
In the analysis carried out in this chapter as well as Chapter 6, the use of good-
ness of fit to evaluate the performance of the single equation model against the 
simultaneous equation models would not be an appropriate strategy for model 
comparison. This is because the objective in the empirical analysis is not to 
maximise how well these models fit the data, but instead to obtain consistent 
estimates of the parameters. Of primary interest are the marginal effects of the 
insurance and patient type binary variables which in some applications are found 
to be endogenous due to the significance of some of the correlation parameters. 
This strongly suggest that the system of equation approach is necessary and justi-
fied. It would be to examine how the results would vary if different distributional 
assumptions were adopted. A potential candidate is the Negative Binomial re-
gression model with latent factors which handles endogenous regressors. Variants 
of models that are similar to this were applied in Deb and Trivedi (2006) and 
Atella and Deb (2008). This however is beyond the scope of this study and may 
be another area for future research. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
8.1 Contributions and key findings of the study 
This study contributes to the understanding of the determinants of individ-
uals' decisions to seek hospital care and purchase private health insurance in a 
mixed public and private hospital system as that of Australia. In Chapter 3, a 
mathematical model with explicit function forms was developed to theoretically 
examine the determinants of the intensity of care hospital care use, the choice 
to seek public or private care and the decision to purchase private hospital in-
surance. One feature that differentiates this inquiry from those undertaken in 
previous studies is the use of explicit forms in the theoretical model. This strat-
egy facilitates the use of comparative statics to identify how the utilisation and 
insurance decisions are influenced by the parameters of the model. A second fea-
ture of the study lies in the examination of the relationship between the severity 
of individuals' medical conditions and the decision to seek public or private health 
care. The theoretical model demonstrates that the intensity of health care use, 
the choice between public or private care and the decision to purchase insurance 
are interdependent. One key result from the analysis is that individuals with 
more severe medical conditions are expected to have a higher probability of seek-
ing treatment from the public sector because the duration of wait for public care 
is shorter due to priority setting in the public sector which is based on the clinical 
urgency of patients' medical conditions. Also, the availability of private hospital 
insurance reduces the effective price of private hospital care and increases both 
the probability that individuals seek private treatment and the intensity at which 
private hospital care is utilised. 
The structure of the theoretical model described in Chapter 3 was utilised 
as a guide to develop a novel simultaneous equation econometric model the ac-
commodates count and binary outcomes variables as well as endogenous binary 
regressors. Although a variety of methods have been developed to analyse count 
data models with endogenous regressors, there has so far been little attempts to 
extend these models to a system of simultaneous equations. This is described 
in Chapter 5. The econometric model is employed in Chapter 6 to analyse the 
determinants of the intensity of hospital admissions and the decision to purchase 
private health insurance using household data from the 2004-05 National Health 
Survey in Australia. The endogeneity of the private health insurance binary re-
gressor in the hospital admission equation is accounted for although the results 
indicate that there are no self selection effects into insurance. A key result from 
the analysis is that having private hospital insurance increases the expected num-
ber of hospital admissions by 19 percentage points each year. The findings also 
showed that the expected intensity of hospital admissions is higher for females in 
the childbearing years and for those who are not in employment. 
Chapter 7 empirically examines the determinants of the intensity of hospital 
care use and the decisions to seek public or private hospital care and purchase 
private health insurance using a system of simultaneous equations. Previous 
studies have examined each of these separately or in combination with one other 
theme. The simultaneous equation model described in Chapter 5 allows for the 
simultaneity of the insurance and patient type decisions. The results suggest that 
the insurance binary variable is endogenous in both the public/private patient 
choice and hospital care utilisation equations. Individuals with private hospital 
insurance are 82 percentage points more likely to seek hospital care as a private 
patient. The results also show that the expected length of hospital stay by private 
patients is on average 1.11 nights shorter than that of public patients which 
suggests that systematic differences exist in the types of medical conditions for 
which individuals seek public or private treatment. 
The empirical finding that hospital admissions by privately admitted patients 
involve shorter length of stay is consistent with the results from the theoretical 
model in Chapter 3 where it was shown that individuals with less severe medical 
conditions are expected to have a higher probability of seeking treatment from 
the private sector. Given that the expected duration of wait on public hospital 
waiting lists is inversely related to the severity of medical conditions, and the 
corresponding urgency of treatments, individuals who seek private hospital care is 
expected to do so for non-urgent medical conditions where the required treatment 
is simpler and elective in nature. The empirical result is also consistent with 
existing evidence in the literature which suggest that the public hospital system 
is utilised by patients with more complex and severe medical conditions requiring 
a greater intensity of treatment than that in private hospitals. On a policy 
dimension, the effects of government initiatives to encourage the purchase of 
private hospital insurance are likely to be limited to reducing public hospital 
waiting lists and lowering waiting times for public treatment. 
8.2 Overall strengths and weaknesses 
A key strength of this study lies in the structural approach to the empirical 
analysis. The econometric model that is employed is premised on a microeconomic 
model that describes how individuals make decisions to use hospital care and 
purchase private health insurance in a mixed public and private system such as 
that in Australia. From the theoretical model, we observe that the intensity of 
hospital care and decisions on patient type and insurance choices are outcomes 
of individuals' utility maximising behaviour. In the econometric modeling in 
Chapter 7, careful attention is given to account for the simultaneity of insurance 
binary variable in the patient type and hospital intensity equations as well as the 
patient type variable in the hospital intensity equation. 
Overall, the lack of more detailed data on key outcome variables is an impor-
tant limitation of the study. One limitation of the data is that information on the 
number of hospital nights is made available as interval values which constraints 
the richness of the data. Appropriate measures have been undertaken to overcome 
this limitations and sensitivity analysis have shown that the results obtained do 
not vary significantly. A second constraint with the data is that it captures in-
formation on individuals' patient type choice and length of stay only from the 
last hospital episode for which one cannot analyse the dynamics of hospital care 
use. Overall, the study utilises self-reported data for the analysis and, as with 
most self-reported data, there is the possibility of inaccurate reporting. However, 
in the absence of additional data that allows one to validate the accuracy of the 
data used in this study, it is impossible to determine the extent of misreporting. 
8.3 Future research 
One area for future research is to conduct policy simulations to examine how 
policy instruments (e.g. through the tax system) can influence changes to private 
health insurance and consequently the effects on the utilisation of public and pri-
vate hospital care and health care expenditures. This area of inquiry has not been 
examined in this study as this exercise requires detailed information on house-
hold income and family structure, both of which are not available in the data. 
Two potentially feasible datasets that can be employed for this purpose are the 
Household Expenditure Survey collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data. 
These datasets contained detailed information on household income, expenditure 
and family composition which can be used to examine the impact of taxes on 
the decision to purchase private health insurance. These may be combined with 
the results from this study to predict the effects on the utilisation of hospital 
care. A second area of future research would involve the use of hospital admin-
istrative data such as the National Hospital Morbidity Database maintained by 
the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) or the Victoria Admitted 
Episodes Database. These datasets contains individual-level information such as 
length of hospital stay, patient admission and hospital types, diagnosis of med-
ical conditions, and the medical treatments performed which can potentially be 
tracked across time. The nature of the data allows one to examine the dynamics 
of hospital care use which can potentially reveal interesting and policy relevant 
insights. 
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Appendix A 
Derivations for Economic Model 
Workings 
This section presents the detailed derivations for the computations in the preced-
ing sections. 
Deriving 7 7 1 Q 0 ( S ) 
To derive m j 0(s) in each health state s, first substitute q — 0, (3.2) and (3.10) 
into (3.15) and differentiate the result with respect to rriofi(s) to obtain 
- l 7 Cr 
Using (A.l) and rearranging the terms, we can obtain 
m C-y Ss 
m + Ss T - 1 m (m + Ss)2 
(A.l) 
mmfa 1 \ m -fids 1 + - I m = —— Y - T f i s ) (A.2) 
\ 7 ) 7 Trr 
We can now solve for m in the quadratic equation above by completing the 
square by first adding 
rearranging, we obtain 
G 1 to both sides of the equation. After some 
m2 + 5sll + - \m + S i Ss 7 Tm Y - Tite(s) + m 
(A.3) 
which is equivalent to 
m + + - _6s_ 
lTm 
v - mm + 
2 I I (A.4) 
Taking the square root of both sides in equation (A.4), the optimal intensity 
m0io(s) is expressed as 
mo,o(s) 1 ± \ 
_6s_ 
lTm 
Y - Wmm + mm FSf l <A-5) 
where the solution in (A.5) is defined only if Y—Tite{s) + i f o f l + i > 0 
+ ^ . Given that the intensity which implies that Y - Tite(s) > - 7T m Ss 
of hospital care m* can only assume non-negative values, the solution in (A.5) is 
restricted to 
+ \ 
6s 
lTm 
Y - M + • • mm (A.6) 
and 
Y - Ttte(s) > 0 
D e r i v i n g m l 0 ( s ) 
Correspondingly, the solutions to the optimal intensity of public hospital care for 
an individual with insurance are 
«ii,o(s) i ± \ 
Ss 
lTm 
y - p i - Ttte(s) + Wi 1 + i (A.7) 
For the same reasons as that described above, the solution is restricted to 
mi,olsJ I A 
Ss 
7 Tm 
Y-P- Tite(s) HI mm (A.8) 
and 
Y - P I Ttte(s) > 0 
Deriving rao,i(s) and raj ^(s) 
Similarly, the solutions to the optimal intensity of private hospital care for an 
individual without and with insurance are respectively 
mo,i(s) B + \ 
Ss 
7 
Y 
(»lPm+pi) + Tn, 1 * 1 mml 
(A.9) 
m i,iW = + \ 
Ss 
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(A.10) 
and 
Y Y-P 
(VPm + Pq) + Tm' (r]pm + pi) + T„ 
> 0 
Change in m*dq(s) given unit change in s 
To examine how TO-Q 0(s) changes with a unit increase in illness severity s from s 
to s + 1, substitute s and s + 1 into (3.17) to obtain 
\ 
Ss 
7 Tm 
Y - T{te(s) H (A.11) 
\ 
S{s + 1) 
7 Tm Y - Tit
e(s + 1) + \S(S + I)ll+1- tf 
(A.12) 
Prom (A. 11) and (A. 12) above, we can observe that 
_5s_ 
7 I 
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Ymte(s+i) (A.13) 
given that te(s) > *e(s j-1). Also, for Y - 7]£e(s) > 0, 
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(A. 14) 
Correspondingly, for Y -§7}te(s + 1) > 0, 
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(A.15) 
On the basis of the conditions in (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15), one can conclude 
that 
mo,o(s + ! ) > "*S,o(«) 
The same argument applies to the remaining three sets of optimal solutions 
to mj 1 ( S ) , m\ o and ml x 
P r o o f : s ^ f < mo o 
As shown in (3.17), mj0 (s) is 
B M W \ 
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Hence, we can derive s A ' which is 
1 <5s 
Am* 27rm 0,0 s — — 
nf H 
ra 
As 
Ss 
iTm Y - Tit
e(s) + ¥s • I - i s (A16> 
Using the above, we can proof that s ^ ^ 2 < m*Q 0 by showing that 
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Cross multiplying the denominator on the LHS with the RHS in A. 17, we 
obtain 
1 Ss 
u s 
Y - T t f i s ) mm Ss 1 
(A.18) 
which is true. The same arguments can be applied to show that s A°,:l < m^ l-\-(3 
P r o o f : - 1 < ^ < 0 
Using (3.19), is expressed as 
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Appendix B 
Estimation Program Codes 
-start of program codes-
cap prog drop progname 
program define progname 
version 9.0 
args lnf thetal theta2 theta3 theta4 theta5 theta6 theta7 
local tt4 = 'theta4' 
local tt5 ft ltheta5' 
local tt6 = 'theta6' 
if ltt4' < -8 { 
local tt4 = -8} 
if 'tt4' > 8 { 
local tt4 8} 
if 'tt5' < -8 { 
local tt4 = -8} 
if 'tt5' > 8 { 
local tt4 = .8} 
if 'tt6' < -8 { 
local tt4 = -8} 
if 'tt6' > 8 { 
local tt4 = 8} 
tempvar rhol2 rhol3 rho23 
qui gen double lrhol2' = 0 
qui gen double 'rhol3' = 0 
qui gen double 'rho23' = 0 
qui replace 'rhol2' =[exp(2*'tt4')-l]/[exp(2*'tt4')+l] 
qui replace 'rhol3' ^[exp(2*'tt5')-l]/[exp(2*'tt5')+l] 
qui replace 'rho23' =[exp(2*'tt6')-l]/[exp(2*'tt6')+l] 
if ( 'rhol2'^=. | 'rhol3'==. | 'rho23'==.) { 
qui replace 'lnf'=. 
exit} 
local R12='rhol2' 
local R13='rhol3' 
local R23='rho23' 
tempvar denl den2 den3 den4 tousel touse2 touse3 touse4 tempvar simdenl sim-
den2 simden3 simden4 
local repl M -insert number of replications desired-
qui gen double 'denl' M 0 
qui gen double 'simdenl' = 0 
qui gen double 'tousel'=0 
tempvar qli q2i 
qui gen byte 'qli' = (2*($ML_y2 =0)-l) 
qui gen byte 'q2i' = (2*($ML_y3 =0)-l) 
forvalues i#l/ 'repl ' { 
qui replace 'tousel' = exp(-exp('thetar)*exp('theta7'*xi'i'))*((exp('thetal') 
*exp('theta7'*xi'i'))A($ML_yl)/(exp(lngamma($ML_yl + 1))) 
*binorm('qli'*('theta2' + 'R12'*xi'i')/sqrt(l-('R12'A(2))),'q2i'*('theta3' 
+ 'R13'*xi'i') 
/sqrt(l-('R13'A(2))), 'qli'*'q2i'*('R23' - 'R12'*'R13')) 
qui replace 'denl' = 'denl' + 'tousel'} 
qui replace 'simdenl'Bln('denl'/ 'repl') 
qui replace 'lnf' |= 'simdenl' 
end 
-end of program codes-
Appendix C 
Regression Results: Demand for 
Private Hospital Insurance 
Table C.l: Demand for Private Health Insurance: Hospital Table 
Explanatory Variables Coeff S.E dF/dX S.E 
Female 0.196*** 0.068 0.077*** 0.027 
Age 1.258*** 0.237 0.009*** 0.001 
Age-squared -0.857*** 0.226 
Childbearing -0.112 0.135 -0.044 0.053 
Couple 0.267*** 0.067 0.105*** 0.026 
Depchild -0.140 0.091 -0.055 0.036 
Country of Birth: 
Main English -0.303*** 0.091 -0.117*** 0.034 
Others -0.178* 0.093 -0.069* 0.036 
Household Inc 0.607*** 0.148 0.049***,a 0.006 
Household Inc-Sq -0.175 0.139 
Health Card -0.484*** 0.095 -0.190*** 0.037 
Education 
Vocational 0.129* 0.074 0.051* 0.029 
Diploma 0.435*** 0.106 0.172*** 0.041 
Degree 0.551*** 0.100 0.217*** 0.038 
Occupation: 
Manager /Admin 0.362** 0.159 0.144** 0.062 
Professional 0.106 0.137 0.042 0.054 
Asc Professional 0.344** 0.138 0.137** 0.054 
Tradesperson -0.006 0.159 0.002 0.063 
Adv Clerical/Service 0.466* 0.274 0.183* 0.103 
Int Clerical/Service 0.135 0.126 0.054 0.050 
Production/Transport -0.175 0.180 -0.068 0.069 
Ele Clerical/Service -0.056** 0.023 -0.022** 0.009 
Labourer -0.438** 0.172 -0.164*** 0.059 
Alcohol 3-day Risk -0.123 0.103 -0.048 0.040 
Smoker Regular -0.496*** 0.082 -0.189*** 0.029 
Regions: 
VIC 0.159 0.098 0.063 0.039 
QLD 0.301*** 0.100 0.119*** 0.039 
SA 0.330*** 0.096 0.131*** 0.038 
WA 0.368*** 0.105 0.146*** 0.041 
TAS 0.425*** 0.118 0.168*** 0.046 
NT 0.089 0.533 0.036 0.212 
ACT -0.115 0.135 -0.045 0.052 
Remoteness 
Inner Aus -0.183** 0.080 -0.072** 0.031 
Others -0.267*** 0.091 -0.104*** 0.035 
Constant -3.277*** 0.395 
a. The change in probability of insurance given a $100 increase in weekly household income. 
